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REGIONAL BLACK SEA ARCHITECTURE AND CONSEQUENCES FOR THE REGIONAL COOPERATION FRAMEWORK

Alina Homorozean*

Abstract**: Sometimes considered an asset, other times a liability, the Black Sea started recently to be regarded as a region. However, the Black Sea Region (BSR) lacks a common vision, often due to the complicated and often inefficient nexus of regional cooperation initiatives. Following the logic of finding regional solutions for regional problems, this paper aims to assess existing institutional and regional initiatives, reflecting on the implications for the success of Black Sea regionalism in creating patterns of sustained and sustainable development and a high degree of actors’ involvement. This paper concentrates on two complementary research questions: What is the regional order in the BSR and what does it imply for its future? What is the current contribution of the most significant cooperation initiatives and what are the consequences for regional institutionalism? For the purpose of this paper, I draw on best-practices from other two regions: the Northern Dimension and South-East Asia. Through a comparative perspective, I suggest an analysis of the most important initiatives: BSEC, CDC, Black Sea Synergy, Eastern Partnership, Baku Initiative and the BSF. This paper argues that a possible strategic solution for successful policy development lies in the creation of an integrated regional cooperation package, functioning on the principles of multi-speed and multi-dimensional cooperation in several policy fields, in a context in which the BSR seems to be caught between two paradigms: a European and a Russian-oriented one.

**Keywords**: Black Sea Region (BSR), regional order, regional cooperation framework, Northern Dimension, South-East Asian regionalism.

1. Introduction

At a conference, the German minister Erler (2009) commented that “before 1989, no one would have discussed power-sharing in the Black Sea. […] The question today is: do we consider the Black Sea an asset or a liability?” Although it covers just 0.3% of EU’s territory (European Commission, 2009a), the Black Sea has an important influence on the wider Black Sea region (WBSR), both in environmental, security, energy and regional development terms. It is considered by scholars of international relations of increasing importance for geopolitical, military-strategic and geo-economic reasons. While being a region at the intersection of several major world arenas – Europe (EU), Russia, Central Asia and the Middle East –, it also constitutes the South-Eastern frontier of

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the EU and NATO and is situated between two spheres of influence: Russian and Western. Moreover, the EU recently (2007) discovered the Black Sea as a geopolitical hub of particular strategic importance in order to foster sustained development and regional cooperation, and started regarding it as an integral part of the European project; the European Parliament increasingly puts the idea of “An EU strategy for the Black Sea” on its work agenda. However, at the moment there is a complete lack of common vision whether this region should be on a middle or long-term perspective. Among many other reasons, the underlying explanation for this situation lies in the insufficient understanding and acceptance of the regional order, the resulting complex security and cooperation architecture and the nexus of more or less inefficient regional cooperation initiatives/institutions which, paradoxically, seem more to undermine than reinforce each others’ activity in their current uncoordinated mechanisms.

Following the logic of finding regional solutions for regional problems, the aim of this paper is to briefly assess the various – and often competing – institutional and cooperation initiatives in the Black Sea Region (BSR) and examine their interaction and the level of their complementarities, reflecting thus on the potential implications for the success in terms of creating synergies and patterns of sustainable development. Starting from the special features of the Black Sea regionalism, I therefore suggest both a short analysis of the local players strategic interests, as well as of the current regional multilateralism initiatives (especially BSEC, Community of Democratic Choice, Baku Initiative, Black Sea Synergy (BSS), Eastern Partnership (EaP), Black Sea Forum), insisting on their role and prospects of future institutional and policy development, in a context in which they seem to be caught between two development paradigms: an European (ENP, BSS and EaP) and a Russian-oriented one.

For the purpose of this paper, I also draw on best practices and some case-study analysis conducted on two other regions: the Northern Dimension (Baltic region mainly) and South-East Asia, with ASEAN as a regional leader and many other initiatives that coexist and offer this type of regionalism particular characteristics. Last, the conclusions summarize the findings on the main research questions and propose some suggestions for the region progressing in reaching its full potential in terms of economic, political and social development. In term of methodology, while deriving from the main research conducted on the Black Sea area in the last years, this paper conducts a small-scale constellation analysis, consisting of an interests’ analysis of the main actors, a perception analysis, as well as a behaviour analysis (within the cooperation initiatives), in order to underline the existing link between actors’ interests, perceptions and strategies and the actual cooperation framework, which has only rarely been underlined by existing research. Second, this paper surpasses the purely European approach, while looking, besides the Northern Dimension, at an apparently far and distinct regional order and institutionalism based rather on a security dimension in South-East Asia. Thus, this paper supports the theoretical view that the new world order is characterized by region-formation and different types of regionalism. Therefore, we speak of a world and a Europe of regions, in which the BSR is a small, but strategic part.
2. The regional architecture of the BSR: main players and geopolitical interests

The geostrategic value of the BSR made the region’s development particularly interesting to both internal (from within the region) and external players. For practical purposes, this paper splits the main actors involved or with stakes in the BSR into three distinct categories, depending on their geopolitical status, regional interests and the instruments by which they pursue them. The first category comprises littoral states, such as Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine or Georgia. In a second category we include the regional powers, which claim historical and ideological roots over the Black Sea: Russia and Turkey. The third category is composed of global players, which express geopolitical interests in its development and which created themselves Black Sea-related policy areas: the USA and the EU. There is clear evidence of an overlap of both influence and interests of global actors in the wider region, of regional former and current powers, as well as increased regional integration and multilateral institutionalism.

2.1 Local players and their strategies

Romania’s regional importance is driven from its geo-strategic position as a new South-Eastern EU border, its market significance for regional trade and investments, the existence of the Danube and the Danube Delta, the relatively low cost of labour and existence of high qualified human resources, the potential of agricultural resources, fishery, tourism and transportation, but also from its cultural heritage and the fact that it constitutes a meeting point of several cultures: Orthodox, Islamic and Western. Since it became an EU member, but also in the decade before, Romania has been developing certain ambitions concerning its role in the BSR. Romania even created several cooperation frameworks (Black Sea Forum) and it cooperates in all regional initiatives. However, in order to play a more significant role, Romania needs EU support and western cooperation. While increasing its participation in regional forums, the Romanian foreign policy did fail in one important area, that of pursuing stronger bilateral ties with other BS countries, especially Russia and Ukraine, which also aim at (sub)-regional leadership. While considering itself a Latin enclave in a “Slavic sea”, Romania long ignored the rapprochement of its neighbourhood, and focused its foreign policy more towards the West, i.e. NATO (USA) and the EU. While this is normal for a country aiming at becoming a part of the Western world, Romania paradoxically ignored its geographical location, exactly the one that Romanian researchers and international scholars throw more attention about – the Black Sea axis. This suggests some sort of disagreement between the political class and researchers, which has to be solved in the years to come. Bulgaria, also a new EU member, has been concentrating more on building long-term agreements with Russia or Turkey and established itself as a possible transit country for several energy pipeline projects. Bulgaria has also taken an active part in most of the regional initiatives and even hosts a Black Sea Border Coordination and Information Center (BSBCIC) in Burgas in order to strengthen the efficiency of border management. However, Bulgaria still has a certain institutional weakness and problems concerning corruption, fight of organized crime, justice system (EU Final Monitoring Report, 2007). In summary, Romania and Bulgaria are EU’s eyes and ears in the BSR and advocates of the Black Sea Synergy in Brussels (Tassinari, 2005). Especially Romanian MEPs and leaders manage to put Black Sea or Danube issues on EU’s agenda and lobby for more concrete actions, while
Romania and Bulgaria will also take a leading role in the Environment, respectively the Energy BSS-Partnerships of the EU (2010). Concerning the other two riparian states, Ukraine and Georgia, they both managed to change the geopolitical balance of influence of the BSR, after the Rose and Orange revolutions and after the Georgian-Russian conflict in August 2008. Their regional role of Achilles’ heel for regional stability has to be acknowledged. While playing the role of promoter of European orientation for the Post-Soviet countries of the BSR, Ukraine tries to assert itself as a regional hub and sub-regional leader. For Ukraine, the Black Sea is both economically and militarily vital, due to its fertile lands, navigable rivers (even in winter), and to its peacekeeping role. Ukrainian regional ambitions cover the prospects of NATO membership (which at the moment seem rather low), securitizing the Caucasus, demilitarizing the BSR and maintaining a balance of power that impedes military and political domination of the BSR, especially Russian one. However, due to the Western rapprochement of these countries (also in institutional terms, by creating the Community of Democratic Choice, which excludes Russia), Moscow reacted promptly. The Black Sea is similarly vital for Georgia, whose only access to Europe is via the sea, due to the rugged terrain of the Caucasus and because of Russian hostility (Stratfor, 2008). These tensions should be kept under control and these countries should try to balance Russian with Western interest, even more than the other regional players, due to their pivotal role in forging regional stability. Also, while putting some “soft security issues” on the cooperation agenda, regional actors should acknowledge the “hard security nature of energy” and act so as to balance the most important contradictory interests (Tassinari, 2005).

2.2 Regional powers and their strategies
While Turkey and Russia possess different strategic interests and geopolitical strategies, they follow the same goal, that of becoming a regional leader in the BSR. Their foreign policy agendas concerning the Black Sea partially overlap, both countries wishing to distance the United States from using of the Black Sea for military operations against the Middle East and prevent it from becoming a NATO preserve (Fotiou, 2009), but they also compete for “regional hegemony”-especially in the Caucasus and Caspian area. Because the BSR is a strategic corridor connecting Europe to the energy rich Caspian and Central Asian regions (Staiano, 2009), Turkey’s foreign policy ambition is to become a major energy hub and a „buffer state“ for European security. Turkey takes its bridging role between supply and demand points very seriously and also aspires of becoming an EU member. Furthermore, Turkey is a classical US-partner and a regional observatory coveted by the West (Çelikpala, 2010). Therefore, it is neither efficient nor reliable to establish any comprehensive regional organization in the region, without Turkey’s participation. Turkey’s self-awareness has increased during the last decade. As a result, issues and territories that had formerly been seen as lying beyond its geostrategic orbit currently fall within its strategic responsibility area. Particularly after the Georgian-Russian war, Ankara has been pursuing a two-dimensional goal: to stabilize its volatile strategic neighbourhood by reaching breakthrough in the settlement of regional conflicts (regional stability and cooperation) and to secure energy flows and alternative energy transportation routes (e.g. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan). Turkey’s interests are mostly geostrategic, economic (first financial and commercial Caspian hub), cultural and ethnic (pan-turkism). For all the reasons exposed above, Turkey is working hard to
improve the existing regional organizations and initiatives. Turkey was the first to take a proactive attitude and set-up BSEC and Blackseafor (Naval Task Force), in an attempt to fill in the strategic void after the USSR collapse (Karadeniz, 2007). Yet, every Turkish initiative on Caucasus was somehow hindered by Russia (Axis, 2005). Nowadays the two regional players have started cooperating or at least tolerate each others’ projects, while competing for Europe’s supply routes. Turkish-Russian relations now reached the level of “multidimensional strategic partnership”, which is good for regional stability and security, yet much still has to be done for this rapprochement. One of the latest Turkish regional initiatives is the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (August 2008), which could set the basis of an enduring regional security regime (Çelikpala, 2010). The CSCP was established also in order to make a fresh proposal by securing Russia’s involvement (Kheleshvili, 2008). For the last two decades, Turkey has supported or initiated BSEC, Blackseafor, Black Sea Harmony in order to assist regional transition and support BSR’s integration into the global economy (CBS, 2009a). Turkey also welcomed most EU initiatives, but the problem is that Turkey would -whenever possible- seek to engage partners on its own terms.

For Russia, the key strategic value of the Black Sea consists in the possibility of controlling the energy resources of the Caspian Sea (Regnum, 2008). Consolidating its position of regional power, Russia follows a strategy of reassertion of its influence in the “near abroad”, focused mainly on two goals: keeping control first over its former traditional sphere of influence (many of the WBSR-states) and –second - of energy production and transit infrastructure and export and of the key energy resources, for continuing rehearsing regional pressure, while dampening the strategic influence of other big players. Other interests include: preventing anti-Russian (military) coalitions (also Ukraine and Georgia’s NATO-membership) and fighting separatist incentives and terrorism. Since Putin’s era, the Caspian region became a key strategic issue of Russian foreign policy (Foreign Policy Concept, 2000), while the BSR was somehow neglected (Russia still lacks a BS-strategy), even though, historically has considered the BSR to be a crucial component of its national security. Recently, the BSR has become important to Russia, especially regarding Ukraine’s and Georgia’s political trajectories, transit of European gas through the BSR or North-Caucasus secessionism. A reason for the Russian participation in regional initiatives is that it fears encirclement by the West and thus works to counteract NATO and EU influence (Black Sea Commission, 2009a). For the very same reasons, adding that of prestige, Russia keeps significant regional military presence (Sevastopol, Ukraine, Transnistria). Analysts claim, however, that the Black Sea fleet is more a symbolic presence, than a real military concern. The extent of naval and military power lies much more in its ability to project power, as witnessed in Georgia, and its domination by virtue of land-power and contiguous territory (Marketos, 2009). Currently, relations between Russia and the West entered a period of active cooperation (Radvanyi, 2006, p. 9). Moscow is weaving a complicated new web of regional alliances, drawing deeply into Russia’s collective historical memory as a regional power (Cornell et al, 2007, p. 10). Russia is seeking to provide new infrastructure for energy transit to Europe from the Caspian region, which is aimed at reducing the rationale for projects such as Nabucco, which would connect the region’s resources to the European market through...
Trans-Caspian pipeline and Turkey. This shows that, due to security of energy supply reasons, Russia still balances cooperation with competition-based behaviour towards other BS-states: although it reinforced its presence in the BSR, it is quite unwilling to actively participate in regional initiatives. Furthermore, currently, a possible “threat” for the BSR is represented more by Russia’s participation in the Northern Dimension. Therefore, a main challenge to the regional institutionalism’s success is to overcome Russia’s regional isolation and transform its well-developed network of bilateral relations into multilateral ones.

2.3 Global actors and their interests

In fact, in the first decade of the post-Cold War era, the United States kept a rather low profile when it came to Black Sea issues, the main priority being how to deal with post-Soviet Russia (Commission of the Black Sea, 2009a). Starting from the mid-1990s, Washington has prioritized the enhancement of US power projection so as to guarantee the continued flow of energy to major US commercial partners (Ruseckas, 2007, p. 7). As in South-East Asia, US foreign policy aims at securing its regional influence on one hand (a reason for supporting Ukraine and Georgia’s NATO accession) and the energy supply from the BSR and Caspian region, on the other. Washington thus made energy security a priority of its trade and foreign policy (Marketos, 2009). Its main strategy is that of indirect power projection. During the Bush era the strategy became: securing more oil/gas from foreign sources for supporting US economic growth and using the new strategic relationships to enhance transportation capabilities for its arenas of military operation (Iraq, Afghanistan) (Sypko, 2007). After the end of 1990s, the US strategy towards the BSR was based on the promotion of democracy and market economy, energy security and soft-security (fighting terrorism, organized crime, and the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction). The US supports several security and trans-border cooperation initiatives, such as the Black Sea Border Security Initiative (Bulgaria) and the Black Sea Civil Emergency Response Planning funded by the US Defense Department. Also, in order to improve its regional position, the US keeps close bilateral security ties with regional actors such as Romania, Georgia, Ukraine and Bulgaria. Furthermore, successive US administrations have supported NATO’s security role in the region. On the other hand, exactly this strengthened NATO presence in the BSR both through its Partnership-for-Peace Program or Membership Action Plans contributed indirectly to Russia’s perception of insecurity and therefore created certain tensions in the relation between the two countries (CBS, 2009b). Similar to the US, the European Union also only recently discovered the BSR as a bordering region with a development agenda and geopolitical, security, environment and economic challenges. The main EU positions and initiatives towards the Black Sea are summarized in the next chapter of this paper.

Currently, the BSR is one of the most multi-polar regions of the world, yet, due to actors such as Turkey and Russia, which claim regional control, the regional balance of power is often changing. However, Turkey and Russia are different in their strategies: Turkey is more similar to China in Asia, in the sense that it acts more peacefully and tries to become a benevolent leader, while Russia is similar to Japan in SE-Asia, i.e. a country feared for what it did in the past and for what it could do in the future – a leadership based on fear and pressure. A solution for better understanding the implications of these aspects is to look at South-East Asia, which has been dealing for centuries with the same
fear and ultimately decided to engage all actors, even the ones she feared.

2.4 Lessons from South-East Asian regionalism

The South-East Asian regional order includes three great powers (China, Japan, USA) and a fourth power (India) aspiring to rise to this status, four nuclear powers (China, India, Pakistan, North Korea) and three nuclear-threshold-states (Japan, Korea, Taiwan), described as Asian tigers and dragons, and several states which claim a profound ideological and cultural influence. With few exceptions, most Southeast-Asian countries have had a colonial experience and therefore know how important hierarchical relations are and have a long experience in resisting Chinese or Japanese potential threat (Buzan, 2003, p. 12). Eastern Asia is currently witnessing the emergence of a regional order with a multilateral institutional architecture based on a series of increasingly shared norms about interstate relationships and security as forms of “cooperative security”. Although local leaders consider East-Asian order multipolar (i.e. US external dominance moderated and balanced by other regional powers), in many aspects, the SEA regional order is rather hierarchical, a term implemented in Asian historical and social traditions. The unspoken regional strategy is that of balancing against both USA and China, through unfolding these in international institutions and multilateral agreements. Two tactics are applied here: on one hand, the enmeshment of actors in complex agreements and norms of international institutions; on the other, creating a balance of influence that comprises indirect military balancing policies undertaken unilaterally or bilaterally, aimed at deterring a range of potential threats (many of which also apply to the BSR), and regional “complex balancing” policies (multiple balancing targets, with the wider aim of economic and security cooperation). From a theoretical perspective, the reason for the increased regionalism is offered foremost by realist theories which claim that regional multilateral institutions become more firmly rooted in SE-Asia as a way to rebalance the regional power distribution, which created fear and instability. This last argument applies for the BSR as well; however, the BSR did not yet completely acknowledge the major security threats in case of non-cooperation. Also, SEA institutionalism differs from the European in three ways: the latter is generally more “formal and political” and relies more on “state bargains and legal norms”, while Asia’s is “informal and economic” (based on “market transactions and ethnic or national capitalism”) (Buzan & Waever, 2007). Also, their attitudes toward sovereignty differ: “Europe’s regionalism is more transparent and intrusive than Asia’s”; while “absent in Asia are the pooling of sovereignty and far-reaching multilateral arrangements. However, these observations only apply for the European integration process itself and less for the BSR. Furthermore, another common characteristic of SEA and BSR is the lack of a very powerful and influential regional leader. While Indonesia is unable to act as SEA leader, even though it is the biggest in terms of territory and population, since it lacks stability and power (in a realist sense), while Russia is unable and -to a certain extent- unwilling to become the regional BSR leader (but wants control), due to its lost of “privileged sphere of influence” and to its unclear strategic roadmap towards the BSR. Most SEA countries have had a colonial experience and therefore know how important hierarchical relations are and have a long experience in resisting Chinese/ Japanese (Russian in the BSR case) threat. However, none of the BS-states enjoys much soft-power and acceptance, except maybe
Turkey and Romania, which try to become (sub)-regional soft-power-based leaders. Summarizing the main features by theoretical inputs, we can characterize the new security order in SEA as institution-building, balancing behaviour against the USA and China and modified hegemony (Goh, 2007). The same attributes could also apply for the BSR: the institutional approaches in the last two decades show a clear tendency towards regional institution-building with the indirect goal of balancing behaviour against Russia (from USA, Turkey). Concerning actors’ roles, Turkey could take up China’s role in the BSR, namely to be perceived as a constructive partner and a good neighbour, following a proactive strategy of “engaging the periphery”. Up to the political will, Romania’s role in the BSR could become similar to both Japan and Indonesia’s in SEA, although, from a constructivist perspective, Romania lacks the perceived sub-regional leadership role, legitimacy (due to economic and infrastructure problems) and power of influence over the BSR. As shown in this chapter, the Black Sea and Central Asia are two geostrategic regions, in which security and foreign policy interests of Russia, the US, Turkey, Iran and even China collide. Therefore, the EU is confronted in her instable wide neighbourhood not only with strategic questions of energy supply and security, but also with several global and regional actors.

3. Cooperation initiatives in the Black Sea region

The purpose of regional cooperation in the Black Sea area is to foster sustained development (Manoli, 2010). As underlined by Mr. Adrian Pop (2004), the BSR currently suffers from an “inflation” and supra-saturation of cooperation incentives with often overlapping agendas, but also with different memberships and a very low degree of inter-institutional coordination (see Table 1- Annex). While the Western world hardly paid any attention to the East, starting with the early 1990s, the East-European countries have been rapidly engaging in both political and economic transitions with important consequences also for the civil society and the business community, as well as in regional cooperation schemes meant to solve regional problems and allow interstate information exchange. Despite of the lack of a regional identity (Isic et al, 2008) and often conflicting interests, the necessity for governments, regional and international organizations to involve civil society in regional dialogue increased (Zongur, 2009). Apart from peace-keeping and conflict resolution efforts, numerous other ongoing regional cooperation initiatives aim at fostering regional peace, stability and prosperity (Erler, 2009), yet they are quite ineffective in comparison with their objectives. As Manoli argues, the problem with regional cooperation is that it is often considered just from a policy perspective (2009a) and thus only rarely accompanied by proper instruments and – I would add – SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, time-related) objectives. This chapter provides an overview of the most important regional cooperation initiatives, their impact and prospects for development, against the background of similar cooperation initiatives in the Baltic Sea region (Northern Dimension) and in South-East Asia.

3.1 Analysis of the main cooperation initiatives

3.1.1 Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) (Turkish initiative)

On the ground of close historical, cultural and social ties, the BSR includes Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Romania,
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Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia and covers 20 mil. km² and a population of 350 mil. Babaoglu (2005) argued that the Black Sea security and stability architecture relies on two main pillars: BSEC and Blackseafor (on-call naval task force), both of which are Turkish initiatives and are based on the idea of constructing regional peace through regional cooperation. Initiated in 1992 as an informal intergovernmental meeting and transformed into an regional economic organisation on 1 May 1999, BSEC is the most important institution in the BSR, similar to ASEAN in South-East Asia or CBSS¹ in the Baltic area, using its soft power to strengthen regional economic interdependence and embed all relevant actors (12) in chains of interdependencies through a multilateral framework of about 33 distinct initiatives and action plans: Those are aimed at political and economic cooperation between member states in order to ensure peace, stability, prosperity and good-neighbourly relations in the BSR (BSEC, 2010). However, throughout the years, BSEC (headquarters: Istanbul) has failed to move beyond an exchange between the heterogeneous interests of the members and is as a result considered inefficient (Isic et al, 2008). During its almost two decades of existence, BSEC has undergone several transformations: after several years of existence, the organization had to redefine its objectives, and during the 10th Summit (2002) the Council of Foreign Ministers officially included the hard security field on the organization’s agenda. However, this step did not lead to the much-desired change, because the BSEC members belong to different political and security organizations and have not always convergent security interests; so this led to a weak political engagement and a weak willingness to create a proper and concrete framework for regional security in which Russia or Turkey would play an essential role (Garnet, 2007). On the other hand, as compared to other regional initiatives (NATO, OSCE), BSEC has not yet developed the instruments and mechanisms to act in the field of hard security. However, BSEC’s structure is quite professional and includes the Parliamentary Assembly, a Council of Foreign Ministers, a Permanent Secretariat, an International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS, Athens) and a Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB, Thessaloniki), which should receive more political and financial support in its role as the only regionally owned development bank and be complemented by other IFI funds or funds from the ENPI and NIF. While its working structure is quite flexible (which is in fact good if it is do be adapted so as to support the BSS), its decision-making is based on numerous procedural rules, yet countries try to take decisions unanimously. However, one major problem concerning BSEC structure and mechanisms refers to the top-down view: the organization functions based on intergovernmental meetings, with few prospects for decision-making coming from other actors. On the other hand, this intergovernmental cooperation tries to encompass all strategic spheres of cooperation: energy, transport, communications, trade and economic development, banking and finance, institutional renewal and good governance, combating organised crime, environmental protection, agriculture, cooperation in healthcare issues, emergency assistance, research and development, education, tourism, culture, facilitation of transit and customs procedures, exchange of statistical data and the promotion of SMEs. On the negative side, BSEC could so far

¹ Council of the Baltic Sea States, political forum for regional inter-governmental cooperation in the Baltic area
only marginally address several of these issues (mainly transportation, environment, healthcare and culture issues) and – contrary to its nature, of economic organization – it has been so far less successful in promoting regional trade and economic convergence and setting-up a free trade area, although it covers an area with a population of 330 million, with rich natural and human resources, but also an attractive investment area (resources, transportation and shipment routes). Furthermore, it is actually impossible for the BSEC to have a free trade area, because the EU has a common trade policy and some BSEC member states are either accession candidates or actually EU MS. The major setback is that BSEC so far received less financial support from its members in general and Russia, in particular. Also, its second initial goal (create a cooperation process based on business interests) failed, especially because the private sector remained to a large extent outside the decision-making process (the above mentioned top-down view). Established in November 1992, the BSEC Working Group on Trade and Economic Development has considered a wide range of issues relating to the trade exchanges and economic cooperation, but its last meeting was held in February 2008 and rejected the idea of creating a preferential trade regime in the region (BSEC, 2010). This demonstrates that there is a clear need to further strengthen BSEC’s business voice, with a view to promote a more result-oriented approach. On the other hand, paradoxically, by the creation of a working group to combat organized crime and deal with natural disasters (1998), one to deal with border controls and counterterrorism (2002) and a network of liaison-officers between the interior ministers (2004), BSEC de facto already exceeded its official status as a regional economic organization, undertaking tasks in the security field.

The main factors that so far impeded BSEC from reaching its objectives are: (1) the lack of a benevolent leader state, which can take upon itself a good part of its costs (Greece and Turkey play partially this role); (2) the existence of some unresolved hard security problems; (3) the avoidance of sensitive economic issues; (4) bureaucratization; (5) the consensual decision-making mechanism and (6) the lack of regional coordination with other initiatives and duplication of objectives. Summarizing, we could say that “thinking regionally has not become the highest priority for any Black Sea state” (Pavliuk & Klympush-Tsintsadze, 2004). Also, the attitudes of the BSR-states towards the region differ: while Russia and Turkey used it to keep regional power and retaining control (through the decision-making mechanism), for Romania, Bulgaria and even Ukraine it provided a tool for European integration and gaining some soft power. However, BSR countries will have to acknowledge that it is too early to formulate a coherent and cohesive strategy towards the BSR, yet it is possible to start a coordinated cooperation on “low-policy areas” such as environment, transportation and infrastructure, that bring less political stakes and where the benefits overcome the cooperation costs, as well as formulate short and medium-term action plans for their priority cooperation areas. Another suggestion would be that BSEC gets rid of its cooperation areas that did not bring much relevance and efficiency in the last decade and whose activities overlap with those of other, more credible, active and goal-efficient institutions and initiatives. The alternative will be that BSEC becomes a true “umbrella-organization” with different branches coordinated by the BSEC Secretariat and practically supported by other regional initiatives (CDC, BSF, etc.). Furthermore, BSEC should increasingly use the Black Sea Forum as a dialogue...
platform for regional information and best-practice exchange, in order to increase transparency of regional incentives. The ministerial meeting from 2008 approved the introduction of the fast-track process, which effectively enables some members to opt out of BSEC policies. Several authors (Manoli, 2009 and Isic et al., 2008) suggested that BSEC should become the right-hand of the EU in BSR and that no other institution should be created for implementing the BSS objectives. The exact content of integration and institutional cooperation between the EU and BSEC recently began to be contoured, yet much must be done yet. For the Black Sea regionalism it is vital that BSEC develops a constructive and structured relationship with all regional and international actors, especially with EU and Russia.

3.1.2 The Black Sea Synergy (BSS) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) (EU initiatives)

The BSS from 2007 represents an intermediate step leading to a strategic EU vision for the BSR, by adding a multilateral view to the Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the strategic partnership with Russia and Turkey’s accession negotiations. Despite its drawbacks, BSS has two main benefits: (1) it suggests key areas for regional cooperation and (2) stimulates reform in the regional countries in order to support stability and growth. Thus, the BSS is – to a certain extent – an initiative providing alignment with the EU acquis and thus engages the WBSR into an “Europeanisation process” (CBS, 2010b). Furthermore, by developing the BSS, the EU signalizes its will in order to become an important player in the region, without having control ambitions (soft-power approach). On the negative side, the BSS has been so far less successful in promoting concrete projects.

As compared to the BSS, the Eastern Partnership follows a more bi- and multilateral approach, characterized by flexibility, increased funding, differentiation, as well as concrete political backing from several countries, mainly Poland and Sweden (Tsantoulis, 2009). The EaP has set out to identify regionally owned priority projects right from the beginning, as for example concerning SME development. Through the development of three Sector Partnerships (environment, transport, energy), the BSS also tries to fill in the void of concrete shared fundable projects starting from 2010. The lack of success so far is a consequence of: (1) insufficient leadership capacities, (2) lack of administrative and financial resources (only 126 mil. euro allocated in 2007); meanwhile, the main EaP problem areas are the confusion about its bilateral and multilateral components, but also the fact that countries start from a different basis. Also, the two EU policies are badly coordinated: there is an overlap, especially in energy and visa issues. Both the EU and the US try to promote basic Western values such as democracy, the rule of law and human rights as problem-solving receipt; yet, some actors have a tendency to use political and military pressure (authoritarian practices) in their international relations (CBS, 2010c). Therefore, the BSS must be further supported and reinforced. The leading role in this matter will be held by Romania, Bulgaria and Greece, which are the coordinators (as ‘steering body’) of the Partnerships starting from 2010. Since BSEC is highly active in the area of environment protection, the recently launched Environment Partnership is a starting point for concrete meaningful cooperation between the two organizations. Some more Partnerships will probably follow, but this will be more a matter of
time and correct implementation of the Environment Partnership, in which Romania plays a leading and coordinating function.

3.1.3 Community of Democratic Choice (CDC) (Ukrainian and Georgian initiative)

Launched by Ukraine and Georgia in 2005, the CDC is an international organization and one of the most active regional initiatives in the field of democracy and human rights. Unfortunately, all Black Sea states suffer from high corruption rates, a weak civil society and a certain lack of political stability (Isic et al., 2008, p. 6). Looking at these challenges, certain policy objectives become clear, such as: strengthening state institutions, involving civil society, promoting the rule of law and ensuring dialogue between all Black Sea states in this policy area. Comprising nine states, the CDC membership goes beyond the WBSR, but it excludes Russia, which views this institution as an initiative aimed to undermine Moscow’s influence, due mainly to its inception after the Orange and Rose revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia. However, the CDC’s prerogatives are very similar to those of GUAM: to provide cooperation, democratization and solutions for the regions’ frozen conflicts. Unfortunately, this may weaken the effectiveness of both organizations. The first cooperation area proposed by BSS in 2007 was the promotion of “Democracy, respect for human rights and good governance”, according to OSCE and Council of Europe standards; yet, the EU has so far been reluctant at politically supporting the CDC as the single most important democracy promoting instrument. This situation also needs to be addressed by the Black Sea policy in the very near future. On the other hand, on the short term, Russia’s lack of participation may provide more opportunities for the EU in promoting its European ‘democratic’ values. Giorgi Arveladze defined it as “an axis of democratic countries that do not wish to remain in Russia’s orbit”. A major setback for the CDC is however the fact that the so called “post-Soviet space” has never been geopolitically homogeneous, but also the lack of a clear organizational shape, even though at the CDC Vilnius conference (2006), member states signaled their wish to create a NGO, Intellectuals and Youth Forum, from which only the last took ultimate shape. The last CDC annual conference took place in May 2006.

3.1.4 The Baku Initiative and the Energy Community (EU-led initiatives)

Energy is mentioned in the BSS Paper as a fourth area of cooperation. In EU’s opinion, the BSR is “an important component of the EU’s external energy strategy” (European Commission, 2007, p. 4), with the main objective to provide a clear, transparent and non-discriminatory framework, in line with the acquis, for energy production, transport and transit. The Baku Initiative is an EU policy aimed to promote energy transport infrastructure, launched in 2004, soon after the EU started paying more attention to energy not just in technical terms, but also in geopolitical and economic perspective. It promotes cooperation and legal harmonization in the field of energy and should provide an integration of all Caspian and Black Sea states in energy-related matters (Garnet, 2009). This way the EU tries to secure its share in the “energy-game”. According to the BSS paper (2007), the Baku Initiative is a framework for enhancing cooperation in both the energy and transport fields and to

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2 Georgia, Ukraine, Afghanistan and Republic of Moldova.
3 Giorgi Arveladze is former Head of the presidential administration of Georgia.
stimulate progressive convergence towards EC principles. In the same time, another EU initiative, the Energy Community, provides a framework for SEE to cooperate on rebuilding its energy networks and support the integration into the internal EU energy market. It offers significant advantages both in terms of improved utilisation of existing supply and production capacities as well as optimising future investments, while extending the membership also to Ukraine and Moldova, countries that do not have EU accession prospects yet (Erler, 2007). Therefore, the Baku Initiative and the Energy Community should work in a coordinated manner in order to assure the existence of identical market structures after the completion of the energy markets, and also create a legal framework covering producer, transit and consumer countries (Oettinger, 2010). Meanwhile, BSEC is also working since February 2010 towards steps that will eventually lead to the establishment of an integrated BS energy market. For the moment, a study will be conducted on the national legislations of the BS country in the energy sector, as well as supporting projects for sustainable energy development in the region. Attention should be therefore paid that these programs do not overlap and that BSEC concentrates more of funding small-scale projects, while the Energy Community and Baku Initiative provide more technical assistance. Together with other EU assistance instruments such as INOGATE, TRACECA, but also with collaboration with the BSEC Energy Working Group, the Baku Initiative could become the leading BSR instrument in addressing energy-related challenges that could fall into the category of energy cooperation.

3.1.5 The Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership (Romanian initiative)

Romania launched the Black Sea Forum in 2007 in order to promote multiple objectives such as: creating synergy between regional initiatives, reinforcing mutual trust, supporting regional projects, sharing information and experience between civil society and other stakeholders. It represents a complementary instrument and a framework for multidimensional interaction in the BSR, meant to generate a common and coherent vision on the BSR’s future. Besides BSEC, the BSF is the only regional cooperation initiative mentioned by the EU in its BSS from 2007, the EC considering that “it could be particularly useful at the non-governmental, civil society level” (European Commission, 2007). Given its focus on regional partnerships and networks, the BSF could provide a continuous platform for idea exchange and networking among all regional initiatives. This way duplicity could be avoided, and all relevant actors informed about what is going on the region, on strategic, tactical and implementation level. The Forum is not meant to create new regional institutions, but rather to turn into a regular consultative process among countries of the WBSR. This Forum has however been almost inactive during the last two years. The main reason for this situation is the lack of political support, as well as the emergence of twin-initiatives.

3.2 Lessons from the Northern Dimension

In 2009 the EU launched the Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. It is considered the beginning of a new way of working and thinking about cooperation in the EU, especially with non-members Russia and Norway (Barosso, 2010). This strategy
reaches behind EU’s borders and aims to remove obstacles to cooperation on economic development, safety, transport and energy. Ten years before (1999), the EU launched the Northern Dimension policy and updated it in 2006 in order to become more comprehensive and to enable the creation of a real multilateral cooperation framework, as well as providing best practices of engaging both EU MS and external actors such as Norway, Iceland (future EU member) and Russia; simultaneously, it engages organizations and other local and sub-regional actors (CBSS, BEAC, AC, NCM, IFIs and NGOs), by concentrating on northwest Russia, Kaliningrad, the Baltic and the Barents Seas, the Arctic and Sub-Arctic areas. According to EC President Barosso, the Northern Dimension is now the most dynamic framework for cooperation, showing that equal partnership works. In 2006, a Policy Framework Document replaced the old system of Action Plans, thus increasing the consistency and coherence of the policy, by adding a co-ownership of this policy field, which thus no longer stayed EU-related, but inter-governmental (legal status), linking the ND to the four spaces of cooperation of the EU-Russian Partnership and viewing it as a common project, as well as by introducing four sector partnerships in the areas, as an effective way to organise practical implementation of projects in the agreed priority sectors, set up for 5 years: environment, public health and social wellbeing, culture and transport, and logistics. This structure was complemented by the establishment of a small secretariat for the ND Transport Partnership in June 2010. The EU allocated 15 million EUR (2010) for the initiatives in the 3 SP and is currently discussing with the EP a 20 million EUR reserve for initiatives that promote cooperation reflecting external aspects of EU’s Strategy for the Baltic. The BSR could draw significant lessons both from the institutional structure, as well as the “enmeshment” areas of the ND, which recently also started to apply concerning the BSS Policy, which was added in June 2010 an Environment Partnership (European Commission, 2010). In terms of policy formulation, the BS could propose a regional strategy that clearly defines: actors, objectives, on an operational level: key priority sectors and descriptions of their areas of activity and their support for project implementation, as well as concrete information on funding. Apart from the Sectoral Partnerships, a realistic number of themes and concrete projects in the agreed priority sectors with detailed financial and operational parameters can be approved at a meeting of Foreign Ministers or Senior Officials. While keeping in mind that big “package deals” (in terms of set objectives) are difficult to handle and to be accepted by all actors, a common meeting with all relevant stakeholders should be held and agreed on only 4-5 top priorities, which could be later on complemented by less urgent aspects, such as cultural and educational exchanges, which could be dealt with by regional and local initiatives, administrations and NGOs. BSEC and the EU as most important partner (observer) could jointly chair this meeting. The ND itself, while acknowledging around 10-12 general objectives, only comprises 6 priority sectors: economic cooperation, freedom, security and justice, external security (civil protection), environment, nuclear safety and natural resources, research, education and culture, health care and social welfare. Similar to the situation of BSEC, many of the Strategy’s objectives are similar to the priorities of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, whose work in several areas (e.g. sustainable development) is highly relevant for the success of the strategy. Since the decision-making in all SP is consensus-
based, this also requires strengthened cooperation between all parties and a high level of mutual trust. I claim that this trust can be first learnt by cooperating on rather low-policy areas, while leaving high-politics, sensitive issues (security agenda, energy security issues) for later cooperation stages, while keeping in mind that institutions already exist (NATO, OSCE) dealing with large security problems.

4. Conclusions

In view of recent developments in the Black Sea region, considering Black Sea’s role of both bridge and buffer between Europe and Asia, this paper provided a short overview of the existing regional cooperation framework and its current implications. It is clear that it is of utmost importance to promote peace as well as social, human and economic development in the BSR, security for all countries and confidence between them, resulting in deeper cooperation. Regional structures are vital prerequisites to solve regional problem areas. As shown in chapter 2, the regional order is currently multipolar, yet this does not automatically promotes stronger regional cooperation. Due to historical and cultural reasons, but also because of the communist legacy, the region’s countries do not have much experience in practicing mutual trust, building strong bi- and multilateral relations and effective regional efforts. While participating in regional initiatives, they mainly promote their own initiatives and often compete for sub-regional (Romania, Ukraine, Bulgaria) or regional leadership (Turkey, Russia). The location at the convergence point of Russian and European/Western geopolitical tectonic plates still contributes to the geopolitical jockeying of all countries, which will have to balance their interests, so as to simultaneous meet EU, NATO and Russian expectations and still follow their own path of development. An overlap of regional actors, which rely more on their EU and NATO belonging than on own capabilities (RO, BG), regional powers (RUS, TRK) which follow different strategies (fear vs. soft-power building through cooperation), and global actors with mainly security-energy (USA/NATO) or energy-economic (EU) regional stakes, characterizes the BSR. As a rather politically constructed region, bound by risk and strategic relevance rather than by identity, BSR thus needs maintaining a regional balance of power, which would make the military and political domination of one country impossible. The BSR could draw lessons in this sense from SEA, with ASEAN and regional states managing to entangle the “dragons” (China and Japan) in complex interdependencies (institutional framework), while keeping US-hegemony incentives under control. Chapter 3 summarized the main institutional and policy-based cooperation framework in the BSR. While BSEC established formal institutionalisation with permanent secretariats and other organs, more “politicized”, but flexible cooperation structures, thus less ambitious, such as the CDC, Baku Initiative or the BSF bring issues of security, energy, democratisation and civil society on the Black Sea agenda. As this analysis shows, aiming at political dialogue, these are less effective in engaging all relevant actors and in accomplishing their goals, while their success resumes to lobbying for setting the BSR on the EU political agenda and strengthening dialogue. Romania could still play a relevant role through promoting the Black Sea Forum, but, more important, by creating synergies with all relevant actors through the Environment Partnership of the Black Sea Synergy and by trying the much-needed rapprochement of Russia. The implications of this would be
a more peaceful and stability-based region. Currently, BSR regional cooperation clearly lacks sufficient leadership. I claim that this political drive should be provided rather by an organization with strong political backup, such as BSEC, than from a country. Also, this paper argues that a possible strategic solution for successful regional cooperation initiatives lies in the creation of a single integrated regional cooperation package, functioning on the principles of multi-speed cooperation and multi-dimensional development in several policy fields, constructed along sectoral lines, with a particular focus on regional public goods, which do not affect sovereignty issues. Therefore, considering a view based on comparative advantages analysis, the Black Sea cooperation framework should concentrate on four main pillars: economy (incl. energy and transport), environment, good governance and security. These could be supported by the existing institutional framework. The Northern Dimension could provide a particular model for structuring the sector partnerships policy.

Keeping in mind that the present paper sets the basis for a more comprehensive analysis within a master thesis, the author suggests that future research concentrates more on developing a framework (i.e. criteria) for qualitative assessment of the cooperation initiatives, and that provides possible scenarios on how the regional cooperation architecture could look on a medium to long-term perspective, and how it could be designed to engage all relevant actors.

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REGIONAL BLACK SEA ARCHITECTURE AND CONSEQUENCES FOR THE REGIONAL COOPERATION FRAMEWORK

Appendix:

*Table 1: The most significant regional cooperation initiatives in the Black Sea region*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)       | 1992/ IO since 1999 | - cooperation based on business interests  
- improving the business environment and promoting individual and collective initiative of the enterprises and companies,  
- develop economic collaborations - encompass all strategic spheres of cooperation: energy, transport | Unanimous decisions  
Flexible structure  
33 issues  
No common strategy  
No clear vision | 12 states  
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine.  
EC, USA as observers, among 10 other observers | Turkey (HQ: Istanbul) | - financial contributions from the member states  
- Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB), Thesaloniki  
- Limited resources  
-Distinction from EU: EU focuses more on cross border cooperation, while BSEC on intergovernmental |
| Black Sea Commission (BSC)                  | 1992      | - protection of the BS against pollution  
- sustainable marine management  
- sustainable human development | Environmental protection  
Implementation of the Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution | Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine  
EU as direct partner | Turkey | National funding organizations |
| Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership | 2006      | - Promote good governance, civil society, empower youth, involve the business community, best practice and experience exchange, crisis management, civil emergency planning. | Provide a platform for regional dialogue and experience sharing | Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine, Russia  
EU as partner | Romania | Romanian funds Not very clear |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Community of Democratic Choice (CDC)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Black Sea Synergy (BSS)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Baku Initiative</strong></th>
<th><strong>Commission on the Black Sea</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>international organization</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2005</strong></td>
<td><strong>2007</strong></td>
<td><strong>2004</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- promote democracy and human rights in the region between the three sees (Baltic, Black and Caspian)</td>
<td>- democratic and economic reforms - support stability and promote development - focus on practical projects in areas of common concern - coordinated action in a regional framework - solutions of conflicts in the region</td>
<td>- progressive integration of the energy markets of BSR and CSR into the EU markets; - energy markets harmonization - transportation of energy resources to EU</td>
<td>- provide policy-oriented research on the challenges and opportunities of the Black Sea region - suggest ways to secure its peace and prosperity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, Macedonia, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Slovenia Ukraine EU, USA as observers</strong></td>
<td><strong>EU</strong> members, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Republic of Moldova, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine</td>
<td><strong>Azerbaijan, Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan</strong></td>
<td><strong>The International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS) Black Sea Trust (BST) Bertelsmann Stiftung</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Georgia, Ukraine (Kiev)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>EU</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public and private sources, not very clear</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own representation.
TURKISH PARTIES’ POSITIONS TOWARDS THE EU: BETWEEN EUROPILIA AND EUROPHOBIA

Mehmet Bardakcı*

Abstract: This research is a case study meant to find out whether the arguments put forward by Szczerbiak and Taggart analyzing Euroscepticism in the party systems of the EU candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe hold true for party-based Euroscepticism in Turkish politics. The primary argument of this article is that the Turkish party system displays many similarities with its Central and Eastern European counterparts despite some differences. In order to test this argument, firstly the nature of Euroscepticism in Turkey and Turkish political parties is clarified. Then, the characteristics of Euroscepticism in Turkish political parties are tested against Szczerbiak and Taggart’s hypotheses with respect to the Central and Eastern European candidate countries. Among the propositions tested are the influence of a party’s position in the left-right spectrum on the expression of Euroscepticism, the relationship between the level of public Euroscepticism and the level of Euroscepticism in the party-system, the variation between soft-Euroscepticism and hard-Euroscepticism in the candidate and member states of the EU, the correlation between the level of Euroscepticism and the prospect for EU membership, the link between state development and the level of party-based Euroscepticism, and the relationship between public Euroscepticism and party-based Euroscepticism.

Keywords: Euroscepticism, Turkey, EU integration and enlargement, political parties

1. Introduction

While Turkey has had relations with the then EEC since 1960, when an association agreement was signed between the parties, the idea of Turkey’s integration to the EC was still of an ambiguous nature and the EC issue therefore had little impact on Turkey’s domestic political debates. When Ankara established a Customs Union with the EU in 1996, the parties came closer. Yet, Turkey-EU relations were still marked by an anchor-credibility dilemma. In other words, Turkey’s European orientation was not credible enough. Nor was the EU ready to play the role of an effective anchor for Turkey’s reform process. Therefore, during this period, from Turkey’s perspective, the EU issue was more a matter of foreign policy rather than a dynamic of domestic politics. It was at the Helsinki Summit in 1999 that the anchor-credibility dilemma governing Ankara-Brussels relations started to mitigate, as the EU gave Turkey official candidate

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status. From that time on, a substantial process of the Europeanization of Turkish politics started. This watershed event led to some new realignments in Turkish domestic politics. Apart from the traditional divide between the left and the right, Turkish political parties realigned themselves along pro-European and EU-sceptic stances. Due to the challenge of substantial domestic transformation as a result of EU-induced reforms, Turkey’s political actors were involved in wide-ranging debates and discussions as to the meaning and implications of the EU integration process for their respective parties and Turkey.

The primary argument of this article is that the Turkish party system displays many similarities with its Central and Eastern European counterparts despite there being some differences. In order to test this argument, firstly the nature of Euroscepticism in Turkey is clarified. In this part, the dual role of Europe in the Turkish mentality, both as a model for modernization and as a source of threat, is highlighted. The subsequent section draws attention to the features inherent in Turkish politics which distinguish them from the political system in Western Europe. Then, the Turkish political parties’ stance vis-a-vis Europe and EU reforms is explained. Afterwards, the characteristics of Euroscepticism in Turkish political parties are tested against the hypotheses of Szczerbiak and Taggart regarding the Central and Eastern European candidate countries.

2. Dual Image of Europe in the Turkish Public Opinion

Turkey has had a complex relationship with Europe. In a contradictory manner, Europe has been historically perceived both as an example and as an enemy in Turkey. It is a model against which Ottoman and Turkish modernizers measured their efforts to reform their political, educational and military systems. Atatürk, the founder of the modern Turkish Republic, set the level of modernization represented by the West as the final stage of civilization which Turkey should struggle to attain.

However, in stark contrast to “model” image of Europe, in the eyes of the Turkish people, Europe also embodies a source of threat, ready to dismember Turkey, as occurred during the final phase preceding the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The European occupying powers imposed the Treaty of Sevres (August 1920) on the Ottoman state, which was defeated in the First World War. According to the Sevres Treaty, entire Anatolia, except for a minor part in Central Anatolia, would be transferred to the victorious European states, the Greeks, the Kurds, and the Armenians. Thus, the Treaty of Sevres became the most important symbol of Turkish distrust towards Europe, which is deeply ingrained in Turkish political culture. As a corollary of the perception of Europe as a potential “enemy,” Turkey remains cautious and vigilant towards Europe.

It is against this continuing Turkish perception of Europe both as a “historical threat and model” that Euroscepticism in Turkey should be understood. Thus, it should not be surprising at all to find two contradictory opinions regarding Turkey’s view of Europe: “Turkey wants to be part of Europe although it believes that the EU wants to divide Turkey.” According to an opinion poll, which was conducted in Spring 2009, 76 per cent of the respondents claimed that one of the primary aims of the USA and the EU was to divide up Turkey. Almost all the respondents (93%) opine that the EU does not treat Turkey in the same way as the other

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3 Şahin Alpay, “AB’ye ve ABD’ye Güvensizlik Neden” (Why Distrust towards the EU and the USA), Zaman, June 09, 2009.
EU candidates. Therefore, an overwhelming majority of the respondents (80 %) are of the opinion that Turkey would not be allowed to join the EU, even if it fulfilled all the criteria. Despite this, the majority of the respondents (57 %) support Turkey’s full membership to the EU. As compared to the traditionally Eurosceptic British (48 %), fewer Turks (32 %) hold favorable view of the EU.4

3. The Peculiarities and Paradoxes of the Left-Right Cleavage in the Turkish Party-System

In Turkey, the left-right partition does not correspond neatly to their counterparts in advanced Western democracies. While in European and Western political systems, whether a party is left or right is determined by that party’s stance on socio-economic issues, in Turkey the distinguishing characteristic of the left from the right is their position on secularism. In the European context, social-democratic parties are traditionally more sensitive to the socio-economic well-being of the poorer segments of the population; they put a special emphasis on the measures for redistributing income evenly across various classes in the society. Christian-democratic, center-right, or conservative parties, on the other hand, are more concerned with economic growth and are therefore usually supported by well-off segments of society. Moreover, while the conservative/right-wing parties attach more importance to the preservation of religious and traditional values, social-democratic/left-wing parties are more secular in outlook.

However, in the Turkish context, the major dividing line between the left and the right is not a party’s position on socio-economic policies. As pointed out by one of the leading scholars, in the Turkish context “the ‘right’ refers to a commitment to religious, conservative and nationalist values while the ‘left’ is defined primarily in terms of secularism.”5 Moreover, the fact that center-right parties in Turkey have been responsive to the issue of redistribution of national wealth in favor of the disadvantaged groups in society, has brought them closer to social-democratic parties in Europe.

Another significant feature which differentiates the left-wing/social-democratic parties from their European counterparts is that the center-left parties in Turkey have historically been strongly associated with the state. Being affiliated with the state and detached from the society, they have had difficulty in representing the population at large. By contrast, center-right parties in Turkey are more society-oriented and are the product of a movement from below unlike center-left parties which are the product of the top-down modernization experience. This is why some scholars in Turkey claimed that in fact, the left is the right and the right is the left in Turkey.6 Besides, unlike many of its Western European counterparts, center-left parties in Turkey also carry the heavy baggage of nationalism.

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4 Transatlantic Trends, Key Findings 2009, German Marshall Fund of the USA, p. 25.
6 This argument was first put forward by İdris Küçükoğlu. For further discussion of this argument, see: İdris Küçükoğlu, Düzenin Yabancılaşması: Batılaşma (Alienation of the Order: Westernization), (İstanbul: Ant Yayınları, 1969).
4. The Pattern of Opposition and Support for the EU among Turkish Parties

4.1. Nationalist Right: MHP (Nationalist Action Party)

Commonly known as the “grey wolves” (bozkurtlar) or the “idealists” (ülkücüler), the MHP is one of the main political parties in Turkey with serious reservations about Turkey’s EU accession, along with the CHP (Republican People’s Party). While the party leader Devlet Bahçeli stated that his party has “no enmity against Europe”, he, on the other hand, stressed that Turkey should preserve its national character, unity and sovereignty. According to him, Turkey can not and does not have to make concessions on a number of issues which might undermine national unity, territorial integrity and national interests. MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli maintains that EU membership is a state policy and Turkey should enter the EU in an honorable way.

After the MHP came to power in 1999 in a three-party coalition which included Ecevit’s centre-left DSP (Democratic Left Party) and Yilmaz’s centre-right ANAP (Motherland Party), it realized that it had to balance the responsibilities of being a partner in the coalition government with its ties to its nationalist grass-roots supporters. Therefore, despite being a coalition partner, it appeared to have adopted a tough stance on critical issues such as the Cyprus question, Kurdish separatism and the death penalty, in an effort not to lose face with its core nationalist electorate.

When the chance for early elections emerged due to Ecevit’s illness in the summer of 2002, the MHP toughened its position on the EU in the hope of winning back some of its lost nationalist votes and blocked the EU reforms. The MHP appealed to the Constitutional Court against the abolition of the death penalty and six Articles in the harmonization laws in a bid to force the Parliament to reverse its decision regarding the death penalty and minority rights.

After the Parliament set the elections for November 3rd, 2002, the MHP hardened its attitude toward the EU reforms. When on August 3rd, 2002, the Parliament voted to approve a package of human rights reforms, which it hoped would clear the way for Ankara to join the Union, the MHP voted “no” en bloc on all of the reform items in the package. This indicated that as it was certain that the government would no longer exist after November 2002, the MHP could adopt a more uncompromising attitude and behave like a real opposition party. It was no longer restricted by the duties of the coalition government and could now improve its “moderate image” in the eyes of its electors. During this period, the MHP sought on every possible occasion to show the electorate that it had not, in fact, changed its stance on critical national issues.

After the political earthquake in the November 2002 elections, which allowed only two major parties, the AKP and the CHP to enter the parliament, the MHP was forced to remain outside of the parliament. The MHP managed to make a comeback to the parliament in the 2007 elections with the help of the protest votes amid Euroscepticism and rising nationalism in response to the resumption of attacks by the separatist organization PKK. This time occupying the opposition benches in the parliament, the MHP hardened its Eurosceptic stance as opposed to its soft-Euroscepticism when it was part of the coalition government during 1999–2002. Under these circumstances the
MHP claimed that Turkey’s relations to the EU should be questioned and maintained that under these conditions it would not be possible for Turkey to be a member of the EU.8

The MHP opposed the efforts of the AKP government to align the Turkish political system with that of the EU. In terms of its opposition to the AKP government and the EU reforms, it pursued a quite similar pattern to that of the main opposition party CHP, with which it cooperated against the reform process. The reforms the MHP were opposed to include amending Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code to reduce the punishment given to those who insult “Turkishness” and “the Turkish state”. They raised their objection to the adoption of the Law of Foundations improving the status of non-Muslim minority foundations, the possibility of the opening of the Halki Seminary in Istanbul to give religious education to the Greek minority in Turkey, and the recognition of the ecumenical status of the Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul. They have also declined to cooperate with the AKP government regarding the so-called Kurdish and Armenian openings. They have avoided supporting the efforts of the AKP government to overhaul the authoritarian aspects of the Turkish Constitution, which is the product of the 1980 military intervention.

4.2. Nationalist Left: CHP (Republican People’s Party)

As the major social-democratic party in Turkish politics, the CHP has displayed a highly nationalistic and restrictive stance when it came to relations with the EU and EU democratization reforms in the recent years. Why has the CHP progressively turned so Eurosceptic?

Historically, the CHP has been under the influence of two political traditions: Kemalism and European social democracy. Regarding the Kemalist tradition, the CHP inherited an interventionist and authoritarian legacy from the early years of the Republic.9 The understanding of modernization during this era involved the top-down enforcement of new western values and lifestyles on the Anatolian population which held traditional values. Moreover, the CHP has also taken over the state-centric legacy from the Ottoman State in which the Ottoman elite sought to “save the state” which had been in decline over the last few hundred years. Therefore, democracy and the liberties and freedom of the population became secondary to the drive to “save the state.” In time, the instinct of “saving the state” was complemented by such motives as “national unity and togetherness” and “to safeguard national interests.” Thus, the left became increasingly detached from its universal norms based on democracy, human rights and freedom. Furthermore, the CHP's historical alliance with the military, which established the Turkish Republic and helped modernize the country, led it to adopt an inconsistent policy with respect to civil-military relations.

Despite the fact that prior to 2002, the CHP under Deniz Baykal attempted to make some inroads on the promotion of social democratic values within the party, he shelved the agenda for ideological renewal after the AKP, a party with an Islamist pedigree, assumed power following

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8 “AB Raporu” (The EU Report), MHP Araştırma Geliştirme ve Değerlendirme Merkezi, February 9, 2009, p. 9.
9 For a detailed criticism of the CHP, which oscillated between an authoritarian form of Kemalism and the universal values of social democracy, see a recently published study: Sinan Ciddi, Kemalism in Turkish Politics: the Republican People’s Party, Secularism and Nationalism, (New York: Routledge, 2009).
the 2002 Parliamentary Elections. In other words, in particular from 2005 onwards, the CHP has tended toward an authoritarian form of Kemalism, adopting an overly secularist and nationalist agenda. In the run up to the 2007 General and Presidential Elections, the CHP’s ultra-secularist and ultra-nationalist rhetoric peaked.

In addition to the motive to oppose the AKP government, the other reason why the CHP was not cooperative with the AKP in passing EU reforms in the parliament in the post–2005 era was due to the dramatic rise in Euroscepticism among the Turkish public because of the higher perceived costs of the EU accession against uncertain membership prospects. Therefore, by playing on the fears of the Turkish public stemming from the EU accession process such as the loss of Cyprus, the threat of disintegration as a result of the expansion of minority rights, the CHP sought to enhance its political position against the AKP government.

After the 2002 elections the CHP opposed the reforms and appealed to the Constitutional Court to annul some democratization bills and laws adopted by the Parliament, which are closely linked with meeting EU membership criteria. In 2008, the CHP applied to the Constitutional Court for the cancellation of the Law of Foundations, which improved the status of the foundations owned by non-Muslim minorities. The CHP’s objection to the Law stemmed from the fact that the Law was in violation of the principle of reciprocity in the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 and that similar rights have not been granted to the Turks in Northern Thrace by the Greek authorities.10

Regarding its attitude on civil-military relations, upon the CHP’s application in 2009 to the Constitutional Court, a law that allows military officers to be judged in civilian courts for non-military crimes was annulled. Furthermore, Baykal did not criticize the e-memorandum from the Armed Forces on the eve of the election of the President in 2007 in order to prevent the AKP from electing a President with Islamist inclinations.

CHP has also ensured the annulment of a constitutional amendment lifting the ban on headscarves on university campuses and the presidential election held in parliament in 2007, in which AKP’s candidate Abdullah Gül was elected president on the grounds that at least 367 deputies had to be present in the parliamentary session for the election to be valid. Furthermore, CHP has adopted a highly security-oriented approach with respect to the AKP’s Kurdish opening and the amendment of Article 301 in the Turkish Penal Code which penalizes insulting Turkishness. They have sided with former Turkish Cypriot President Rauf Denktaş, who campaigned for the rejection of the Annan Plan during the simultaneous referenda held in both parts of Cyprus. Baykal rejected cooperation with the AKP government on the amending the Constitution. They have condemned the AKP government’s initiative to normalize relations with Armenia.

4.3. Muslim Democrats: AKP (Justice and Development Party)

It would not be too far-fetched to label the AKP the Muslim Democrats of Turkish politics drawing a parallel to the Christian democratic parties of Western Europe. Notwithstanding significant differences between the AKP and the Christian democratic parties of Western Europe, there are striking similarities between the

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two when it comes to their approaches to moral, educational and cultural matters, their international attitudes and their support base.\textsuperscript{11} Most important of all, they both advocate liberal democratic values and place an emphasis on the rights of the individual rather than the power of the state.

Ironically, although the AKP had an Islamic pedigree and its predecessors had adopted a strong anti-Western posture, it was during the tenure of the AKP government in which Turkey achieved the most radical democratization reforms, which have brought Turkey closer to Europe. Denying that it was an Islamist party, the AKP managed to convince the electorate that it would not pursue a confrontational agenda against the secular establishment. On coming to power in 2002, the AKP focused on the EU issue and took steps to meet the Copenhagen criteria. It revised the authoritarian aspects of the 1982 Constitution and adopted five democratization packages known as harmonization laws.

After the so-called 28th February process (1997), in which the staunchly secular military cracked down on the Islamists in power, the expansion of democratic freedoms via European integration were regarded by the Islam-sensitive parties as the best possible means of protecting themselves from the restrictive provisions of Turkish legislation and the Constitution. After all, the head of the AKP, Erdoğan, had himself been banned from politics by the Kemalist judiciary for reciting a poem by a republican poet.

The AKP government, as it had pledged in its programme, expanded the cultural rights of the Kurds in Turkey. It also amended legislation regarding freedom of expression, opening the way for the release of Kurdish politicians from prison. On June 9, 2004, in line with the changes in the RTUK law (The Radio and Television Supreme Council), the Turkish state television, TRT, started to broadcast Kurdish language programmes. At the same time, as part of the judicial reforms, four prominent Kurdish activists, including Leyla Zana, who had been sentenced in 1994 for having connections with the secessionist PKK, were released following a retrial in April 2004. These developments demonstrated the AKP government’s determination to secure an affirmative decision at the Summit on December 17th, 2005, which was to take place in a few months’ time.

As for the Cyprus issue, with a view to securing a date to start accession talks with Brussels, Erdoğan gave the green light to a solution in Cyprus on the basis of the Annan Plan, which foresaw the unification of the island following a referendum in both parts.

In short, it can be suggested that both interest and ideology-related reasons account for the AKP government’s commitment to political reforms and EU accession.

Since in the post-2005 era the AKP found itself in a domestic environment where the popularity of the EU among the Turkish public was at an all-time low, the party has slowly come to lose its initial zeal for the EU project. At the end of the day as the AKP’s electoral fortunes rely on the support of the people, the AKP has quietly shelved the EU issue and has committed its attention to domestic challenges.

4.4. Fringe Parties: SP (Party of Happiness), IP (Workers’ Party) and GP (Young Party)

4.4.1. FP/SP (Party of Happiness)

The SP is the last incarnation of the Islamist parties in Turkey which come from the National Outlook (Milli Görüş) tradition. The National Outlook is a form of religious nationalism blending anti-Westernism and religiosity with a sense of the greatness and leadership of Turkey in the world. National Outlook parties have permanently come under pressure from the secular establishment and have been consecutively shut down for being a source of anti-secular activities. Finally, when they were ousted from power by the military in 1997, they were forced somehow to moderate their views regarding secularism and the role of Islam in politics. Despite these cosmetic changes, they maintained their National Outlook nature in essence.

The SP strives to emphasize its uniqueness and distinction from the rest of the parties so that they can tap into the niche segments of the population, which are angry with the EU and have been negatively affected by the EU reforms. In this context, they point out that all the other parties but the SP are competing with each other to promote EU membership and relations with the USA and the other imperialist powers and side with these powers.12

Despite the fact that they pay lip service to the importance of universal human rights and freedoms and the global economic system (a change which occurred to a significant extent after their predecessor the RP [Welfare Party] was ousted from power in 1997 by the secular establishment), the SP use anti-system rhetoric to appeal to the electorate. They call for a change in the existing world order and the status quo in Turkey. Therefore, they are critical of privatization, the interest-based capitalistic economic system and the institutions associated with it like the IMF. They use a highly threat-based rhetoric on relations with the EU and maintain that Cyprus is about to be lost. They maintain that the EU’s demands from Turkey to redefine minorities, on missionary activities, the possibility of the establishment of a Greek Pontus state in Turkey’s Black Sea region, and the granting of ecumenical status to the Orthodox Church in Istanbul (which has a universally accepted status as the religious head of the world wide Orthodox community) pose a threat to the unity of Turkey.13

Regarding the EU membership of Turkey, they tend to a hard-Eurosceptical stance, as they state that they are definitely against Turkey’s EU membership. They assert that full membership in the EU, which is led by racist imperialists, would result in Turkey giving up its independence, submission to Western culture and civilization, and the step-by-step disintegration of Turkey. Instead of the EU, they place a special importance on relations with the developing Muslim world. In their opinion, through the D-8, which is composed of eight largest developing Muslim countries, it would be possible to establish a “new just world order,” 50 years after the Yalta Conference where the post-World World II global order was designed. They believe that this would counterbalance the power of the strong western countries which come together under initiatives such as the G–8.14

12 “Saadet’ten ‘Fark Var Saadet Var’ Açıklaması”, (Clarification from the SP for the Slogan “There is Saadet; there is difference”), Milli Gazete, February 26, 2009.
14 Ibid.
4.4.2. IP (Workers’ Party)

Another anti-system party is the IP. Like the SP, the IP sought to emphasize its uniqueness and difference from the rest of the parties in the political system. Ideologically, it can be categorized as nationalist-left, as it tries to nationalize socialistic ideology. Although the IP defines itself as a leftist party, it espouses a highly nationalistic and state-centric line. It emphasizes the independence of Turkey. It blames the other “establishment” parties for defending the interests of the imperialists of the EU and the USA. It equates the EU membership process with the Sevres Treaty (a treaty signed in 1920 whereby Turkey was partitioned among the victorious Western powers at the end of the First World War). It rejects EU membership as it believes that EU accession undermines the revolutions of Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic. Another feature characterizing the IP is its xenophobic attitude towards foreigners. In this context, it characterizes Christian missionary activities as crusades and opposes the recognition of the Istanbul Patriarchate as ecumenic. It maintains that sale of territories to foreigners should be stopped. Instead of NATO and the EU, it proposes a regional alliance encompassing such countries as Syria, Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan and Northern Cyprus. Another alternative proposed by the IP to the EU is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, in which Turkey could cooperate with such Eurasian countries as Russia and China.16

4.4.3. GP (Young Party)

This is a short-lived party set up by a young businessman, who has been living in self-imposed exile in France because of the cases opened against him for involvement in fraud against the Turkish state and international firms. It is comparable to populist Jörg Haider’s FPÖ in Austria. It has a populist agenda and declared its opposition to Turkey’s EU membership.

4.5. Regional Parties: HADEP/DEHAP/DTP/BDP (Peace and Democracy Party)

Like the Islamist parties, ethnic Kurdish parties have suffered the fate of periodic closure by the Kemalist judiciary due to their perceived links to the armed terrorist organization PKK. The last ethnic Kurdish party to befall the same end as its predecessors was the DTP (Democratic Society Party) in December 2009. It was quickly replaced by a new ethnic Kurdish Party, the BDP (Peace and Democracy Party).

It has been the Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin who have benefited most from the democratization and the opening up of the regime along the EU integration process. Since the 1990s, the Kurds saw their cultural rights broadened. Rights granted to the Kurds increased in scope and scale in the post-Helsinki era of 1999, when Turkey was given official candidate status by the EU. Thus, it is not surprising to find that ethnic Kurdish parties were among the most ardent supporters of Turkey’s EU vocation.17

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15 “İşçi Partisi Seçim Bildirgesi: Ne ABD ne AB Tam Bağımsız Türkiye”, (Workers Party Election Manifesto: Neither the USA nor the EU; fully independent Turkey), available at: www.ip.org.tr (last accessed March 14, 2010).


17 For instance see: “Kürtler % 100 AB’yi istiyor.” (Kurds want the EU 100 %), available at http://www[tempodergisi.com.tr/toplum_politika/09759/ (last accessed March 17, 2010) and “AB’yi istiyoruz ama…” (We want the EU, but…), available at http://www.haber3.com/abyi-istiyoruz-ama-175864h.htm (last accessed March 17, 2010).
Following the EU accession process, the state of emergency was lifted in the predominantly Kurdish populated provinces in southeastern Turkey. The expression of pro-Kurdish views was made possible through amendments in Anti-Terror Law, the Turkish Penal Code and the Constitution. Broadcasting in Kurdish was permitted. Restrictions on the use of Kurdish in education were eased. Kurdish parliamentarians who had been in jail for a decade were released in 2003. The AKP government’s recent Kurdish initiative promises further expansion of rights for the Kurdish segments of the population.

4.6. Center-Right/Liberal: DYP/DP (Democrat Party)

The history of the DP dates back to the 1950s, when Turkey introduced the multi-party system. However, it has lost its relative importance in the Turkish political system since 2002 when the newly established AKP managed to fill the vacuum left in the centre-right. Today, in terms of electoral support, the DP enjoys a peripheral status. The DP has a liberal, pro-EU agenda.

5. Assessment and Comparison

Euroscepticism is defined as “the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration.” It is divided into two categories: soft and hard Euroscepticism. Hard Euroscepticism is “outright rejection of the entire project of European political and economic integration and opposition to their country joining or remaining members of the EU.” Soft Euroscepticism, on the other hand, implies “contingent or qualified opposition to European integration.”

Factors having a bearing on party-based Euroscepticism include identity politics/ideology, position on the most appropriate site for conflict resolution, and relative position in the political system. The Turkish parties’ positions on the EU will, therefore, be evaluated in relation to the above factors.

While one can not ignore the significance of ideological factors in explaining party-based Euroscepticism, one should also take into consideration the parties’ positions in the party system. That is, whether they are in government, in opposition or at the fringes of the party system. The relationship between ideology and party position is that ideology serves as a constraining factor on the party’s position and vice versa. In other words, parties occupying particular positions in the national party systems legitimize their actions and policies with reference to their ideologies.

The first proposition is that a party’s position on the left-right spectrum is independent from whether it is Eurosceptical or not. As the Turkish case demonstrates, not only the far-right (MHP) and Islamist parties (SP), but also the radical-left (IP) and center-left parties (CHP) can be Eurosceptical. As expressed by Szczerbiak and Taggart, Euroscepticism brings together “strange bedfellows” of some very different ideologies.

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19 Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001), op.cit. p. 10.

20 Taggart, op.cit. p. 379.

All of these parties, while subscribing to opposing ideologies, raise their objection to the EU and EU reforms in varying degrees. On the other hand, it is important to note that all the Turkish parties have been heavily influenced by nationalism. This fact distorts the categorization of parties solely on the basis of their ideologies. For instance, the major center-left/social democratic party CHP has a heavily nationalistic legacy unlike its Western counterparts. The CHP as a social-democratic party is not the party of the working class like in the West either. By western standards one could not, therefore, classify it as a social-democratic party. Thus, if looked at from this perspective, this argument by Szczerbiak and Taggart might not be applicable to the case of Turkey, as one could categorize all the above Turkish parties as nationalistic. Taggart and Szczerbiak also find that while Euroscepticism transcends party types, in comparison with Western European cases, Eurosceptic parties in the Central and Eastern candidate states are inclined to be on the right of the spectrum.22 If the CHP is described as a social-democratic party, then this argument would not apply to the case of Turkey as a candidate country because of the CHP’s soft-Euroscepticism as a party on the left of the ideological spectrum. In that sense, the Turkish party system would be more comparable to its Western European counterparts, where one can also find social-democratic parties expressing Euroscepticism.

The second hypothesis is that there is a meaningful link between the positions of the parties in their party systems and the expression of Euroscepticism. As the ruling party, the AKP is responsible for representing the general consensus in the country, which overwhelmingly supports Turkey’s membership to the EU. Moreover, as a mainstream party, it would not take the risk of opposing Turkey’s EU integration, as cutting off ties with the EU or objecting to the EU membership would have far-reaching implications, hitting first and foremost the party in power itself. One can also observe that the far-right party MHP was forced to moderate its stance vis-a-vis EU when it came to power in the three-party coalition in 1999. It tried to strike a balance between its nationalist ideology and the responsibility of being in power. After it became clear that the coalition government would not continue and new elections were imminent, the MHP then turned to its nationalistic agenda, fiercely criticizing the EU and EU reforms. Agreeing with integration with the EU in principle, but holding significant reservations, it can be categorized as a soft-Eurosceptical party. When the MHP occupied the opposition benches following the 2007 elections, it strenuously opposed the AKP government’s EU reforms and asserted that Turkey’s relations with the EU had to be questioned. Therefore, nature of its opposition to the EU shifted from soft- to hard-Euroscepticism, once it lost its government-party status. It is also noted that while in Western Europe Euroscepticism is almost completely absent from mainstream governmental parties, Euroscepticism exists in many major parties in Central and Eastern Europe.23 Like in the Central and Eastern European countries, both the major opposition parties (CHP) and parties in government (MHP in the coalition government between 1999 and 2002) express Euroscepticism in Turkey. In this

23 Ibid., p. 22.
sense, the Turkish party system is similar to those in Central and Eastern Europe.

In addition, as they do not have the responsibility that comes with being in power and ruling Turkey, peripheral parties such as the SP and the IP have explicitly and vociferously rejected Turkey’s EU membership. Opposing Turkey’s EU membership is costless for these parties as they are located at the margins of the Turkish political system. Another reason why they are hard-Eurosceptical is that these parties use their opposition to the EU as a vehicle through which to showcase their fringe-party status and emphasize their distinction from the other “order” parties in the political system. As the mainstream parties take a pro-EU line, the peripheral parties seek to occupy the remaining niche of opposing the EU, in which they have an undoubted advantage when compared to the mainstream parties. As in Western Europe and the Central and Eastern European states, all hard-Eurosceptical parties in Turkey enjoy a peripheral status in the party-system.

Although ethnic Kurdish parties are peripheral in terms of voter support, they are not Eurosceptical unlike the other peripheral parties in Turkish political system. Their attitude towards Turkey’s EU membership follows a similar pattern to other regional parties around Europe, which seek to circumvent the national central authority and enhance their positions via European integration.

The third proposition is that the level of public Euroscepticism does not necessarily correspond to the level of Euroscepticism in the party-system. In other words, parties are independent actors, whose behaviour may not always reflect that of the public. Testing this proposition, Taggart and Szczepaniak conclude that there is no simple link between party-based Euroscepticism and public opinion on European integration. They showed that while countries with low levels of public Euro-scepticism enjoy high levels of party-based Euroscepticism, countries with high levels of public Euroscepticism have the potential for low-party based Euroscepticism. However, Turkey does not support this hypothesis. According to a survey conducted by Open Society Institute in 2007, 32.4% of the Turks interviewed said that they would vote no if there were to be a referendum today on Turkey’s membership in the EU, which is a considerably high figure.24 As for party-based Euroscepticism, Eurosceptical parties received 42.06% of the votes cast in the July 2007 Parliamentary Election elections in Turkey. This indicates that both public-Euroscepticism and party-based Euroscepticism are high in Turkey.

The fourth proposition is that in those candidate countries where accession becomes a more immediate prospect, Euroscepticism rises, whereas Euroscepticism is lower in those candidate states where it is perceived as a distant possibility. Taggart and Szczepaniak find little relationship between the prospects for accession and the level of Euroscepticism. The Turkish case, however, supports this hypothesis. Prior to the start of accession talks between the EU and Turkey in 2005, a great number of Turkish people were enthusiastically supportive of Turkey’s EU membership and the idea of EU integration without contemplating much about what it could involve. However, when the accession talks started in 2005, it became much clearer that Turkey’s EU membership could entail costs. For instance, the Turkish Republic of

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Northern Cyprus could lose its sovereignty after unification with the South and accession could be disadvantageous for some sectors of the economy such as agriculture, which had previously been heavily subsidized by the state. Also, the granting of rights to minorities as a result of EU democratization reforms led to the resurfacing of the fear of disintegration among the Turkish people. In contrast, the benefits arising from accession are long-term. Free-circulation of Turkish people in the EU is for instance not foreseen for more than a decade. Some of these benefits are not concrete, such as higher democratic standards. Therefore, coupled with the lukewarm attitude of the European public as well as the elite towards Turkey’s accession, the initial zeal for EU integration has dramatically diminished among the Turkish people during the accession process.

The fifth argument is that soft Euroscepticism is more prevalent in the candidate states to the EU than hard Euroscepticism. Taggart and Szczerbiak find much evidence from the candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe to support this hypothesis. The Turkish case provides further evidence showing the validity of this argument. As seen in the Table, the total share of votes for soft-Eurosceptical parties (35.15%) in the 2007 general elections is overwhelmingly higher than the total percentage of votes for hard-Eurosceptical parties in the table (6.91%), which are all peripheral parties. Because of the perceived benefits of EU membership, there is a general consensus among the political elite in favour of Turkey’s EU accession whereas outright objection to EU membership is not widespread.

The sixth proposition is that party-based Euroscepticism in the newly independent states is much stronger than that in the older states. As national identities in the newly independent states have not been consolidated to the full extent, joining a larger supra-national body like the EU is perceived as a blow to national identity. Taggart and Szczerbiak conclude that there is no meaningful link between state development and levels of party-based Euroscepticism. For instance, although Hungary is an established state, it is marked by a high level of party-based Euroscepticism. A similar conclusion can be drawn regarding the case of Turkey. Although Turkey is an established state, level of party-based Euroscepticism is quite high at 42.06 per cent (the Table). This can be explained by the latent mistrust towards the West and Europe in Turkish public opinion. Although Turkey has been historically among the most ardent supporters of joining the EU, when the relations with the EU sour, then the negative aspect of the European image governs the Turkish attitude towards the EU. Moreover, in the post-2005 era, after accession talks with the EU started, the costs of accession to the EU have come into the spotlight on the part of the Turkish public opinion. More importantly, the EU capitals’ expression of Turkey-sceptic have fed the Eurosceptic backlash both at the elite and public level.

6. Conclusion

From the analysis of party-based Euroscepticism in Turkey, some conclusions can be drawn. First, Euroscepticism is a phenomenon which makes no distinction among party families, with Eurosceptic parties being from both the left and the right side of the political spectrum. Second, some fringe parties emphasize their Euroscepticism to underline their peripheral status. Third, soft Euroscepticism is mainly expressed by mainstream parties. Fourth, soft-Euroscepticism is much more widespread
than hard Euroscepticism. Fifth, the level of stateness does not correlate with the level of party-based Euroscepticism.

Comparing the Turkish case to the party-based Euroscepticism in the Central and Eastern European candidate states, like in the central and Eastern European candidate countries, the phenomenon of Euroscepticism in Turkey is a “minority component”, albeit a significant one. One of the significant differences of party-based Euroscepticism in Turkey from that in the Central and Eastern European candidate states is that Euroscepticism is spread across the political spectrum and is not concentrated at the right end of the spectrum. One of the factors responsible for this difference is the peculiarity inherent in the left in general and social-democracy in particular in Turkey. First, social-democracy and the left in Turkey are not wholly comparable to the Western European political systems. Universal values of social democracy, such as human rights and rights of minorities are not firmly rooted in the social democratic movement in Turkey. One of the peculiarities of social democracy in Turkey is that it was established from above by the state, rather than through a movement from the below. Therefore, it is associated with the state. Social-democracy in Turkey has been heavily colored by state-centric attitudes and nationalism rather than the Western models of social democracy. That is one of the reasons why the CHP, the major social-democratic party in Turkey, has leaned towards Euroscepticism, rather than embracing Turkey’s EU Project wholeheartedly.

Another similarity between party-based Euroscepticism in the Central and Eastern European candidate states and that in Turkey is that there is no single-issue anti-EU party in Turkey. Nevertheless, such single-issue anti-EU parties are present in EU member states. As Taggart and Szczepanaki explain, this is indicative of the fact that the European issue is to a great extent inclined to be a “second order” issue in states that have not joined the EU yet.25

As in the Central and Eastern European countries, one of the most important differences of party-based Euroscepticism in Turkey from Western Europe is the fact that Euroscepticism is present in the mainstream and governmental parties in Turkey.

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25 Taggart and Szczepanaki (2002), op.cit. p. 29.
ANNEX

Table: Categorization of Turkish Parties in terms of Euroscepticism or Eurosupportiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Position of the Party in the Political System</th>
<th>Ideology of the Party</th>
<th>Nature of Euroscepticism</th>
<th>Vote (%) in 2007 Elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>Center-right</td>
<td>Conservative Democrat</td>
<td>Eurosupportive</td>
<td>46.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHP</td>
<td>Center-left</td>
<td>Social Democrat/Nationalist Left</td>
<td>Soft-Eurosceptic</td>
<td>20.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHP</td>
<td>Center-right/Far-right</td>
<td>Ultra-Nationalist</td>
<td>Soft-Eurosceptic/Hard-Eurosceptic</td>
<td>14.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTP/BDP</td>
<td>Ethnic/Regional Party</td>
<td>Kurdish Nationalist</td>
<td>Eurosupportive</td>
<td>5.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP/SP</td>
<td>Fringe Party</td>
<td>Islamist</td>
<td>Hard-Eurosceptic</td>
<td>2.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP</td>
<td>Fringe Party</td>
<td>Radical nationalist-left</td>
<td>Hard-Eurosceptic</td>
<td>0.36</td>
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<tr>
<td>DYP/DP</td>
<td>Center-right</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Eurosupportive</td>
<td>5.41</td>
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<tr>
<td>GP</td>
<td>Fringe Party</td>
<td>Nationalist/populist</td>
<td>Hard-Eurosceptic</td>
<td>3.04</td>
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<tr>
<td>BTP</td>
<td>Fringe Party</td>
<td>Islamist</td>
<td>Hard-Eurosceptic</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Fringe Party</td>
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<td>Hard-Eurosceptic</td>
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<td>ÖDP</td>
<td>Fringe Party</td>
<td>Socialist</td>
<td>Hard-Eurosceptic</td>
<td>0.15</td>
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Source: [http://www.belgenet.net/](http://www.belgenet.net/)

Cumulative Share of the Vote for Party-Based soft- and hard-Euroscepticism in 2007 General Elections in Turkey

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<th>Hard Euroscepticism</th>
<th>Soft Euroscepticism</th>
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<td></td>
<td>6.91</td>
<td>35.15</td>
<td>42.06</td>
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BRIEF OVERVIEW ON THE CONDITIONALITY IN THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

Oana Mocanu*

Abstract**: The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has become a top issue on the EU agenda after the EU enlargement wave of 2004, completed in 2007. The question of efficiently managing the new borders of EU, by facing the new-fangled challenges related to security, combating trafficking, ensuring economic prosperity and environment protection has driven new and restructured EU mechanisms in order to manage the relations with its new neighbourhood - rather diverse in terms of economic and social welfare. Conditionality from the part of EU towards the ENP partner states has been an intricate issue even from the start. How committed can these countries be on the path of rough economic, political and social reforms, in the absence of a perspective of EU accession? If conditionality, as we know it from the pre-accession process of the former candidate states for example, is going to be a success or a failure in the case of the ENP states is still a matter of perception. This paper attempts to give an overview of different opinions upon the potential effect of the conditionality mechanism within the ENP. The victory or breakdown of conditionality within the ENP depends both on the commitment of the ENP partner states to the goals, values, concrete projects promoted through this policy and its consolidated initiatives (Eastern Partnership, Union for Mediterranean), but most of all on the capacity of the European Union to replace the traditional incentive of accession with a proper alternative, mostly in economic, financial, social and security terms.

Keywords: European Neighbourhood Policy, conditionality, security, neighbours, cooperation, common values

The European Neighbourhood Policy, initiated by the European Union in 2003 through the Wider Europe Paper and one year later, in 2004 through the ENP – Strategy Paper was meant to be at the time an offer for the EU neighbouring states ‘to share the benefits of EU enlargement in terms of stability, security and well-being’. It was believed that this new policy was merely a counter-offer to the new neighbours of the European Union, once it expanded further East, at the same time an offer meant to shift away the focus from the enlargement projects that some of these countries had

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definitely in mind at the time. The new context was defined by the new type of cooperation relations and work framework mechanisms that the EU would have had to endeavour in order to manage successfully not only the opportunities that these states would bring to the European market, but mostly the challenges related to security, efficient external border management, stability, peace and prosperity in the EU’s immediate proximity.

In this context, analysts have tried to explain the necessity of the conditionality system and mechanisms even in the new European Neighbourhood Policy.

Conditionality was often perceived either as ‘a means to use incentives in order to change the behaviour or the policies of a state’, or as a strategy for the international institutions to promote the harmonization of different national policies towards a number of conventional standards. At first mainly economic in essence, used mostly in the financial assistance programmes of the World Bank or IMF, the conditionality principle has gradually found its place and role also in NATO and EU negotiations.

Conditionality became a thorough topic of discussion at European level especially in the period of the accession to EU of the Central and Eastern European countries. This phenomenon became visible in the Association Agreements negotiations, the accession criteria and the pre-accession strategy, the structured dialogue and in the negotiation and legislative harmonization process. Often perceived by the candidate states only as an element of constraint, of some kind of limitation for their own development options in favour of reaching certain ‘standards imposed by the Union’, in the absence of clearly stated advantages/disadvantages that it might entail, the conditionality phenomenon was not easily digested by the candidate states. According to some analysts, the national administrations were even subjected to an intensive Europeanization process, taking up gradually the role of ‘implementing agencies for EU rules’. Often used even by the governments of the candidate states as a justification for the shocks produced by the internal economic and social reforms, conditionality represented both a strong incentive for reforms, necessary to any transition process to a functioning market economy, and a permanent element to be criticised among the candidate states.

The success of conditionality in the enlargement process was based mainly on the existence of the accession perspective to EU and on the prospective benefits exceeding the costs that full membership might have entailed.

In the case of the ENP states, the situation is different, given the diversity of the countries in the area, the lower economic and social development level, the whole range of sensitive problems (such as the frequent non-observation of the rule of law, of human rights, insecurity and instability climate). The major difference is though given by the absence of the main incentive for modernisation and reform: the affirmed perspective of EU accession. In the different stages of defining the ENP and, more recently, in all the attempts to consolidate this policy, it was reiterated the fact that the ENP was not going to be a prior phase towards enlargement. In other words, the

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2 Jeffrey T. Checkel, „Compliance and Conditionality”, ARENA Working Papers, WP 00/18, University of Oslo (2000), [http://www.arena.uio.no_publications/wp00_18.htm](http://www.arena.uio.no_publications/wp00_18.htm) last accessed on 18 December 2009
3 Husein Kassim, “The European Administration: between Europeanization and Domestication” in Jack Hayward and Anand Menon (eds), „Governing Europe”, Oxford University Press, 2003
countries under the ENP were not explicitly offered any promise or prospect of accession to EU.

In the European Neighbourhood Policy, conditionality would be explained by the possibility for the ENP partner states to benefit from ‘privileged relations’ with the Union, by an increased access to the EU Internal Market, depending on the concrete progress on sharing the European values and on the effective implementation of the economic and institutional reforms in these states.

Even in the ENP Strategy Paper (2004) it is mentioned that any progress in the EU-partner states relation is conditioned by the latter’s ‘commitment degree to the common values and the willingness and capacity to implement the agreed priorities’4. The application of the differentiation principle depends also on the success of the implementation of the common values of EU by the partner states. The analysts often state that the agenda is not set by the ENP relevant democratic institutions; instead the monitoring process of the ENP put these countries under a constant influence of the EU institutions. The recommendation would be that ‘the ENP states should be part of the discussions upon the common values, otherwise, the ENP goals risk to represent only the political preferences of the EU, and not a reflection of the common values of the two parties’5.

Within ENP, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument incorporates elements of ex-post conditionality6, the assistance could be suspended if a partner country does not observe the democracy principles, rule of law, human rights etc. The added value is represented by the ex-ante conditionality, through a permanent link between the development of further (neighbourhood) relations and the fulfilment of certain standards/terms in the Action Plans. There are analysts discussing the EU’s offer to support the partner states being conditioned more by the level of institutional and political capacity in each country, than the actual rhythm of change in some internal policies7.

Naturally there have been debates upon the potential success or failure of the conditionality in the EU Neighbourhood Policy. It is still under discussion the extent to which these partner states would firmly commit themselves on the path of reforms, though necessary for them – in particular for the ones in the Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus – in the absence of the final result that could ‘justify the sacrifice’. The most probable answer to this dilemma comes out of the cost-benefit analysis. The reform measures that need to be undertaken (related to democratisation, observing human rights, rule of law, macroeconomic policies, structural reforms, social policy and employment policy, poverty reduction,

BRIEF OVERVIEW ON THE CONDITIONALITY IN THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

regional development), most of them similar to the ones applied in the former candidate states from Central and Eastern Europe, will imply a series of costs and the advantages of preferential trade relations, of a consolidated cooperation relation (in all the fields covered by the strategy documents) will have to overall exceed these costs, even in the perspective of non-accession to the Union. As a matter of fact, the costs for adopting the EU rules are much higher in the neighbouring countries, ENP partner states, given the authoritarian regimes in some of these countries, reluctant to change, as well as their lower level of economic and social development.

Some analysts even discuss about a harsher conditionality in the case of the ENP, given the absence of the supreme prize - the membership of the EU. There are though some contradictory opinions regarding a soft conditionality, given the fact that the priorities of the Action Plans and the ways to monitor the commitment to reforms are jointly established, namely in partnership with the ENP states. Parmentier (2008) explains the term ‘soft conditionality’ through the link between granting the benefits for the fulfilment of some conditions, this way being capable to influence policies, but not imposing a unique policy valid to all those involved. The Action Plans were somehow compared to the Accession Partnerships of the EU enlargement towards the Central and Eastern Europe. The conditionality is even more difficult, since ‘there is no uniform acquis to be adopted in the case of ENP partner states’.

The efficiency of the conditionality in the ENP is also questioned as a result of the diverse priorities of the Eastern European, Southern Caucasus states and the Southern Mediterranean ones. Regions with a different level of development and welfare, as well as with diverse visions upon their future in relation to the EU, some of them expressing firmly their wish to join the EU, affirming their European vocation and history and declining the status of merely neighbours of Europe, the reconciliation of interests and priorities will not be an easy target.

In this sense, the ENP launch was not received with a great deal of enthusiasm by all the EU neighbouring countries. Some of them were not content with the status of neighbour of EU (i.e. Ukraine or Republic of Moldova), while Russia has even withdrawn from the ENP initiative from a very early stage, choosing instead the Strategic Partnership with the EU formula. The Mediterranean states remained optimistic in view of consolidating their relations mostly at

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8 Michael Emerson, Gergana Noutcheva, Nicu Popescu, “European Neighbourhood Policy Two years on: Time indeed for an ‘ENP plus’”, Centre for European Policy Studies Policy Brief No. 126, March 2007, p. 6
a bilateral level, while the Western Balkans states were satisfied with their non-inclusion in the ENP, as a sign of confirmation of their future prospect of accession to EU. 

The possibility of the EU neighbouring states to have an increased access to the EU Single Market is one of the most important incentives offered by the ENP. The neighbouring countries can become buffer zones between the EU and regions considered to be origin sources of potential threats. The countries in question can encounter difficulties on the internal side for the drastic measures that they can be obliged to adopt towards third countries. As a matter of fact, there is a paradox: in all the strategic documents of the ENP, the focus is placed on the common values of these countries and of EU, the sharing and consolidation of common democratic values and principles, and the even Action Plans are focussed on the political goals, upon observing the human rights and democratic principles, while ‘many of these countries do not even have a history of observing this kind of values or principles’, quite the opposite. Even sharing these EU values (according to the EU Treaty) is a distinctive sign of the conditionality practiced within the ENP: ‘the degree in which the EU neighbours share the EU values will determine the degree in which the Union will deepen the integration level’.

The whole logic of ENP gravitates around conditionality. The more the ENP partners develop their society according to EU standards, the more the EU deepens the economic and political relations, which puts most of the responsibility on the shoulders of the neighbouring partner states. This way, conditionality is often perceived as a key-mechanism of EU’s power to bring on reforms also in its neighbourhood.

A very interesting perspective on the functioning system of conditionality in the ENP is offered by Ruben Zaiotti (2007). He puts to question the existence of a real commitment and even the sincerity of EU in affirming the wish to create a ‘ring of friends’ (in contrast, the European Security Strategy in 2003 uses the formula: ‘ring of well-governed states’), explaining that the necessity to build better, more secure, more efficient “protective fences” could not really represent a sign meant to bring confidence to the partner neighbouring states, on the contrary, there could be the risk of hostility, reluctance, suspicion, even the creation of new barriers. A European initiative, the ENP is more an asymmetric initiative to assure that the EU borders are stable, with an increased focus on security issues, hoping that these partner countries will end up sharing the same values as the EU. ‘The negative conditionality’, suspending the advantages in the absence of reforms, is not sufficient in

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17 Rachel A. Epstein, Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Beyond conditionality: international institutions in postcommunist Europe after enlargement”, in Journal of European Public Policy, 15:6 (pp. 795-805), September 2008, p. 610
the case of ENP. ‘The positive conditionality’ is also considered in deficit, in the absence of clear incentives that would justify and boost the necessary drastic and substantial economic, institutional, political reforms. Meanwhile, the interests of the partner states focus on the trade relations, the access to the EU market, the economic development (through FDI, EU financial assistance), internal stability. The countries not registering progress cannot be given advanced opportunities for cooperation. This way, a major role is given to the governments of the ENP partner states in order to facilitate and boost the cooperation relations. Some analysts have even compared the ENP with ‘an association policy with low credibility’, given the explicit exclusion of the accession perspective

The conditionality balance shifts when it comes to the energy field. The degree of dependence of EU on some of the ENP states, as well as on Russia in the field of energy supply, transportation routes is not to be neglected. The power to negotiate of the ENP partners states can make a difference when it comes to this very sensitive field. They are most certainly going to use this advantage in the future negotiations of different agreements with the EU.

In this context, one must not forget that the EU itself depends upon its neighbourhood, in terms of good relations, stability, security at its borders, energy transit, migration, environment protection. The behaviour of EU neighbours in all these fields is crucial to EU. This way, the degree of mutual dependence should not be of such high concern. After all, the ENP represents a promise to strengthen cooperation relations in exchange for concrete reform results. The ENP consists of the promise to consolidate the political relations and economic relations with the partner countries in exchange for tangible progress in the internal reform process in the partner states.

The European Neighbourhood Policy is not fully a brand-new policy. Built on existing agreements, mechanisms and instruments of different cooperation forms at the regional level (from the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the Eastern European countries), the ENP is also based on several mechanisms that have proven useful and efficient during the EU enlargement process. Using certain instruments such as Action Plans, similar somehow to the Accession Partnerships, the technical and financial assistance, twinning, conditionality, monitoring and regular reporting on progress to date, the ENP uses a whole range of mechanisms used by the enlargement policy.

The success or failure of the conditionality within the ENP depends both on the commitment of the ENP partner states to the goals, values and concrete projects, promoted through this policy and its consolidated initiatives (Eastern Partnership, Union for Mediterranean) and also on the capacity of the European Union to replace

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the traditional incentive of EU accession perspective with a proper alternative (mostly in economic, social and security terms) in order to promote the necessary economic, social and political reforms in these countries, so that they might become closer to the European Union.

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BRIEF OVERVIEW ON THE Conditionality in the European Neighbourhood Policy


Official documents:


EUROPEANIZATION OF ROMANIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Liliana Popescu*

Abstract: The paper discusses various aspects of the Europeanization of Romanian foreign policy: elite socialization, bureaucratic reorganization, institutional and policy adaptation to the requirements and exigencies of EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), projection of national interests onto CFSP agenda and decisions. There is very little written in the literature on the subject of Romanian foreign policy Europeanization. From this standpoint this article fills a gap and indicates an area of research in need to be explored. The paper is using a series of Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) documents related to its organizational changes as well as a number of interviews with diplomats. It is trying to test in the case of Romania a few relevant theses written by significant authors with reference to the Europeanization of other Member States. It draws a number of conclusions – most of them confirming important theses on Europeanization. It ends by remarking the uneven character and the short length of the Romanian foreign policy Europeanization.

Keywords: Europeanization, foreign policy, Romania, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, national adaptation to EU, projection of national interests, Republic of Moldova

The theme of ‘Europeanization’ is increasingly discussed in the literature dedicated to European studies. More and more conferences are dedicated to the subject and debates are developed around it. But what is ‘Europeanization’ and what is the relevance of using the concept? Can it be applied to foreign policy? If so, what can we meaningfully say about the Europeanization of the Romanian foreign policy? These are the major questions this paper is going to address, with a particular focus on the last question.

The added value of this article resides in the qualitative analysis of significant empirical data: interpretation of foreign affairs ministers’ interviews on Romania’s foreign policy change, evaluations of the Romanian foreign policy actions meant to promote the national interest at the EU level, successive organizational schemes of the Romanian MFA, interpretation of interview answers of MFA officials (director and director general levels) with significant experience in working in Romanian diplomacy on EU affairs.

I. What is ‘Europeanization’?

Johan Olsen remarks the ambiguity of ‘Europeanization’, identifying five possible meanings: changes in external boundaries (enlargement), developing institutions at the European level, central penetration of national systems of governance, exporting forms of political organization, a political unification project (Olsen, 2002: 923-924). Starting from this multiplicity of use, the term ‘Europeanization’ seems to be close to

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important aspects of European integration, to the point of raising the question whether the concept is useful at all and whether it cannot successfully be replaced by ‘European integration’. Olsen himself is questioning the usefulness of the concept, given its resemblance to various aspects of European integration.

Beyond the multiplicity of meanings identified by Olsen, in the literature on Europeanization, one can distinguish, however, a “mainstream meaning” of Europeanization, which is a composite concept. In this sense, ‘Europeanization’ seems to be a concept that covers a suite of phenomena describing a distinct process, being defined by the following four dimensions (Strang, 2007: 11):

- adaptation of national policies to EU requirements and policies (downloading);
- national projection of Member States’ interests, or the attempt of Member States to promote their interests onto the agenda and policies of the EU (uploading);
- elite socialization;
- bureaucratic re-organization.

However, there is no consensus among authors not even with respect to these features. Some authors discuss it in terms of two complementary processes: adaptation of national policies to EU policies and national projection of interests at the EU level (Börzel, 2002, for example). Michael Smith claims that (1) elite socialization and (2) bureaucratic reorganization are two indicators of national adaptation, besides (3) constitutional change, and (4) increase in public support for European political co-operation (Smith, 2000: 617). Featherstone (2003) proposes as well to use elite socialization and bureaucratic reorganization as indicators of national adaptation. Certainly, this indicates a certain overlap of the dimensions identified of Europeanization. A series of methodological problems have been identified by other authors, including the difficulty to measure ‘national adaptation’ or the difficulty to separate other factors from the EU factor in impacting upon national foreign policy (Saurugger, 2005).

A number of authors focus either mainly or exclusively on the adaptation of national policies, or downloading, dimension. In this sense, Europeanization was defined as “the reform of domestic structures, institutions and policies in order to meet the requirements of the systematic logic, political dynamics and administrative mechanisms of European integration” (Joseph S., 2006 apud Moga, 2009). In his case study of the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy, Spyros Economides (2005) tends to disregard the downloading dimension, focusing almost exclusively on the national projection approach. He writes: “[T]he real Europeanization of Greek foreign policy has occurred in the domain of the translocation of Greek foreign policy preferences and interests in at least two key issue areas, Turkey and Cyprus, onto the EU agenda” (Economides, 2005: 472). Joanna Kaminska, writing about the Europeanization of Polish foreign policy, is also focusing on the uploading dimension, despite the fact that she defines Europeanization by both “top-down” and “bottom-up” processes (Kaminska, 2007: 5).

Some authors explicitly reject the uploading dimension because they believe that the process of projecting the national interest onto the EU agenda reflects strictly an intergovernmental approach of states towards EU and CFSP.1 Denca’s comparative study on Hungary, Romania and Slovakia (2009) is a good example in this sense. He focuses, like Joseph, on the downloading dimension.

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1 Common Foreign and Security Policy.
II. Can we talk about the Europeanization of national foreign policy?

The fact that the European foreign policy is largely an intergovernmental sector makes us wonder whether we can talk at all about the Europeanization of the Member States’ foreign policy. Member States supposedly defend and protect this key domain of sovereignty (Wong, 2005). CFSP is essentially an intergovernmental activity and the fact that the ministries of foreign affairs of Member States are well represented in the Permanent Representation (PermReps) offices in Brussels is proof of that. A wide range of ministries and governmental departments are also represented within the PermReps. However, they are mainly dealing with Council issues – major intergovernmental institution of the EU. The acquis communautaire has been minimal in the area of foreign policy; the chapter on foreign affairs was one of the quickest chapters to be closed during the negotiations of many present Member States with EU, including Romania. Still, there are aspects related to foreign policy which are undergoing changes under the four dimensions of Europeanization, and these are going to be discussed further down.

The creation of the CFSP is a process, still in its very beginning despite the fact that the European Political Cooperation started in 1970. Some authors tend to downplay it; others tend to value the progress achieved. Being a process and not a simple result, to be measured in a number of common declarations, positions, actions and strategies, it should be approached as such: as a process. Europeanization of national foreign policy does not presuppose a perfect record of common agreement in foreign affairs between Member States. CFSP does not mean that all EU are required to speak and act the same in foreign affairs matters. However, CFSP involves an increasing coordination and construction of common values and norms (like communication, consultation, confidentiality, consensus (Smith, 2000)), ways of approaching international issues, concerted actions in view of a possible future unified European foreign policy. The Lisbon Treaty emphasizes “the development of mutual political solidarity among Member States” (Art 24.2), ‘loyalty’ and “the need to work together” (Art.24.3). In the light of these ideas, it is legitimate to talk about the Europeanization of Member States’ foreign policy.

If we turn our attention to the Europeanization of Romanian foreign policy we might notice the scarcity of studies and research in this area. One notable exception is represented by the study of the Europeanization of Romanian foreign policy in comparative perspective, written by Sorin Denca (2009). His study conceptually refuses to deal with the dimension of uploading, as mentioned earlier. However, his study is rich in discussing the bureaucratic reorganization as well as the socialization and the national adaptation dimensions. Other studies on Romania’s Europeanization draw on regionalism (Dobre, 2009), gender equality (Chiva, 2009), minority issues (Dobre, 2003), on conditionality and its role in Europeanization (Papadimitriou, Phinnemore, 2004), on Romania’s entry into the EU in comparative perspective (Papadimitriou, Gateva, 2009).

III. The Europeanization of foreign policy

Most authors consider the European Political Cooperation (EPC) as the starting point of the process of Europeanization of foreign policy. Established in 1970, EPC represented the beginning of the cooperation and coordination between Member States in the area of foreign policy. It was also the beginning of a long process of learning
to work together, as well as of the process of adaptation of Member States to the common foreign policy (the downloading dimension of Europeanization).

The issue of Member States’ adaptation to EU requirements is at least bi-dimensional, presupposing changes at the institutional level and at the policy level, regardless of the area of adaptation. In the area of foreign policy, Europeanization presupposes changes at the level of the institutions involved in the process of creating foreign policy (ministries, Permanent Representations etc, but also norms, procedures etc) and at the level of the policy itself (content, orientation, values, standpoints).

One way of defining ‘national adaptation’ is: “the ability of a political actor to change its behaviour so as to meet challenges in the form of new demands by altering the means of action” (Manners, Whitman, 2000, apud Strang, 2007). Michael Smith (2000) discusses this dimension of Europeanization in terms of “impact on national foreign policy both in style and substance.” Every Member State went through a process of adaptation in the process of becoming EU member. Every Member State is undergoing a process of continuous adaptation of its institutions and policy in order to facilitate its participation in EU affairs and policies. This is valid in the case of CFSP. In this sense, “there is no template for policy adaptation within the EU” (Longhurst and Miskimmon, 2007).

The EU imposed conditionality has been the main driving force behind the Europeanization in the case of the latest waves of enlargement (2004, 2007) (Moga, 2009; Chiva, 2009). The issue of conditionality as motivating power behind the Europeanization of national foreign policy has been extensively analyzed in the case of Greece (Economides, 2005, for example), an older Member State. But it has also been analyzed in the case of a non-EU country like Turkey (Moga, 2009; Meltem Muftuler-Bac, Yaprak Gursoy, 2009). Meltem Muftuler-Bac and Yaprak Gursoy show how Turkish foreign policy changed in content (towards Iraq, and in a series of other areas). EU conditionality in the area of foreign affairs has proven to have a pacific effect on countries having a record of conflicts and tensed relationships. In the case of Romania, the closure of Chapter 27 of negotiations, started in 2000, meant that Romania had to align to the foreign policy declarations of EU, without having any veto right (right acquired after gaining membership status in 2007).

Various studies reflect the ways in which Member States act in order to have their foreign policy national interests projected onto the EU agenda. Kaminska is writing about Poland’s successes in promoting its foreign policy agenda related to Ukraine and Belarus, focusing thus on achievements of Polish diplomacy in projecting the national interest onto CFSP. Jose Torreblanca is writing about Spain’s successes in promoting its Mediterranean and Latin American agendas. He shows that in the case of Spain, EU turned into an extremely forceful amplifier of national interests (Torreblanca, 2001). “[T]he EU has provided an excellent opportunity to enhance the foreign policy capacity and the national goals of a country which had a large and problematic foreign policy agenda, scant economic resources to match ambitions with policies…” (Torreblanca, 2001: 5). The examples of analysis may go on with the cases of UK (Bulmer and Burch, 2005), Germany (Longhurst and Miskimmon, 2007), France (Wong, 2006), and many more.

Each EU Member State has to gain as a result of its very EU membership. First, being one of the most powerful economic actors in the world and the first worldwide contributor to the development of less developed countries, EU provides to its
members prestige, high regard and attention from countries outside the EU. Second, the nature of the CFSP decision-making process guarantees the fact that each Member State has a voice, is listened to and its interests are taken into account. The veto power of every Member State guarantees precisely that.

The projection of national interests onto the EU agenda depends to a certain extent on the capacity of the elite to deal with their counterparts in Member States, on their capacity to know the interests of others as well as to communicate appropriately their interest and with the right means. Socialization presupposes social learning, a “mechanism whereby national policy-makers learn the norms and rules characterizing the EU foreign policy culture … In other words, their preferences and behaviour are being Europeanized.” (Denca, 2009).

Thus, ‘elite socialization’ represents an essential dimension of Europeanization, including in the field of foreign policy. Scholars of Europeanization are discussing about ‘norms entrepreneurs’ (Börzel and Risse 2003: 58-59; Sedelmeier 2006), who are those policy-makers directly involved and most exposed to EU norms and rules, such as experts and diplomats from PermReps in Brussels, diplomats from relevant European departments in the MFA. In some interpretations, the success of EPC came through socialization, through the “club atmosphere” of talks within EPC, through the contacts and networking at the civil servant levels (who have permanent positions, unlike political appointees) (Nuttall, 1997, apud Smith, 2000). The evolution of the EPC towards CFSP led to the development of a specific culture and specific procedures of Member States’ representatives in the area of foreign policy. These representatives share a culture, procedures, and norms of a bargaining process (that defines an intergovernmental type of relations). “They are “problem solving” norms and procedures: communication and consultation prior to common decision-making, development of a communauté de vue on what constitutes ‘European interests’, confidentiality among members, consensus.” (Smith, 2000: 615-616).

Smith (2004) rejects the intergovernmentalist position according to which CFSP decisions are taken on the basis of the lowest denominator. Decisions are not taken in this manner, rather the representatives of Member States are consulting each other, are learning very well the positions of others, they realize the importance of reaching a common position, they are building consensus, they tend to compromise and reach a median position.

One of the effects of becoming EU member and of the need to adapt to European structures is the bureaucratic reorganization – important dimension of Europeanization. Political cooperation priorities become national priorities. As Smith (2000) puts it, political cooperation: 1. requires the establishment of new national officials to serve it; 2. encourages the expansion of most national diplomatic services; 3. leads to a clear reorientation of national foreign ministries toward ‘Europe’ in order to improve their handling of European affairs. In turn, bureaucratic change leads to the reinforcement of cooperation norms.

The process of implementing the acquis communautaire requires a significant increase in the bureaucracy needed to implement the acquis at national level. However, in the case of foreign policy, it was not the acquis that determined the increase of bureaucracy in number and complexity, but the need to adapt to the whole coordination process and to the entire complex infrastructure needed to
support the decision-making bodies in foreign policy (Council of EU, COREPER I, COREPER II, COPS, working groups and committees behind them). That requires an increase in number of diplomats at the level of the national MFA and in the Permanent Representation in Brussels. These two elements are to be verified with respect to the Romanian case further down. Another hypothesis to be tested in the Romanian case is this: policies are Europeanized at a faster pace than the governmental structures, the bureaucracy, the organizational infrastructure (Bulmer, Burch, 1998).

IV. What are the dimensions of the Europeanization of the Romanian foreign policy?

The studies dedicated to the Europeanization of Romanian policies and institutions are scarce. However, a number of features may be described and a series of hypothesis might be verified with reference to the Romanian case. The scarcity of studies on Europeanization is maximal in the case of foreign policy. One significant article writes, in a comparative perspective, about the Europeanization of Romanian foreign policy (Denca, 2009). Denca enumerates the areas in which Romania, like other former socialist countries who became EU members (2004/2007) had to make changes. Romania: had to adopt the existing acquis and institutions in the field of CFSP, without having the option to project their own preferences; had to align her national positions to the EU common positions, common strategies, joint actions, and political declarations; had to refashion the administrative structure needed for taking part in the political and technical committees and working parties of the Council of Ministers; had to set up new political-expert positions and new communication infrastructure for sending and receiving confidential information had to be created; had to change embassies into ‘permanent representations’ (PermRep) to execute a wider and more complex range of functions.

All these elements are part of a complex process of national adaptation of Romania’s policy to the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Romania had little to adapt in terms of acquis. However, Romania’s representatives had a lot to learn in terms of practices, of style, of ways of conducting relations with European partners in the period of accession negotiations (2000-2004). The alignment to the common declarations of the EU was featuring among the obligations deriving from this chapter. This obligation was fulfilled very soon by Romania, after the closure of the chapter. “The period of time between signing the Treaty of Accession of Romania and Bulgaria (2005) and the actual accession (more than one year and a half) was spent by Romania’s diplomats and representative observing the whole process of preparing decisions on foreign policy – at various levels” (Comanescu (1), 2008).

The involvement of the Romanian political elite in the process of European elite socialization into the main norms of the process of building the Common Foreign and Security Policy started in the early 2000, after the closure of chapter 27 of negotiations on CFSP. However, only after 2005, were Romanian representatives able to observe the process of negotiations within CFSP. Since 2005, Romanian delegates had the right to observe the process of preparation of positions, decisions etc within CFSP and this was a further step in learning the „cuisine process” of CFSP, how the consensus is built in this process, says a director in the Romanian MFA who worked in the PermRep Brussels in top positions. The involvement in and the accumulation of practice in the area of building consensus within the CFSP
Council working groups and committees is a very recent phenomenon: beginning in 2007, when Romania became EU member.

The projection of national interests onto the EU agenda depends to a certain extent on the capacity of the elite to deal with their counterparts in Member States. In a way, smaller countries are disadvantaged within the mechanism of building consensus in the CFSP, even though they have the same right of veto. For representatives of more powerful states within EU it is easier to rally other states to pursue your interests, as one MFA director was asserting. “Europeanization as socialization depends to an important extent on the way in which foreign policy elite perceives the distribution of power within the EU” (Denca, 2009). If we look at the process of elite socialization from this viewpoint, Romanian foreign policy entrepreneurs are disadvantaged, so far. Romania’s record of integration in the EU after 2007 is far from being excellent. The Mechanism of Cooperation and Verification has been extended in the area of justice, Romanian policy makers did not perform well when faced with the crisis etc. G. Pridham exquisitely showed in his paper presented at a conference on Europeanization in Bucharest (June 2010).

In terms of socialization, of learning the norms and rules of EU foreign policy culture, the newer to the club the least socialized in these areas. Romania, like other countries of the former Soviet Bloc, was less socialized into European values and had a pretty ‘illiterate’ political elite from the viewpoint of European values. Perhaps it is worthwhile noting that the culture of foreign policy elite, of the diplomats included, was characterized by duplicity (fed by the simultaneous dissidence of Romania within the Soviet Block and at the same time functioning within this Block, Warsaw Treaty, Comecon) and by a historic aversion towards the Big Brother (USSR). Romania’s ambition, pursued efficiently by the diplomatic elite over the last 15 years, to become NATO and EU member, led to a situation in which Romania had to make decisive steps to overcome this duplicity. The statements of former Minister of foreign affairs Andrei Plesu’s on this issue are exquisite.2 Romanian political elite was faced in the late 1990s with the situation in which it had to prove its commitment to democratic values and to the Allied position (NATO’s need to be supported in bombing Belgrade, 1999). CDR, the coalition in power at the time (1996-2000), proved to have decision-makers (elite) able to make such a difficult step towards decisiveness and commitment to the Allies, as opposed to duplicity and lack of indecisiveness. In terms of foreign policy culture, Romania is coming from far away towards the EU, and the journey is not over.

Despite the short period of Romanian elite socialization into CFSP norms and practices, Romanian diplomats rapidly adapted to the reflex of coordination and they joined l’ésprit de corps various analysts are talking about when describing foreign policy cooperation ever since its inception, according to one of the MFA directors interviewed. Nonetheless, as one director general was saying, there is still a long way to go in accumulating experience and the so called ‘European reflex’. The diplomats and civil servants involved, Romanian administration, needs to learn more in the area of specific practices, rules and norms of the EU mechanisms and institutions. Being questioned what diplomats learned before 2007 and after 2007, one diplomat answered: before 2007 we learned

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2 Published in weekly magazine Dilema and in Foreign Policy Romania journal.
regulations, procedures and the *acquis*, with an accent on *acquis*; after 2007 we learned regulations, procedures, *acquis* and responsibility, with an accent on regulations and procedures. Before 2007, knowledge of the *acquis* was essential; after 2007, knowledge of regulations and procedures proved to be essential in order to be able to act responsibly within CFSP.

The learning process takes time, and Romania became member less than four years ago. The discrepancy between the norms practice in Bucharest (‘în centrala’ in Romanian, that is, in the MFA headquarters) and the norms learnt by part of the elite working in Brussels is large (or at least this was the situation in the first years after 2007). One example given in an interview was the inflexibility of the instructions coming from the headquarters of the Ministry in Bucharest and the need for flexibility felt by participants in negotiations in the working groups in Brussels, as part of the process of consensus building. In relation to this issue, here is what Denca writes:

> “An important asset that national representatives in Brussels bring to the capital is that they have a comprehensive understanding of the EU... In addition, national representatives know when a particular position is unsustainable. In such a case, to carry on with the national mandate received from the capital may eventually lead to isolation in the group. Therefore, they may convince colleagues in the capital that it is not realistic to go on and a change of the national position is required (interviews, Romanian and Slovak PermReps, Brussels, December 2007).” (Denca, 2009: 397)

Leaving aside the creation of successive institutions specifically dedicated to the European integration (the early Department of European Integration, the Ministry of European Integration, at present Department of European Affairs), this paper focuses on the changes occurred in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in Romania’s mission to Brussels during the last 10 years. The questions to be answered are the following. What were the effects of Romania’s process of accession to the EU on the infrastructure of foreign affairs? What does the *bureaucratic reorganization* consist of?

As a result of Romania’s accession to the EU, the Permanent Mission (Embassy) of Romania to the EU in Brussels changed into Permanent Representation (PermRep). The number of diplomats and representatives in the PermRep increased massively over the last 10 years, being determined by the necessities of negotiations and the enhanced functions and attributions mirroring the increased complexity of Romania’s relationship with EU. According to a director general from the MFA with extensive experience in Romania’s mission in Brussels, in 2002 there were approximately 20 diplomats and about 30 other representatives from various ministries, thus about 50 staff in total. Today, there is approximately 100 staff in the PermRep, the number of diplomats being doubled within this figure. The range of functions performed by PermReps changed as well (Denca, 2009) so as to serve the new position of Romania as EU member.

The reorganization of the bureaucracy in the area of foreign policy is not a formal matter; it is a substantial change: it affects the ways in which political decision is made in Bucharest. The PermRep was restructured so as to respond to the requirements of Romania’s accession to the EU. On the foreign affairs side, the PermRep had to be restructured so as to correspond to Romania’s need to fully participate in the CFSP process and institutions – that is, to have diplomats
to participate in various institutionalized levels below the Council: working groups, committees, COREPER I, II, COPS etc.

With respect to the reformation of the foreign affairs service, Minister Comanescu mentions several times, in 2008, the reform of the Romanian diplomacy that started with the consular section. Indeed, there have been and there are important pressures coming from Romania’s commitments toward EU, related to the freedom of movement of citizens in the EU, related to Romania’s aspiration to enter the Schengen area in 2011, and related to the development of the European Home Affairs area, reflected in the relatively recent set up of the Directorate General Home Affairs (July 2010). These resulted in the priority of reforming the consular section of the Romanian diplomacy.

With regard to the reform of the diplomatic service, one can notice the following:

1) diplomacy became more and more politicized over the last few years to the point of fully contradicting the legal framework that requires diplomats not to be politically affiliated – thus indicating that old duplicity reflexes are not dead;

2) despite the fact that successive directors of human resources have been trained by prestigious trainers in excellent programs, despite the fact that almost every minister stated the need to reform the human resources area,

   (a) the diplomatic career is unpredictable because of the lack of rules and the supremacy of clientele and favouritism,
   (b) the promotions and career path are often not dependent on merit but on connections, clientele and political criteria,
   (c) some of the most talented diplomats defect and join EU institutions or the private sector,
   (d) potential talented newcomers are discouraged by current recruiting practices;

3) every new minister who comes to office (and there were frequent changes over the last three and a half years since Romania’s accession to EU: Adrian Cioroianu (2007), Lazar Comanescu (2008), Cristian Diaconescu (2009), Teodor Baconschi (2010)) changes the organizational scheme of the ministry (the organizational scheme promised by the present minister is still awaited by diplomats and the public opinion as well); however, this does not amount to the reform of the ministry.

   These are, in short, aspects unchanged in the MFA, despite the declarations of the need to reform diplomacy.

   However, beyond these unchanged aspects, one may notice certain Europeanizing trends in the way in which the MFA organizational scheme (‘organigrame’ in Romanian) evolved over the last 11 years. In the organizational scheme of 1999, one may find a simple Direction European Union under DG European and Euro-Atlantic Organizations. In 2003, a Directorate General European Union was in place, besides other DGs centered on international organizations. In the same scheme (2003) ‘Europe’ is covered by a Deputy Minister responsible with bilateral relations. The DG EU and bilateral relations in Europe went separately. In 2004 a Deputy Minister in charge of European Affairs took responsibility for DG EU and DG Wider Europe, thus uniting the two separate

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3 Statutul Corpului Diplomatic (Legea Nr.269/2003).
4 The last entry competition to the ministry has been stalled for unclear reasons. The court decided recently to reject the request of the Ministry to invalidate the competition.
entities. ODA is included in the 2004 scheme but not under the Deputy Minister for European Affairs, but under DG Economic and Political Affairs. Ever since 2004, the Romanian MFA had a deputy minister for European Affairs. 2004 was the year of finalizing the accession negotiations with EU. In the 2006 scheme one can notice, under DG EU, a growth in complexity of directorates dealing with EU affairs, including directorate for development assistance (ODA), general affairs, external relations, EU policies. The area of relations with EU countries has been absorbed within DG EU; the DG Wider Europe comprehended Western Balkans, Republic of Moldova, and Wider Europe directions. In the 2009 scheme, the DG Wider Europe was replaced by DG Regional Cooperation. This indicates a shift towards a perspective less focused on bilateral relations, but rather on multilateral relations. It could be related with Romania’s ambition to become a regional leader, but also with a different approach to relationships with neighbours, inspired by participation in EU.

The current Minister of foreign affairs, Teodor Baconschi, claims that the new organizational scheme of the MFA, he announced some months ago, will be inspired by the organization of German and French ministries. The reason invoked is that such an organization would facilitate a visible and easy connection between various departments of the Romanian ministry and of their counterparts in other Member States. The intention goes in the direction of further Europeanizing the Romanian foreign policy, undoubtedly. Such a new structure would facilitate the communication, consultation and mutual knowledge and understanding of concerns and interests among EU Member States.

Up until now, the paper discussed the “downloading” dimension of Europeanization, if we consider that elite socialization and bureaucratic reorganization as indicators of Member States’ adaptation to EU. In the following section the paper approaches the issue of Romania’s foreign policy Europeanization, in its projection of national interest dimension.

A series of authors notice the lack of coherence of Romania’s foreign policy (Miroiu, 2005; Gosu, 2004, 2006; Fati, 2009). Miroiu even questions whether Romania has a foreign policy. This precarious coherence might affect the success of Romania’s initiatives to promote her interests at European level. It is difficult to project interests if one is not clear about them. A good example in this case is represented by Romania’s policy towards the Republic of Moldova.

“Does Romania have a new Eastern foreign policy, as announced by President Băsescu almost 8 months ago? … No. Neither at the theoretical level is there a coherent vision on the new Eastern foreign policy formulated, nor at the practical level can one notice a consistent path of action in this area.” (Gosu, 2006)

“Romania does not have a clear and well settled strategy on the Republic of Moldova. Between the two states the politics resulted from angry diplomacies and the spontaneities of the two presidents [Voronin and Basescu – n.a.]” (Fati, 2009)

It might be the case that writing, spelling out such a strategy is not possible. The inconsistencies referred to above are partly due to the internal fragmentation of views with respect to Romania’s relationship with Republic of Moldova: militancy for unification of Moldova with Romania at
one end of the spectrum (allured by the president and former ministers of foreign affairs) and oblivion at the other end. Support for Moldova to get closer and eventually become EU member is a middle ground.

The interest in intensifying the relationship with Republic of Moldova was explicitly spelled out by president Basescu right in the beginning of his first mandate (2004). Beyond incoherence, Romania tried and succeeded, to a certain degree, in projecting her interest in moving Moldova closer to the EU, despite the duplicity of the former, Communist, administration in Chisinau. Former Minister of foreign affairs, Lazar Comanescu, repeatedly mentioned Romania’s contribution to moving Moldova closer to the EU. The same goes for Cristian Diaconescu and the present Minister, Teodor Baconschi. “Romania was, and will continue to be the strongest supporter of getting closer to the point of accession of the Republic of Moldova to the EU” (Comanescu (1), 2008). “The subject Republic of Moldova was included on the agenda of General Affairs and External Relations Council (CAGRE) at the request of Romania.” (Diaconescu, 2009) Romanian ministers of foreign affairs seemed to be more interested in the ‘Europeanization’ of the Republic of Moldova, while the former Moldovan president Voronin was rather ambiguous about it.

More concrete and substantial steps in supporting Republic of Moldova were taken after the change of power there in 2009. Subsequent to this power change, the Romanian Minister of foreign affairs, Baconschi, was asserting that:

“The decision of EU to start negotiations of a new agreement with the Republic of Moldova is to a large extent due to Romania” ... “[I]n the beginning of this year, 2010, a Group of support for Moldova at the initiative of Romania was set up. [...]” “[A]n agreement for financial assistance of RM worth 100 million euros was signed this year.” (Baconschi (1), 2010)

These actions may indicate a certain capacity developed by Romania to co-opt other Member States, to form alliances and rally others to act according to her interest. However, Romania is not the only EU country with an interest in promoting Republic of Moldova’s getting closer to EU and becoming EU member. Poland, to give a relevant example, is acting in the same direction, and very successfully. The Baltic States are also very sympathetic to Moldova’s cause of getting closer to the EU. Nevertheless, if we were to name one of Romania’s successful directions in foreign policy within EU, in terms of projecting her national interest, the case of the Republic of Moldova would be the most conspicuous. One may suppose that by 2010, Romanian representatives learnt important lessons from the EU membership experience. Romania may be on her way towards turning EU “into an extremely forceful amplifier of national interests” – to use Torreblanca’s expression (Torreblanca, 2001). It is worthwhile to note here that, as a director general in the MFA was witnessing, that most of the activity of Romanian diplomats is hidden to the public view. Even research in this area would be extremely difficult to carry on.

One hypothesis to be further tested is that Romania’s foreign policy incoherence with respect to the East noticed by various theorists is gradually fading away precisely because of her participation in the European Common Foreign and Security Policy. Under the impact of working within CFSP, with the
European partners, Romanian officials and representatives realized that unification with the Republic of Moldova is close to being out of question. Therefore, the idea of supporting Republic of Moldova to join the EU at some point in the future became much more powerful.

Romania’s EU membership is contributing to the development of the bilateral relations with Republic of Moldova especially since 2009, when a pro-European alliance took power in Moldova – after a period of time in which barriers were erected on Prut, and in which Romania was seen as an unwanted advocate of Moldova by the Communist administration. Being an EU member, Romania’s power to influence the common EU foreign policy has increased. Her capacity to offer expertise and to support Moldova’s efforts has increased.

A further step would be to recognize that unless Romania improves her relationship with Russia, further progress with respect to the Republic of Moldova is likely to be stalled. Russia has important leverage means in the Republic of Moldova. The most obviously powerful is her presence in Moldova’s territory beyond Dniester (Transnistria) – but there are other less obvious ways in which Russia is furthering with other means her former Soviet. Good signs in the direction of improving Romania’s relations with Russia are indicated by the present Minister of foreign affairs: “I believe we have to start a new relationship with Russia. [...] My intuition is that an improvement of the Romanian – Russian relationship might increase our shares in the European Union” (Baconschi (2), 2010). However, a number of officials were mentioning the idea of the need to overcome Cold War reflexes over the last few years, without being able to actually overcome them.

Romania’s participation in the CFSP process may act as a stimulus in this direction, given (a) the existing strategic partnership between EU and Russia, (b) the interest of large European countries in developing the EU – Russia relationship, as well as other circumstances like (c) the oil and gas dependency on Russia of many EU states. One may suppose that even the new attitude of the present Minister of foreign affairs represents a change of attitude, an intention of policy change, impacted upon by EU membership. And it does not look as an intention, so far. The Minister has appointed a special adviser on Russian and Central Asian affairs, Dr. Armand Gosu, in the beginning of 2010 – an excellent expert on Russian history and current affairs.

One may identify other actions of Romanian diplomacy in the direction of national projection: “we want to associate ourselves with Poland in a political sponsorship for Ukraine’s EU membership target” (Baconschi (3), 2010) and this sponsorship is welcome by Ukraine (talks between minister Baconschi and his Ukrainian homologue, Gryshchenko, 2010). Certainly, this objective may clash with the objective of improving Romania’s relationship with Russia, but the issue of Eastwards enlargement of the EU is rather an EU issue, and might skilfully be positioned aside from the Romania – Russia relationship.

Romania is using, like other countries in the 2004-2007 wave, her membership in...
EU to bolster her relationships in the region (with Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia). Romania is using her EU membership in relation with other countries in the world as well. Minister Comanescu, among others, mentions this idea in one of his speeches. Spain, like other countries which accessed EU over the last decades, did the same thing, as Torreblanca shows. Being a member of the EU represents an asset in the diplomatic relations with other countries in the world as well. However, Romania needs allies within EU in order to pursue her interests and her capacity to rally others depends on her internal performance as well as on the skills of our diplomats. Romania’s capacity to promote and support Republic of Moldova’s getting closer to the EU also depends on the parties in power in the Republic of Moldova and on the capacity of the Moldovan elite in power to cooperate with Romanian authorities as well as with other Member States. In this very period, the political landscape’s stability in Moldova is weakened because of the fragmentation of the alliance in power and because of the constitutional crisis that tainted Moldovan politics in the last year and a half.

V. Conclusions

Ever since Romania became EU member (2007) her diplomats embarked on a difficult journey of learning: learning the interests and positions of other Member States with respect to a large spectrum of foreign policy issues, learning the importance of reaching a common position, learning how to contribute to building consensus, learning how to compromise in order to reach a common position, and learning many more informal but powerful EU shared norms and values. The diplomats interviewed emphasized the process of learning (the CFSP “cuisine process” as one of them put it) that started before 2007 for them. The learning process is, however, uneven. Those exposed to the EU norms, values and European reflex in Brussels are more socialized into EU norms whereas colleagues in Bucharest, less exposed, tended to display difficulties in absorbing the value of flexibility in dealing with fellow Member States’ representatives. Building consensus is an important element in CFSP, and this importance is grasped by diplomats socialized into the decision-making process in Brussels.

The hypothesis according to which accession to the EU leads to an increase of the number of diplomats at the level of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as an increase of the number and complexity of the PermRep in Brussels is verified in the case of Romania. The number of diplomats doubled in the PermRep in comparison with the number of diplomats before Romania’s accession, in the Permanent Mission at the EU. Also, the number of diplomats in the MFA increased dramatically over the last 10 years, ever since Romania started EU negotiations. According to one of the directors interviewed, the number almost doubled. The structure of the MFA changed so as to mirror the EU functions and Romania’s new status as EU member, as indicated by the evolution of MFA organizational schemes.

Overall, despite the short time since Romania entered the EU, she underwent a considerable process of national adaptation in the area of foreign policy. The question mark lies over the depth of the adaptation process. As the paper showed, the reform of diplomacy was announced, has partly been initiated, but there are considerable areas in which no reform has been made. In a sense, the delay in reforming the foreign policy institutional infrastructure is a proof for the thesis that policies are Europeanized at a faster pace than governmental structures, the bureaucracy, the organizational infrastructure (Bulmer, Burch, 1998).
foreign policy of Romania has been so far notably influenced in content by her EU membership; it has been Europeanized to an important degree. This is less true with respect to the organizational infrastructure, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Organizations are more difficult to change than policies. This hypothesis proves to be true in the case of Romanian foreign policy. The Europeanization of Romanian foreign policy is a process with contradictory elements, characterized by successes in projecting the national interest (as the case of the Republic of Moldova indicates it), but also by behind-lagging and inertia in bureaucratic organization (like human resources management in diplomacy). It is, however, a young process that needs time to grow mature.

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SUPPORTING THE EU WITH(OUT) POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM A NEW JOINER

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Abstract. This article investigates the relationship between political knowledge and trust in the EU among the Romanian citizens between 2002 and 2009. It uses individual level data from the Candidate Countries (2001-2004) and Standard Eurobarometers (2005-2009) to check whether there is a direct linkage between the decreasing level of trust and the increasing level of knowledge in the most Euro-optimist new member state. The statistical analysis reveals that the more citizens know about the EU, the more they trust it. Such a result gains supplementary relevance in the context of decreasing support. Two other general results are relevant for the Romanian case. First, although the level of political knowledge increases as the accession gets closer, it continues to be quite low. Second, the Romanian citizens constantly overestimate their knowledge about the EU.

Keywords: European Union, citizens, political knowledge, trust

Introduction

For approximately one decade, the Romanian citizens display the highest level of support for the European Union (EU) among the member states (Eurobarometers 2001-2009). Such an observation is not surprising as evidence indicates that until their accession, the citizens from candidate countries display higher levels of support than those coming from the old member states (Jacobs and Pollack, 2006). In this group, Romania is the absolute leader with impressive levels of support peaking almost 80% (Gherghina 2010). Another particularity of this most recent joiner is that its citizens have low and very low levels of political information about the EU (Gherghina and Jiglău 2008; Gherghina 2010). This article aims to investigate the relationship between these two characteristics. In doing so, I combine exploratory and inferential analysis, using descriptive and bivariate statistical methods at individual level. The study uses data from the Candidate Countries Eurobarometers (CCEBs 2001-2004) and Standard Eurobarometers (EBs 2005-2009), examining the 2001-2009 period. In descriptive terms, I summarize the longitudinal evolutions of four different aspects, two emphasizing the EU trust and and two knowledge related. On the one hand, I account for the trust Romanians vest in the EU and the image they project for themselves about the EU. On the other hand, I consider both objective and perceived levels of knowledge about the EU, comparing their trends over time. Such comparisons are done having the 2007 accession as a reference point to check whether this moment modified the trust and/or knowledge trends.

This analysis is embedded within the broader theoretical framework of types of

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support and motivations leading to popular support for the EU, mostly conducted in the old member states (Gabel and Palmer 1995; Gabel 1998; Hix 1999). In theory, Easton (1965) differentiates between types of support and labels them as diffuse (general) and specific (particular). Empirically, starting from this general typology, Kopecký and Mudde (2002) build two dimensions of support (for the EU and for European integration) and identify four different types of support: EU optimists, EU pessimists, Europhiles, Europhobes. Their research indicates that, in practice, the support for the EU is multi-layered, involving elites, political parties, and citizens. At elite and party level, there was a widespread consensus about the necessity of the EU accession, the entire 2004 electoral campaign transforming this into a salient issue on the agenda. Regarding the determinants of the EU support at citizens’ level, there were a few competing explanations. The most prominent lies in the perception of economic benefits from membership (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel and Whitten 1997; Gabel 1998). A second explanation emphasizes the direct linkage between trust in the national institutions and the EU with citizens satisfied with the performance of the former being also more confident in the latter (Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000; Rohrschneider 2002). A third cause for support consists of a wide range of ideological orientations and attitudes towards the domestic political issues (Anderson 1998).

Starting from these premises, this article moves beyond the causes of high levels of support by exploring the dynamic of trust in the EU, the image built by the Romanian citizens, and their knowledge about the EU for almost one decade. Complementary, I study the relationship between support and knowledge in the most likely case among the member states: citizens are Euro-optimists and know relatively little about the EU. The first section sketches three theoretical arguments for which we would expect such a relationship to exist, revealing its equivocal nature. The second section briefly explains the variable operationalization and data sources, followed by an extended section including the general attitudinal trends registered in the last decade in Romania. The fourth section explores the relationship between trust in the EU and political knowledge regarding the European issues, whereas the conclusions summarize the main findings and provide room for further research.

Why Should Knowledge Matter?

Irrespective of the motivations and incentives to support the EU, such attitudes require, in theory, a minimal cognitive basis. It is hard to support an institution without knowing what it stands for. Following this logic, knowledge precedes support. There are two competing perspectives reflecting on the role of knowledge in developing attitudes of trust towards the EU. The first assumes that the more knowledge citizens acquire about the EU functioning, the more question marks can be raised. There are several aspects that may develop into negative perceptions of the EU as soon as people learn about them: the democratic deficit (Karp et al. 2003), the lack of transparency in the EU decision processes (Lodge 1994), the weak European political parties, the failure to adopt an EU constitution or to ratify treaties in the first attempt (e.g. The Lisbon Treaty), the difficult decision-making and implementation mechanisms. At empirical level, in the particular context of awareness about the European Parliament (EP), the level of knowledge is negatively correlated with support for the EP in the EU member states (Flickinger et al. 1995).
The second perspective implies cognitive mobilization. High levels of political awareness and developed skills in political communication allow individuals to identify themselves as citizens of a supranational political community (Inglehart et al. 1991). As the information about the EU is usually quite abstract, cognitive skills are necessary to process and understand this information. Irrespective of the content of the message, information about integration promotes support. As citizens know more about the EU, they become more familiar with the subject and feel less threatened by it (Inglehart et al. 1991, 147; Janssen 1991). In this respect, empirical evidence suggests that people interested in the EU politics favor their country’s involvement in the EU (Anderson 1998). Moreover, greater knowledge about the EU maximizes the awareness of membership benefits and thus may end in a positive evaluation of the EU.

Although leading to different results and driven by opposed underlying mechanisms, both situations reflect how knowledge represents a precondition for attitudes formation. The knowledge of the EU can bring with it both a greater appreciation of, and frustration with, the EU – either response is possible. However, in certain circumstances attitude formation and lack of knowledge about the attitudes’ object can co-exist. For example, if an issue is not salient for most citizens, the latter can use shortcuts for attitude formation. In the case of the EU support, knowledge about the EU becomes redundant when the elite reach a consensus and citizens follow the discourse of their representatives. As soon as the elites’ supportive discourse towards accession is adopted by individuals in society, their positive attitudes have little or no cognitive bases.

Without arguing in favor of any approach, I explore which situation applies to the Romanian citizens when expressing their supportive attitudes towards the EU. In this respect, I investigate whether the support for the EU is low among the knowledgeable citizens. Moreover, in longitudinal perspective, it is relevant to observe whether the support decreases at individual level as soon as people start learning more about the EU. The latter is a process expected to develop with higher intensity just before and during the post-accession period.

Data and Variable Operationalization

I use candidate countries and standard Eurobarometer survey data from 2002 to 2009 (one per year). These surveys are appropriate to map trends as they include large comparable datasets in terms of standardized questionnaires, sampling method, and data collection. For this study, all the “do not know/do not answer” responses were eliminated from the sample, being considered missing values. Trust in the EU is operationalized as the answer of the Romanian respondents to the questions directly involving this issue: “How much trust do you have in the EU?”. There are two response alternatives: “tend to trust” and “tend not to trust”. The image of the EU is operationalized as the answer of the Romanian respondents to the question: “In general does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative, very negative image?” The initial answers were coded on a 1-5 scale with neutral as medium value. I recoded this variable to have only three categories by combining the very positive and fairly positive answers into the “positive” category and the fairly negative and very negative answers into the “negative” category.

The political knowledge is an index for which I computed three items. As the battery of questions changes across time, I tried
to include similar sets of questions as they tested the level of knowledge on specific issues. They are all “true/false” items and are equally weighted when forming the index. The first variable refers to the number of member states, the respondent being asked to mention whether the number of member states specified in the question is the real one. For the 2002-2003 CCEBs the respondents were asked to mention whether the Union consists of 15 member states and I coded all the “true” answers as being knowledgeable, whereas the rest as holding no knowledge (including here the "do not know"). Starting with the 2004 CCEB and continuing with the 2005-2008 Ebs, the question referred to 12 member states when the EU was 15 and to fifteen when the EU was 25 or 27. Therefore, the “false” answer is coded as knowledgeable answer, whereas the rest coded as lacking knowledge. The second item regards the direct election of the MEPs, all respondents who answered “true” were considered knowledgeable. In the 2008 EB, this item was replaced by Switzerland being a member of the EU, the “false” answer being correct. The third item varied the most: in the 2002-2004 CCEBs the question referred to the EU being founded after World War I (the “false” answer indicates knowledge about the EU); in the 2005-2009 EBs the item referred to the last EP elections (the “false” answer indicates knowledge about the EU). For the 2009 EB a very specific question was introduced (i.e. the way in which the EU budget is spent) and this influenced the results as it will become visible in the following section. After computing the index, the resulting variable has four categories: no knowledge (people that answer wrong at all three questions), basic knowledge (one correct answer), medium knowledge (two correct answers), and high (all three answers being correct).

**High Trust and Good Image**

Graph 1 depicts the dynamics of trust (continuous line) and lack of trust (dotted line) in the EU among the Romanian citizens between 2002 and 2009. Overall, there is a relative decrease of the level of trust and a slight increase of the lack of trust. Despite these trends, the percentage of citizens trusting the EU is very high, more than 70% of the valid answers indicating every year the full support for the EU. The decrease took place from levels of approximately 80% before the accession to a minimum of 72% in the fall of 2009.

Graph 1: Percentages of Trust in the EU among the Romanian Citizens
The peak from 2004 (85% trust in the EU) can be justified through the accession of many post-communist countries and the Romanian failure to join in that wave. The good example of the neighboring and their successful accession could have shed a positive light on the EU in the eyes of the Romanian citizens. Moreover, the electoral campaign from 2004 touched upon the European accession and often emphasized the benefits derived from membership. In fact, previous studies reveal that the drop in trust visible from 2003 in this graph was accidental. The Euro-optimism of Romanians reached constant levels above 80% before 2004, even when accounting for two EBs in every year (Gherghina 2010). Between 2005 and 2007 there was a constant level of trust in the EU (77%). Starting with the accession year, there is a slow decrease of support for the EU, with a bigger difference between 2008 and 2009 than between the accession and the following year.

The perceptions about the image of the EU display a similar trend. Graph 2 includes the aggregated dynamic of the percentages of Romanians having positive (continuous line), neutral (continuous line with triangles), and negative (dotted line) images about the EU. There are two directly observable issues at this graph. First, the positive perception decreases over time from 83% in 2002 to 67% in 2009. It is hard to know what this perception is based on especially when comparing it to the previous graph. There are more people trusting the EU than having a positive image about it. When closely examining the individual level data it results that some of those who have neutral image about the EU also vest trust into it. The second general observation is that the level of negative image is relatively constant, at a very low level, situated below 10%. Looking again at individual data, we observe that only in isolated cases (one here and there) individuals with a negative image of the EU trust it. In none of these situations, the EU accession made a significant difference in the citizens’ perceptions. There is practically no change of trend or major deviation due to this event.

At the same time, the neutral perceptions of the EU have a tendency to increase over time. There is an evolution from 12 (2002) to 26% (in 2009). This category may not contain substantive meaning as it can include all those subject who have no clear opinion on their perception about the EU. In other words, this can be seen as a masked/alternative “do not know” category.

Graph 2: The Evolution of the EU Image for the Romanian Citizens
Three conclusions can be drawn on the basis of these aggregated data. First, the Romanians trust the EU and have a positive image about it. Second, their perceptions were not influenced by the accession. Third, there is a descending trend both with respect to the trust in and the image of the EU. However, the percentages are quite impressive.

**Overestimating Political Knowledge**

The most basic question targeting the political knowledge of the respondents in the used survey regards the identification of the correct number of member states at the moment when the question is being asked. Graph 3 displays the evolution of the correct – wrong report of the Romanian respondents during the 2002-2008 period (2009 is not included as there was no question about the number of member states). The first striking element is the reduced knowledge on the number of member states: only in 2003 above 50%, reaching in 2004 a negative record of 12%. This should be seen in the context of a true/false question, the subjects were not even asked to mention the number of member states. There is increased oscillation of the percentages of knowledgeable Romanians when answering this question: it increases from 2002 until 2003, it is followed by a sudden drop in 2004 and until 2008 there is an increase of this percentage. In 2009, the percentage decreases from 49 to 47%. What causes the drop in 2004? One plausible explanation resides in the type of addressed question. Until 2003, the question included the correct number of member states and the subjects only had to agree to that (i.e. they were asked whether the EU consisted of 15 member states). Starting 2004, the respondents had to figure out that the question included a wrong number of member states and to answer “false” in order to show their knowledge about the EU. As 2004 was the first year when the change took place, the effect of switching the question is visible.

The increased percentages of people indicating the correct answer about the member states from 2005 onwards may be due to the 2004 accession of the neighboring countries. Although Romania failed to join the EU, people may have started paying attention to news about it. However, such an explanation does not hold if we observe the pattern registered for 2007 and 2008. Once
Romania got into the EU, the knowledge of its citizens regarding the number of member states should have significantly improved. This is not the case, less than 50% of the respondents being able to correctly identify the number of member states.

The situation is similar with the other components of the political knowledge. The question about the foundation of the EU after World War I was asked until 2004 and a maximum of 20% in 2004 identified that this statement was wrong. The direct elections of the MEPs is a tough question for most Romanians until 2007, a maximum of 37% correctly answered that this is an EU procedure. However, the learning by doing mechanism functioned with respect to this question: in 2009, 66% of the respondents correctly answered this question. When getting to specific questions such as Switzerland being an EU member (asked in the 2008 EB), almost half of the respondents (48%) got it right. Even more specific, the way in which the EU budget is spent was correctly identified by only 8% of the population. The individual level data indicate that among these respondents who correctly identified the way of spending the European budget, at least half may have guessed the answer as they did not successfully answered simpler questions.

Graph 4 displays the evolution of the knowledge about the EU among the Romanian citizens. A very high percentage of respondents have no political knowledge about the EU, answering wrong to the questions about the number of member states, the direct way of electing the MEPs and to the third variable question. The 2004 peak can be justified through the same argument as before: a switch in the question about the member states leads to many errors of the respondents. This cannot be considered an excuse for not answering right to this question. Following the 2004 moment, there is a descending pattern for the people having no knowledge about the EU. In 2009, this percentage is below that of those having basic and medium knowledge.

The percentage of the respondents with basic knowledge follows a similar trend, but with minor oscillations. A reverse trend is visible at the respondents with medium knowledge, whose percentage increases
from 19 in 2002 to 43 in 2009. A possible explanation for these patterns lies in the quantity and diversity offered to citizens as the accession moment got closer. The saliency of the EU in media coverage is for the Romanian case negatively related with the time left until the accession. At the same time, not many citizens are interested in searching information that is not immediately useful. Such a context favors the existence of high percentages of people with predominantly no or basic information in 2002-2004 within the population. The decrease of these percentages between 2005 and 2008 is compensated by the existence within the population of more people with higher levels of knowledge about the EU (i.e. medium).

The accession moment gains relevance when looking at the levels of people with high knowledge about the EU. There is a constant level until 2006 when, one year before the accession, it starts increasing.\(^1\) It is logical to expect people from a new member state developing their levels of knowledge about the EU. However, the percentage did not reach spectacular peaks, in the year of the accession 15% of the respondents having high political knowledge. However, one year later, almost a quarter of the respondents (24%) was able to correctly answer the knowledge questions.

As these are the levels of objective knowledge, let us turn now to the difference between them and what Romanians perceived as knowledge. In other words, we investigate how large is the discrepancy between what the Romanians know and what they thought they know. Graph 5 is illustrative in this respect, showing both positive and negative values.\(^2\) Theoretically, when the difference between the levels of objective and perceived knowledge is above 0, the subjects underestimate their knowledge. The evidence indicates that only one of the situations can be interpreted as such – the case of the 2006 high knowledge when the current knowledge is 2% above the perceived knowledge. For the rest of the cases above 0, we have the difference between levels real lack of knowledge and perceived lack of knowledge. Practically, they underestimate the level of inexistent knowledge. Therefore, the logical reciprocal indicates that this is an overestimation of the knowledge. Whenever this difference is negative, they overestimate the knowledge they have. Summing up, most of the bars in Graph 5 indicate that subjects have the tendency to overestimate their knowledge about the EU.

The biggest difference is registered for the category with no knowledge about the EU. For example, in the 2005 EB, 45% of the respondents have no political knowledge about the EU, compared with 17% who admitted this fact. The smallest overestimation of knowledge with respect to this category takes place in 2003 when the difference between the actual and perceived lack of knowledge is of 10%. For basic and medium knowledge the overestimation is moderate, but it is visible in every year. One final remark about this graph is that, overall, the overestimation of the high knowledge is very small. For the year 2005 the actual and perceived high knowledge about the EU are identical, their difference being 0. As previously mentioned, in the EB 2006 there is an underestimation of the actual high knowledge. Summing up, with the exception of the high knowledgeable citizens, most of the respondents tend to heavily overestimate their knowledge about the EU.

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\(^1\) As mentioned, the downturn from 2008 is mainly due to the specificity of the questions.

\(^2\) The analyzed period is 2002-2006 as the question with perceived knowledge is no longer asked in the EBS.
A Weak but Stable Relationship

Table 1 includes the association coefficients (gamma) between the trust in the EU and the levels of knowledge. The trust in the EU is a nominal variable (trust and lack of trust), whereas the knowledge variable has the same four categories as in graphs 4 and 5. The coefficients indicate weak to moderate positive associations, all but the one from 2004, being statistically significant at 0.01. These results suggest that the support for the EU increases with the level of knowledge about it. Respondents with no knowledge about the EU trust it the least. The intensity of the relationship is stronger in the two years before the 2004 missed accession wave and in the 2007 accession year. This partially confirms the theoretical assumption according to which as soon as citizens learn more about the EU they feel less threatened and have the tendency to trust it more. The association between trust and knowledge is weak but stable during the last decade for the Romanians. It holds even when the knowledge questions become specific and thorough information is required (i.e. 2009).

As this is solely a bivariate relationship, without controlling for the influence of other variables, no substantive and definitive conclusions can be drawn. However, the similarity in intensity and direction of the relationship is a safe finding. In this respect, it is useful to take a closer look at the distribution of the respondents. Table 2 reflects the distribution of the percentages for the accession year and supports the

Table 1: The Longitudinal Relationship between Trust in the EU and Political Knowledge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Coefficient (gamma)</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>0.36**</td>
<td>799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>0.32**</td>
<td>845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0.19**</td>
<td>872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>0.26**</td>
<td>836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>0.31**</td>
<td>866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0.19**</td>
<td>882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>0.25**</td>
<td>891</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Statistically significant at 0.01.
* Statistically significant at 0.05.
general story. The pattern described by the association coefficients is clearly illustrated by the extreme categories: 67% of those having no knowledge about the EU trust it, whereas 85% among those who know a lot about the EU trust it. There is also a progressive distribution of percentages of trust among the basic and medium category, with 76% in the former and 85% in the latter. There is apparently no difference of attitudes towards the EU between those having medium and high knowledge. In the presence of such a difference, the association coefficient would have increased. By comparing the percentages of people lacking trust in the EU within the inexistent, medium, and high knowledge categories, there are twice as many without political knowledge relative to those medium and highly knowledgeable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political knowledge</th>
<th>Inexistent</th>
<th>Basic</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust in the EU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of trust</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conclusions**

This article described the dynamics of knowledge about and trust in the EU among the Romanian citizens between 2002-2009, using individual level data from the CCEBs and EBs. The level of knowledge about the EU is generally modest, with less than half of the respondents being able to identify the correct number of the member states at any given moment in time (except of 2003 when the percentage was 53%). The knowledge improves when the EU becomes a salient issue for citizens, largely covered by the media, and emphasized by elites and political parties on the public agenda. At the same time, the time factor cannot be ignored: at the beginning of the 2000’s the Romanian public was generally less informed, with significant improvements of the knowledge levels when the accession was missed (2004) or realized (2007). Moreover, it is worth noting that Romanians overestimate their political knowledge about the EU. Most of the times, people without such knowledge have the tendency to declare that they have some. In parallel, the trust in the EU registers a descendent trend, with averages around 80% before the 2004 wave of accession and slightly more than 70% in 2009.

Such patterns of the aggregated data may indicate that the more Romanians know about the EU, the least they trust it. However, the individual level analysis contradicts such an expectation and reveals a consistent positive relationship between the level of knowledge and the trust in the EU. Respondents with medium or high knowledge about the EU trust it more compared to those with no or little knowledge. Although the relationship is quite weak, it is statistically significant at 0.01 (with one exception), indicating a trend not only in the analyzed sample, but within the entire population.

There are two direct implications of these findings. On the one hand, at empirical level, it shows that citizens from one new member state can support even more the EU when...
they know more about it. Such evidence confirms the results of Karp et al. (2003) and necessitates additional clarification in the context of decreasing levels of trust in the EU within the Romanian population. Knowing more about the EU substantiates the support for it and diminishes the risk to witness dramatic drops. The recent turbulences at European level (e.g. the Irish referendum, the Czech opposition to the Lisbon Treaty), the trust in the EU has high chances to decrease of the citizens have no political knowledge about the European process and developments. On the other hand, at theoretical level, this study indicates knowledge as a potential explaining variable for the level of trust within the member states. In this respect, the article sets relevant bases for further research. This bivariate statistical analysis can be complemented by complex models on the Romanian case or it can be extended to the new member states to observe comparable features within the populations.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**

Abstract: The European Union needs a solid and effective Security and Defence Policy. The goals of this article are to demonstrate, with recent developments in the matter, major challenges and statistic elements on defence, investment and research budgets: at first, that the process of standardisation and harmonisation at the European level are necessary steps toward the creation of a European system of defence procurement, and secondly, the link between this system and the ESDP.

Keywords: European Union, security, European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), budgets, European armaments procurement system

JEL: L50

La fin de la Guerre Froide a apporté des changements importants au niveau de la relation entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe ou plutôt la CE (au moment dont on parle), qui veut prendre distance sinon l’autonomie face aux Etats-Unis du point de vue sécuritaire. Ceci ne s’est pas passé sans des nombreuses discussions contradictoires, car cette initiative impliquait la définition d’une Politique Européenne de Sécurité et de Défense (PESD). C’est précisément ce cadre ci qui enveloppe le cadre plus précis de l’intervention militaire. En ce qui suit on va traiter le sujet de la création d’un système commun d’acquisition d’armements comme un pas indispensable (de mon point de vue) pour l’existence de la PESD.

La mise en discussion de ces objectifs a conduit à des nouvelles occasions dans lesquelles la susceptibilité de l’État-nation surgit, à cause que „la défense reste la responsabilité souveraine des États et tous les pays deviennent sensibles dans la perspective de perte d’autorité dans le domaine, et même plus quand les conséquences économiques et industrielles sont importantes”¹.

La constitution d’un système européen d’acquisition d’armement ensemble avec la constitution de la PESD, dans un contexte militaire divers et complexe, peut être la voie pour influencer la capacité opérationnelle européenne.

A partir d’ici on va discuter dans cet article les points forts, les points faibles, les opportunités et les menaces – les éléments de la méthode SWOT – pour le système commun d’acquisition d’armement au niveau européen. Le but est de démontrer, à travers l’analyse SWOT, que les processus de standardisation et d’harmonisation au niveau européen sont des pas nécessaires en vue de la création du système européen d’acquisition d’armement. Un autre point est de démontrer la liaison entre le système commun d’acquisition d’armement et la PESD.

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¹ Keith Haiworth Vers un système européen d’acquisition des armements, p.23
Analyse

Le problème de l’acquisition commune d’armement est strictement lié à l’harmonisation des besoins et à l’ébauche de standards communs. Mais standardisation et harmonisation sont des faits différents: standardisation signifie la mise en place de critères/standards communs, pendant que harmonisation signifie la mise en place d’un système commun de valeurs.

• Points forts

L’idée à partir de laquelle la réflexion sur l’Européanisation des industries de l’armement et du système d’acquisition d’armement a commencé a été la poursuite de l’indépendance de l’Europe du point de vue de la sécurité ou d’une moindre dépendance face aux États-Unis. A ceci s’ajoute la pression croissante de la compétition que l’industrie américaine de défense exerce sur les producteurs européens.

En conséquence, la nature des risques ayant changé – l’accent a passé d’une défense collective plutôt sur la sécurité collective, de la dissuasion à l’utilisation de la force – la reconstruction radicale des stratégies militaires est devenue nécessaire:

a. pendant la Guerre Froide, les planificateurs militaires européens devaient se préparer pour une guerre de courte durée, où des moyens logistiques dispersés ne posaient pas un grand problème sachant que les lignes de ravitaillement étaient relativement courtes; pourtant, l’OTAN dépose des efforts assez importants dans cette direction (voire les oléoducs militaires, formant un réseau dans l’Europe Occidentale).

b. aujourd’hui, les forces armées européennes doivent être capables d’opérer à grandes distances et pendant une longue période de temps (comme les missions d’interposition et d’imposition de la paix); les avantages d’un haut niveau d’harmonisation deviennent plus évidents et avec des répercussions sur le succès de la mission, donc des avantages sécuritaires et politique immédiats.

Ceux sont les facteurs qui agissent ensemble vers l’harmonisation des besoins – la clé vers l’intégration de la politique de défense, de l’industrie de défense et d’un système européen d’acquisition.

La participation à ce système pourrait assurer à la Roumanie une place reconnue entre les producteurs européens d’armement, un club où la qualité et la fiabilité sont les traits essentiels, assurant la hausse du commerce avec des biens de défense avec des tierces parties (hors l’UE).

• Points faibles

Après avoir jeté un coup d’œil aux points forts, voyons maintenant la partie des points faibles, des coûts de la mise en place les standards communs et un système commun d’acquisition d’armement.

Le Sommet européen de Helsinki en 1999 avait introduit comme objectif la création d’une force armée européenne de 100.000 hommes, une force aérienne de plus ou moins 300 avions et 3 jusqu’à 4 groupes opérationnels navals. Pourtant, la question de leurs coûts rend cet objectif inapplicable, au moins de nos jours, quand la plupart des États européens refusent d’accroître leurs budgets pour la défense. Un changement pourrait néanmoins être imminents étant donné les événements des dernières années et la lutte contre les nouvelles menaces à la sécurité internationales, qui demande des dépenses supplémentaires.

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2 L’expression en anglais est devenue fameuse – “the headline goal”
3 P. W. Rodman European Common Foreign, Security and Defense Policies: Implications for The United States and the Atlantic Alliance, p.5
De toute manière, disent les opposants de l’accroissement des fonds, l’Europe dépense déjà 60% du budget des États-Unis pour la défense⁴ et les besoins sont encore plus grands… Sinon, l’Europe n’a aucune chance de jouer un rôle sécuritaire, disent les défenseurs des grandes dépenses. De ce côté on trouve aussi des responsables Américains, comme Peter Rodman⁵, qui critique la réticence des Européens d’accroître leurs dépenses pour la défense de telle manière que la capacité Européenne d’action militaire n’existe pas avant quelques décennies ⁶.

Selon l’opinion de Keith Hayward⁷, un système commun d’acquisition d’armement n’est pas possible sans que les États sentent le besoin de se donner des armes similaires ou, au moins, avec des traits compatibles. La qualité et le prix sont des critères importants en vue d’un choix. Donc le processus de définition des besoins et de l’acquisition des armements demandent du temps et des ressources et imposent des difficultés au niveau de leur direction et de la réglementation publique ⁸.

Et la nature multinationale du processus fait augmenter le degré de complexité et de difficulté de réconciliation des niveaux de compétence, des philosophies militaires et d’acquisition, des intérêts nationaux politiques et industriels. Il y a beaucoup de facteurs qui doivent être pris en considération – les perceptions géostratégiques, les objectifs de politique étrangère, les projections budgétaires, les contraintes financières, les doctrines militaires, les exigences en matière de la conception des matériaux, l’analyse technologique, les considérations industrielles⁹...

• Opportunités

Quelques débats importants ont été suscités par le niveau multinational de production dans l’industrie pendant les dernières années; ceci s’est passé pour l’industrie productrice d’équipement militaire également. L’exemple à ce point est la fabrication du chasseur américain F-16 car il implique un haut niveau de coopération internationale en vue d’être produit, principalement entre des pays européens, mais réunissant en tout des pays sur trois continents: Amérique, Europe et Asie.¹⁰

Le tableau qui suit est un excellent exemple de ce que la globalisation signifie pour l’industrie de défense sur le plan mondial, évidemment les États-Unis et l’Europe inclus. Une des conséquences est la définition confuse entre produits militaires Américains ou Européens:

"A comprehensive policy on international collaboration will be an integral part of deciding how to … allocate the burden of defense among the allied nations, and how to restructure the defense industries to do it. […] Much weapons technology […] is developed by large multinational companies with manufacturing facilities around the world. [...] Increasingly, international

\[\text{\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|}
\hline
\text{Produit} & \text{Américain} & \text{Européen} \\
\hline
\text{F-16} & \\
\text{production} & \\
\text{coopération} & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}}\]

\[\text{Ibid.}, \text{p.31}\]

\[\text{Ibid.}, \text{p.33}\]

patterns of industrial development are making irrelevant much of the debate over US defense production. If we pursued a strict policy of procuring only from US companies, it would be difficult to specify exactly what a US Company is  

Ceci conduit à plusieurs questions et à l’incertitude quand on traite des acquisitions d’armement – législation, préférences … Et néanmoins c’est précisément ici le point de départ pour l’opportunité qui peut surger pour la Roumanie et son industrie de défense – la production de parties composantes pour l’industrie de défense multinationale, voir transnationale, devenir une partie du réseau qui produit les repères ou les projets pour des équipements militaires, voir même dans le cadre de l’émergente industrie européenne de défense.

L’opportunité est réelle, consistante sachant l’échelle sur laquelle travaille l’industrie roumaine de défense – exigences de l’OTAN. Il a trois principales directions d’action:

“1. Modernisation of the equipment in use, in view of integrating NATO standards for the realization of the objectives of interoperability;

2. Acquisition of equipment and integration of modern fabrication technologies in the home industry;

3. Acquisition of categories of military equipment and special components for which there are no conditions or it is not profitable to be realized in the country”12.

En 2007, le Conseil Suprême de Défense du Pays a octroyé 4,5 milliards d’euros pour l’acquisition d’équipement

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militaire, et la plupart des fonds allait être dirigé vers l’acquisition de l’avion multi-rolle pour les Forces Aériennes roumaines. Les compétiteurs sont Lockheed Martin (États-Unis), Gripen (Suède), Eurofighter (EADS).

• **Menaces**

Les menaces de ne pas mettre en place un système européen d’acquisition d’armement couvrent plusieurs aspects, liés aux risques de ne pas avoir une PESD; les niveaux sécuritaire, politique et économique sont les plus importants. Où est-ce qu’on peut mentionner l’aspect discuté plus haut sur le désaccord des standards de UE et de OTAN ? En effet, il couvre tous les trois aspects principaux.

D’abord, si la Roumanie n’arrive pas à l’interopérabilité avec les forces de l’UE au cas d’un conflit la situation devient réellement menaçante à l’adresse de la sécurité (ne soit ce que pour les vies des soldats sur le champ d’opérations). Ensuite, ceci pourrait engendrer des répercussions sur le court et le long terme et (pour arriver ainsi au troisième point) sur l’économie du pays.

La Roumanie doit faire grande attention aux événements entre l’UE et l’OTAN à cause de ces aspects. Les derniers faits montrent néanmoins que les liens entre les deux se resserrent (concernant l’équipement qui pourrait être utilisé en cas de conflit), fait qui ne peut que plaire à la Roumanie, mais surtout aux États-Unis, intéressés de garder leur prédominance sur le continent, au moins du point de vue de la sécurité. La relation entre l’UE et les États-Unis semble vouée au succès.

**a. Menaces à la sécurité**

Des épisodes comme l’intervention militaire au Kosovo, où la partie américaine d’action dépassée loin celle des Européens, montrent que l’Europe est toujours dans une phase où la gestion des crises dans sa région est problématique, même après tant d’années depuis la définition de la PESC, par manque de moyens (et même de désir). En ce qui concerne les moyens, le Général Allemand Klaus Naumann, président le Comité Militaire de l’OTAN affirme que, sur un total de 48 canaux de communication par satellite que l’IFOR utilisait dans l’ex-Yougoslavie, 46 étaient Américains…

En dépit du fait que l’UEO détient un centre d’interprétation satellitaire en Espagne et une cellule de planification, et les États-membres possèdent assez de forces pour des interventions militaires, ils manquent les moyens de transport des troupes, les systèmes radar mobiles (comme l’avion radar américain “ AWACS ”), les systèmes de communication, le réseau de pipe-lines pour le transport stratégique de combustible (tous appartiennent aux structures de l’OTAN), mais aussi la commande coordonnée et les capacités de contrôle.

**b. Menaces politiques**

De cette manière, l’équipement militaire actuel n’est pas adapté pour des opérations soutenues, de long terme. Ayant connaissance de ce fait, les dirigeants des pays de l’UE se divisent les opinions concernant les sources pour des nouvelles capacités – soit par l’augmentation des budgets pour la défense, soit par une coordination plus efficace des ressources.

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Même si ni l’opinion publique, ni les politiques fiscales européennes ne sont favorables à l’augmentation des budgets militaires, quelques uns la considèrent essentielle à l’accroissement de l’importance de l’autonomie européenne.

c. Menaces économiques
Le PIB de l’UE est au moins l’égal de celui des États-Unis, mais avec environ 50 milliards d’euros/an, la production annuelle d’équipement militaire dans l’UE représente moins que la moitié de celle des États-Unis. La comparaison dans le domaine de l’armement défavorise l’Europe – l’industrie américaine produit pour un seul budget, celui du Département de la Défense, pendant que celle européenne pour plusieurs budgets séparés qui approchent celui américain. C’est un double défi pour l’Europe. Cependant, ceci ne signifie pas que l’Europe produise la moitié du volume américain ou qu’elle produise avec la même efficacité, dès qu’une partie financière importante est gaspillée dans la démarche de soutien aux fournisseurs nationaux (maintes fois loin d’être compétitifs). Voyons aussi quelques chiffres: quatre producteurs de tanks en Europe, pendant que aux États-Unis il n’y a qu’un seul et sept fabricants de sous-marins pendant que toujours un seul de l’autre coté de l’Atlantique.

L’arrêt des aides d’État à l’industrie de défense a engendré aux États-Unis le besoin pour la restructuration radicale, ce qui ne s’est pas passé en Europe et les conséquences sur l’acquisition d’armement sont évidentes – un système commun est impossible aussi longtemps que l’État continue de soutenir “les champions nationaux”.

Et l’UE connaît l’avance de l’industrie américaine, comme le montre une Communication de la Commission de 1996! Dépasser le cadre étroit de l’État sera un grand pas à faire, mais aussi un grand risque, que les États semblent forcés de prendre s’ils désirent toujours de construire une capacité européenne de sécurité et de défense. Un possible pas dans cette direction, même si un pas hésitant, même si avec une utilisation partiellement civile, est Galileo – le système européen de positionnement par satellite, indépendant du GPS américain.

Développements récents
Des progrès notables ont été faits en ce qui concerne le développement des capacités civiles et militaires de l’UE, mais un certain nombre de questions urgentes figurent toujours en tête des priorités des pays assumant la présidence de l’UE. Le Catalogue des forces 2006 (FC06) a été finalisé en 2005 dans le cadre de l’Objectif Global 2010 et une version révisée incluant la Bulgarie et la Roumanie est parue au premier semestre 2007. Les progrès réalisés courant 2006 sur la voie de l’Objectif civil pour 2008 ont été examinés par la Conférence d’amélioration des capacités civiles en novembre. La formation des experts

16 P. W. Rodman op. cit., p.7
17 En 1996 selon René Foch op. cit., p.147
19 Meme si les auteurs ont utilisé cette expression en discutant le traitement des États envers les opérateurs nationaux de télécommunications, il semble approprié de l’utiliser également dans ce contexte – Kjell A. Eliassen & Marit S. Marino “Telecommunications policy: interest convergence and globalization” in European Policy Studies, p.63
20 Communication de la Commission COM (96) 10 The challenges facing European Defense Industries – http://www.europa.eu.int
Cristian Iordan

en vue de constituer une réserve pour les EIC (Equipes d'intervention civile) a été achevée et d'autres travaux se poursuivent sur des éléments de police rapidement déployables [Unités de police intégrées (IPU) et Unités de police constituées (FPU)].

Les travaux relatifs aux Groupements tactiques de l'UE ont avancé et le 1er janvier 2007, il a été annoncé que deux Groupements tactiques de 1 500 hommes avaient atteint la pleine capacité opérationnelle. Les deux unités peuvent être déployées pour des opérations de gestion de crise partout dans le monde, dans les dix jours suivant la prise d'une décision par les membres de l'UE. Toutefois, le Président du Comité militaire, le Général Bentégeat, a souligné pendant la Conférence de Berlin que si l'on veut que «les Groupements tactiques constituent la pierre angulaire des opérations de réaction rapide de l'UE dans les situations d'urgence, les conditions de leur déploiement doivent être précisées».

Ceci signifie que le processus de prise de décision politique conduisant au déploiement de Groupements tactiques doit être clarifié et simplifié dans les États membres afin de ne pas compromettre les délais de réaction et de ne pas retarder un Groupement tactique par le simple fait qu'un État membre n'aurait pas approuvé une décision de déploiement. Un Chef d'État Major adjoint de la Bundeswehr, le Général Johann-Georg Dora, a souligné que les Groupements tactiques ne doivent pas rester le seul moyen pour l'UE d'apporter une réponse rapide de caractère militaire, mais que les possibilités d'action militaire doivent être examinées de façon plus approfondie et les capacités renforcées par des moyens mis à disposition par les trois armes.

Il convient d'ajouter que les industries européennes de défense sont confrontées à de nombreux problèmes et que la priorité actuelle doit être le renforcement de la base industrielle et technologique de défense européenne (BITDE). Lors de la conférence organisée par l'Agence européenne de défense (AED) le 1er février dernier à Bruxelles, Javier Solana, s'exprimant au nom de l'Agence, a déclaré:

«Aucun d'entre nous ne peut plus se permettre de soutenir une BITD solide et complète sur une base nationale. [...] La santé future, voire la survie de l'industrie de défense européenne, nécessite une approche européenne et une stratégie européenne.»

Le Vice-président de la Commission, Günther Verheugen, a ajouté que les obstacles industriels occasionnent des coûts qui s'élèvent à trois milliards d'euros par an. L'élaboration d'une directive en matière d'acquisition de défense a été proposée récemment en vue de compléter le Code de conduite de l'AED pour les acquisitions dans ce domaine et d'écarter ainsi les obstacles en ouvrant les marchés, en introduisant davantage de transparence et en stimulant la concurrence.

Les défis majeurs du développement des capacités

Aujourd'hui, le processus global de développement des capacités (CCDP) en Europe est contrôlé par un certain nombre d'organes qui, en dernier ressort, définissent les besoins et les capacités à développer. On trouve à la tête de ce processus les gouvernements des États membres représentés au Conseil européen et au Comité politique et de sécurité, qui s'appuient essentiellement sur leur politique étrangère et de défense nationale. Les discussions à ce niveau se concentrent sur le rôle de l'Europe dans le monde, les bouleversements géopolitiques et

22 Conférence de l'AED, 1er février 2007, www.eda.europa.eu
géostratégiques, l’évolution du rôle militaire de l’Europe aujourd’hui et demain et les capacités qui seront vraisemblablement nécessaires.

Le relais est ensuite transmis au Comité militaire de l’Union Européenne (CMUE) et à son État-major (EMUE), qui donnent des orientations et présentent des recommandations sur les capacités dont dispose l’Europe et celles dont elle pourra avoir besoin à l’avenir, en s’appuyant sur les conclusions ci-dessus. Une fois les priorités définies, la discussion concerne surtout l’AED et le CMUE. Ces organes définissent les priorités les plus urgentes/importantes; celles qui, de façon réaliste, pourront être amenées jusqu’au stade du développement final; les solutions qu’il faudra apporter et le pays où l’industrie qui sera saisie d’un projet en matière de capacités.

L’AED, créée en 2004 pour aider les États membres à améliorer leurs capacités de défense pour la gestion des crises, s’occupe surtout du développement de capacités, de la BITDE, de la recherche et technologie et de la coopération en matière d’armement. Elle a pour tâches de définir de façon plus systématique les besoins capacitaires de la PESD et de les satisfaire, de promouvoir la collaboration en matière d’équipements entre les industries de défense européennes et d’encourager la recherche et technologie de défense européenne afin de pouvoir répondre aux besoins capacitaires futurs. En outre, l’AED a mis au point une «Vision à long terme» en procédant à une analyse des tendances générales jusqu’à 2025 et de leurs effets probables sur la réponse à donner par l’Europe sur le plan militaire.

Mais pour progresser dans un certain nombre de domaines, il s’agit maintenant de définir une série de lignes de conduite claires et de créer un environnement propice au bon développement des capacités européennes en matière de PESD pour faire face en temps opportun aux défis de l’avenir. Les dépenses de défense sont au nombre des problèmes majeurs d’aujourd’hui.

Ensemble, les États européens dépensent environ 193 milliards d’euros par an, ce qui est considérable, selon European Defence Expenditure In 2005. Toutefois, seule une fraction de cette somme est utilisée efficacement, une grande partie étant perdue en raison des doublures dans les politiques/programmes nationaux et du poids insuffisant de la recherche et technologie et des acquisitions. Prenons un exemple donné par Dick Zandee: «alors qu’elle compte plus de 1,8 million de militaires, l’Europe n’a pu déployer en 2005 que 74 000 hommes pour la gestion de crise, ce qui représente tout juste 4 %».25

Selon le rapport de l’AED, mais portant sur l’année 2006, ce qui représente la plus récente statistique officielle dans le domaine, les États de l’Union Européenne ont dépensé plus qu’en 2005: 201 milliards, ce qui équivaut à une moyenne de 1,78% du PIB des 26 États participants. Ce qui ne représente ni même la moitié du budget américain – 491 milliards euros [755 milliards dollars] dépensés par les États-Unis (à partir de 406 milliards euros [624 milliards dollars] en

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23 AED: Vision initiale à long terme des capacités et besoins capacitaires de défense européens, 3 octobre 2006, www.eda.europe.eu
2005) – ou 4,7% PIB – pendant la même période. Un autre rapport récent indique le fait que les États-Unis sont le plus grand producteur et exportateur de technique militaire, avec 45% du total mondial des dépenses pour la défense, et avec un export chiffré en 2006 à 14 milliards de dollars du total de 45,6 encaissé au niveau global dans le commerce d’armement. Au niveau du globe, le total des dépenses pour l’armement, pour l’année 2007, sont chiffrées à 1339 milliards de dollars ou 2,5 % du PIB mondial.27

Pendant que la différence énorme entre les États-Unis et l’Europe pose des questions sur le degré d’exagération du budget des États-Unis, en même temps, les États de l’Union sont souvent critiqués pour dépenser trop peu dans ce domaine. La plus récente statistique démontre que les États-Unis ont dépensé 454 milliards de dollars en 2007, deux fois en plus comparé aux 204 milliards de dollars en Europe.28

Le fait que les dépenses pour la défense (voir le graphique en bas) complique la création d’une politique commune dans le domaine, créant ce qui est perçu souvent comme des poids injustes sur certains pays.29

Non seulement cela réduit considérablement l’efficacité de la PESD, mais surtout, cela montre quel pourrait être le niveau de l’Europe si ses capacités étaient développées avec une plus grande efficacité et transparence, sans pour autant sacrifier la souveraineté ou exclure la concurrence sur le marché, mais en créant les conditions indispensables à un marché plus sain pour l’avenir.

Les autres défis à relever en ce qui concerne les capacités sont les suivants:


27 Voir The 2008 SIPRI Yearbook on Security and Disarmament.
d’exportations nationales, l’absence de partage d’informations et des procédures d’octroi de licences complexes, tous ces éléments entraînant à leur tour des doubles emplois et des prix indûment élevés. Plutôt que cette absence de concertation entre les ministères de la défense, mieux vaudrait prendre davantage en considération la demande européenne et se concentrer ensemble sur ce qu’il faut faire, ce qui permettrait de combler le fossé entre stratégie et capacités;

- les énormes chevauchements au niveau des technologies militaires et civiles existantes, qui sont tout à fait déraisonnables. Par exemple, il y a gaspillage de capitaux et de temps puisqu’on travaille sur quatre chars de bataille différents et 23 programmes nationaux de véhicules de combat blindés. Le nombre total de programmes d’armements au sein de l’UE s’élève à 89, contre 27 aux États-Unis 31;

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Conférence de l’AED, 1er février 2007, www.eda.europe.eu
– l’absence d’investissements dans les nouvelles technologies, question régulièrement évoquée (voir les deux situations des investissements en bas).\(^\text{32}\)

Pour réaliser une BITDE crédible et efficace, apte à se mesurer avec celle des États-Unis, il faut définir et développer de nouvelles technologies. En outre, les petites et moyennes entreprises, qui mettent l’accent sur les nouvelles technologies, ne sont suffisamment associées à ces programmes. C’est un domaine qui ne nécessite pas nécessairement une attention au niveau paneuropéen mais où des progrès pourraient être faits si des groupes de pays et d’entreprises se spécialisaient dans certaines technologies.

C’est surtout aux gouvernements en tant que principaux promoteurs et administrateurs des industries de défense nationales qu’il incombe de relever les défis capacitaires évoqués ci-dessus. Si les ressources et les objectifs sont mis en commun, une BITDE efficace pourra être créée. Mais l’ouverture des marchés européens de défense étant toujours sujette à controverse, pour ne pas dire taboue, cette question ne peut se régler du jour au lendemain. Elle doit néanmoins être considérée comme l’objectif à viser à long terme. Un dialogue et un engagement plus poussés des gouvernements et des organes législatifs européens dans ce domaine entraîneront nécessairement une réduction des frais inutiles et de plus grandes économies d’échelle, avec un meilleur rapport coût-performances.

Un pas intéressant a été réalisé au début de juillet 2008, quand les 26 pays membres de l’AED ont approuvé un «plan de développement capacitaires» visant à définir les besoins futurs de leurs armées et à combler certaines de leurs lacunes, si possible en coopération et à guider les États-membres dans leurs décisions d’achats.

### Percentage Change in Investment (Equipment Procurement and R&D)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pays</th>
<th>% Changement</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autriche</td>
<td>507%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgique</td>
<td>130%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulgarie</td>
<td>-11%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Danemark</td>
<td>52%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estonie</td>
<td>9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finlande</td>
<td>14%</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Allemagne</td>
<td>22%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grèce</td>
<td>25%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hongrie</td>
<td>12%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Irlande</td>
<td>6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italie</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lettonie</td>
<td>25%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>14%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malte</td>
<td>-36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pays-Bas</td>
<td>4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pays-Bas</td>
<td>15%</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Roumanie</td>
<td>16%</td>
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<td>12%</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
<td>16%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Roumanie</td>
<td>12%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

LE SYSTÈME EUROPÉEN D’ACQUISITION D’ARMEMENT. FACTEUR DE SOUTIEN DE LA PESD

**R&D (including R&T) Expenditure**

- **Total R&D Expenditure in 2006**: € 9.7 Billion
- **Total R&D Expenditure in 2007**: € 9.5 Billion
- **Change 2006-2007**: -1.4%

R&D (including R&T) Expenditure in 2006: [Graph]

- **Antun**: 0.02
- **Belgium**: 0.03
- **Bulgaria**: 0.02
- **Czech Republic**: 0.02
- **Estonia**: 0.02
- **Finland**: 0.02
- **France**: 0.02
- **Germany**: 0.02
- **Greece**: 0.02
- **Hungary**: 0.02
- **Ireland**: 0.02
- **Italy**: 0.02
- **Lithuania**: 0.02
- **Luxembourg**: 0.02
- **Malta**: 0.02
- **Netherlands**: 0.02
- **Poland**: 0.02
- **Portugal**: 0.02
- **Romania**: 0.02
- **Slovakia**: 0.02
- **Slovenia**: 0.02
- **Spain**: 0.02
- **Sweden**: 0.02
- **United Kingdom**: 0.02

(Research and Development (R&D) - any R&D programme up to the point where expenditure for production of equipment starts to be assumed.)

militaires et les incite à collaborer pour répondre à leurs besoins à court, moyen et long terme.33

« Sans stratégies, l’Agence serait comme un bateau sans boussole, dans l’océan, incapable de suivre un cours. Heureusement, ce n’est pas le cas, et l’Agence a un cadre stratégique bien recherché. […] Il y a quatre stratégies soutenues par la direction de l’AED”34: le Plan de Développement Capacitaire, outil stratégique, qui définit les nécessités futures de capacités de courte (2010) à long terme (2020); la Stratégie Européenne pour la Recherche et la Technologie de Défense; la Coopération Européenne pour les Armements (définissant les processus pour aboutir à des programmes d’armements coopératifs efficaces); et la Stratégie pour la Base Technologique et Industrielle Européenne pour la Défense (qui décrit le futur paysage industriel européen pour la défense).

**Conclusions. Perspectives pour l’avenir**

Quand il parle de l’industrie européenne de défense, Bernard Adam observe que sa première caractéristique est qu’il n’y a pas une industrie européenne, mais plusieurs industries de défense nationales – une conséquence de l’interprétation excessive de l’article 233 du Traité de Rome par les États membres, qui maintiennent la souveraineté totale sur la production et l’exportation d’armement même après Maastricht.35 Et connaissant le niveau des revenus pour les budgets nationaux36, ce n’est pas seulement une question de fierté... Pour arriver à un

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36 Voir *The 2009 SIPRI Yearbook on Security and Disarmament, Annexe 2a.*
système commun d’acquisition d’armement, il y a quelques conditions qui doivent être remplies, liées à la création de la PESD.

La première et un pas essentiel serait "Le Livre Blanc sur la Sécurité et la Défense" pour la définition d’une doctrine militaire commune – une sécurité et une défense harmonisées à travers une perception commune des risques et des menaces. Et ceci parce qu’un système commun d’acquisition d’armement n’existe pas hors d’une PESD.

La nécessité d’une doctrine militaire commune a comme origine le fait que, avec des doctrines différentes, il y a des perceptions différentes des risques et des menaces (la défense territoriale totale en Scandinavie, utilisant plutôt l’infanterie, unités aériennes et des unités navales légères et la défense à multiples niveaux en France, utilisant sous-marins nucléaires, porte-avions, infanterie et forces aériennes), la conséquence étant l’utilisation des systèmes d’armement différents. Ceci serait le cadre autour duquel les Etats pourraient travailler.

Un deuxième pas important serait la réforme des industries de défense et le soutien à leur intégration. A ce point on peut mentionner la compétition féroce de la part de l’industrie américaine de défense.

Dernièrement et peut-être le plus important facteur serait la volonté politique réelle des Etats européens pour aller vers un système commun d’acquisition d’armement, sachant que les enjeux sont très importants: l’Europe envisage depuis quelque temps de s’assumer le responsabilité pour la sécurité du continent (même si l’épisode ex-yougoslave marque néanmoins un manque de succès). Le problème reste au niveau européen. Même si la plupart des membres de l’UE sont aussi des membres de l’OTAN, ils ne peuvent pas tomber d’accord sur la nature des standards communs, chacun favorisant "les champions nationaux".

A ceci on pourrait ajouter la suggestion pour un marché européen des équipements de défense, qui devra à terme inclure une politique commune de soutien et de contrôle des exportations, et donc ne pas se limiter aux transferts intra-communautaires. En ce qui concerne l’harmonisation des procédures d’achat des équipements de défense, elle ne pourra faire l’impasse sur un véritable accord européen sur le maintien des compétences technologiques clés sur le sol européen. Pour ce faire, quelle répartition parmi les Etats membres ? Comment faire émerger de vrais pôles d’excellence européens ?

Autant de questions qui nécessitent une réponse de la part des Etats membres, notamment les plus engagés en matière de politique de défense et d’armement, à savoir la France et le Royaume-Uni. Cette réponse ne pourra venir que d’un accord cadre sur les finalités et l’avenir de la PESD, qui, même après le semestre de présidence française de l’Union Européenne, reste suspendu aux hésitations britanniques.

L’analyse SWOT a démontré que l’UE est encore faible comme acteur dans les relations internationales; quand on parle de menaces à la sécurité, l’OTAN et surtout les Etats-Unis sont ceux qui aboutissent à des résultats. Et les divergences au sein de l’UE ne font que rendre la situation pire qu’elle l’est...

37 A. Dumoulin, op.cit., p.212
39 Voir Kjell A. Eliassen & Marit S. Marino, , p.63
Pourtant, la situation ne doit pas rester la même pour les années à venir! Il y a assez de facteurs qui conduisent à cette supposition. La création des standards communs a démontré son importance pour l’OTAN en apportant un plus de consistance et cohérence et prouvera ses effets dans le cas de l’UE aussi. Les lacunes capacitaires des États membres sont dues, en partie tout de moins, au peu de coopération à l’échelle européenne. 42 milliards d’euros de budget d’équipement et recherche en matière de défense pour l’UE-27 représentent un investissement considérable, mais le manque de coordination entre États produit de véritables aberrations, comme le développement de seize différents véhicules blindés de combat en Europe. Ce qui est certain, c’est que la Commission compte bien jouer un rôle grandissant en matière de défense et armement.

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LA PROTECTION DES INFRASTRUCTURES CRITIQUES – DÉFIS ACTUELS

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Abstract: Considering that in the European Union’s plan, it has not been identified a solution for surpassing the legal differences between states (derived from priorities and different interests), Romania continues the program of alignment towards increasing its own standards and interconnecting internal critical infrastructures with the European and regional ones. This process is a lasting one, fact revealed also by the distance, in terms of time, between the first approaches, at a European level, of the problems of critical infrastructures, at the implementation of Directive 114/2008 provisions. The steps taken by the authorities in Bucharest are intended to drive Romania towards a level of development compatible both with the integration in a single European space of critical infrastructures and the fulfillment of an important role in stating the future strategies of the European Union. Currently, Romania’s alignment to the European Union and international standards creates the optimum framework for developing and implementing some specific provisions which, at this time, are materialized as the steps of a single national plan for protecting critical infrastructures, on the way of being configured.

Keywords: protection, critical infrastructure, energy, transportation, telecommunication

Tendances au niveau européen**

Au niveau communautaire, il y a toute une série de directions d’action dans l’aire de la protection des infrastructures critiques1 et quelques projets lancés, qui incluent la Banque Mondiale et des acteurs privés. Néanmoins, il est encore difficile d’obtenir une approche unitaire à cause:

• des intérêts et visions nationaux différents et de l’insuffisante coopération interétatique pour prévenir et contrecarrer;

• des divergences inhérentes au niveau des fournisseurs, systèmes et zones de transit;

• de l’exposition inégalement à des potentiels violences (d’origine terroriste ou guerre) et la compétition qui gouverne les marchés européens d’énergie;

• de l’élargissement des connexions entre les différents secteurs visés (énergie, transport, financier - bancaire), dus à la propagation rapide de la technologie de l’information;

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1 La directive du Conseil de l’Union européenne 2008/ 114/ EC sur l’identification et la désignation des infrastructures critiques européennes; le Programme Européen dans le domaine de la Protection des Infrastructures Critiques/ PEPIC; Communication de la Commission 2009/149 „Protéger l’Europe contre les attaques cybernétiques et des perturbations d’ampleur: améliorer le niveau de préparation, de la sécurité et de la résilience“.
• de la réticence des opérateurs privés de communiquer aux autorités les attaques de type cyber sur leurs systèmes ou les nouvelles plateformes avec lesquelles elles travaillent (parmi les causes, se retrouve la peur de perte de la réputation).

Les attaques cybernétiques – principale menace envers les systèmes critiques

Le manque de communication et la méfiance entre les différents acteurs obligent les institutions habilitées au plan de la sécurité nationale de s’adapter en marche aux risques et menaces de type cyber, en hausse et de plus en plus raffinées (effectuées par des individus, organisations de crime organisé, nationalistes ou terroristes, gouvernements hostiles, etc.).

La plupart des infrastructures critiques dépendent, directement ou non, d’équipements connectés à travers des lignes privées, radio ou VPN (Virtual Private Networks), via Internet ou à l’aide des liaisons téléphoniques.

L'utilisation des modems, même dans les conditions de protection avec un firewall puissant ou sécurité du réseau, peut être accédée de manière non-autorisée, sauf un mot de passe adéquat. Également, la pratique de l’attaque par l'intermédiaire des lignes téléphoniques ("wardialing")², très utilisée dans les années '80, semble reprendre en popularité. Toutefois, on considère que la plus simple méthode d'avoir accès à un réseau SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisitions)³ est de recruter des employés mécontents, provenant de l'intérieur de la compagnie. Par exemple, en 2000, un ancien constructeur a pris le contrôle sur le système de canalisation et traitement des eaux dans la zone de Maroochy, dans l'État du Queensland (Australie), utilisant une connexion wireless et un ordinateur volé. Le résultat a été le déversement de quelques millions de litres de résidus dans un réseau de ruisseaux et parcs.


On a estimé¹ une croissance, en 2010, des menaces contre la sécurité bancaire, tout comme du nombre de réseaux de type botnet⁵ et des attaques orientées contre les réseaux

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² War dialer est un logiciel utilisé pour identifier de numéros de téléphone à travers lesquels on achève une connexion avec un modem qui supporte VOIP.

³ Système qui collecte des données provenant de différents senseurs, les stocke et les transmet à un ordinateur central


⁵ Selon le portail IT “TehnoPol”, un réseau botnet représente une série d’ordinateurs infectés, interconnectés, qui peuvent être contrôlés de loin (sans le savoir ou le consentement de l’utilisateur) et utilisés par des hackers pour envoyer des messages spam, pour attaquer d’autres sites ou pour le vol de données confidentielles.

En dépit du fait que, pendant les dernières années, nous sommes arrivés à une reconnaissance presque unanime au niveau gouvernemental de la gravité du phénomène, indifférent du pays de résidence, le progrès a connu une lente évolution. Une élimination totale des cyber menaces sur infrastructures critiques est pratiquement impossible, l’objectif étant leur réduction au minimum, sans compromettre la productivité et, de manière implicite, la consommation, dans le contexte de la libéralisation des marchés, la privatisation de la majorité des opérateurs d’État et de la dépendance de la technologie de l’information et de télécommunication (ICT).

L’interdépendance des infrastructures critiques - implications

Presque toutes les branches d’activité dépendent, directement ou indirectement, de la sécurité énergétique, avec ses réseaux (physiques et/ou virtuelles) devenus de plus en plus complexes. Si, dans la première partie du XXe siècle, les systèmes d’approvisionnement en énergie électrique étaient décentralisés – et, par la suite, vulnérables en plan régional – l’interconnexion des réseaux (au-delà des frontières nationales, en présent) rend possible le transfert des capacités et la connexion des acteurs étatiques.

L’exemple le plus relevant peut être considéré l’interdépendance entre l’infrastructure de télécommunications et les secteurs énergétiques. Au cas d’une attaque sur un nœud de production ou distribution de l’énergie électrique, les services de téléphonie, autant que ceux de dates, sont inutilisables, pendant qu’une éventuelle chute des lignes de communications pourrait déterminer l’incapacité des opérateurs du domaine énergétique de surveiller et contrôler efficacement les installations de transport.

La diversification du système européen d’approvisionnement et transport du gaz naturel à travers des gazoducs – perçu comme la cheville d’Achille de l’Europe – a fait monter de manière exponentielle le nombre de risques et menaces. Ses sécurité et contrôle sont dépendants, conformément aux experts6, de l’infrastructure ICT, d’une gestion de réseau efficiente, une hiérarchie cohérente des tâches (au niveau central, régional et local).

De manière similaire à la chaîne d’approvisionnement d’un supermarché, qui demande une coordination attentive et à temps dans la fourniture des produits, les systèmes électriques et d’approvisionnement avec gaz naturel sont essentiels pour le bon fonctionnement des grands opérateurs économiques. Au cas d’une éventuelle chute, peut être déclenché un «effet cascade» des conséquences négatives, avec des implications pour les systèmes de télécommunications et transport (service de secours, santé publique et alimentaire).

Également, le système énergétique est interconnecté avec celui financier - bancaire, dont le fonctionnement optimal dépend, à son tour, de la sécurité des télécommunications, conformément aux standards imposés par le système de transfert financier électronique Electronic Funds Transfer Systems (EFT). En Europe, ce système est appelé TRANSFER (Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System), pendant qu’aux États-Unis il est connu en tant que Fedwire, et au niveau international - SWIFTNet (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication Network).

Coopération internationale

En dépit du fait que, jusqu’à présent, il n’y a pas eu une attaque simultanée sur plusieurs infrastructures critiques nationales, celui-ci est faisable de point de vue technique, étant difficile à anticiper et contrecarrer, sans connaître la planification des pas en vue d’atteindre les objectifs visés. Ainsi, pour une protection plus efficace des infrastructures critiques, au niveau européen et pas seulement, il est nécessaire de:

- accroître l’efficacité de l’application de la loi dans la lutte contre la cybercriminalité, étant donnée la rapidité croissante à laquelle évoluent les menaces de l’espace virtuel, les auteurs des attaques étant libres des contraintes géographiques ou des frontières physiques;
- réduire les différences évidentes entre experts gouvernementaux et les spécialistes dans la sécurité des réseaux;
- établir/définir les standards uniques, de partage des responsabilités qui en résultent (au niveau des opérateurs, État, région etc.), respectivement des contributions de chaque partie;
- donner une impulsion au partenariat public-privé, à travers un échange d’informations et bonnes pratiques dans l’aire de la sécurité;
- développer la coopération entre États et organisations, ayant en vue le caractère intersectoriel et transnational de l’assurance de la sécurité énergétique;
- accroître la confiance entre les parties, ce qui peut être fait seulement par la consolidation du dialogue, où l’on répond aux questions et où l’on souligne la complexité des activités de intelligence, sur le fond des menaces accrues;
- accorder une attention spéciale au facteur logistique (secteur vital dans l’appui des processus macroéconomiques, des infrastructures critiques et l’approvisionnement des consommateurs), ce qui sera „le vrai mécanisme de réglage de l’économie” et qui „pourrait aider l’Union européenne à revenir rapidement après la crise globale”.

La composante de prévention des infrastructures critiques est prioritaire, ce qui impose l’implémentation de systèmes d’alerte et intervention rapide, surtout de l’infrastructure de transport des hydrocarbures.

L’importance de la préparation


LA PROTECTION DES INFRASTRUCTURES CRITIQUES – DÉFIS ACTUELS

Roumanie – la continuité du processus d’alignement

Les recommandations formulées au niveau communautaire sur la protection des infrastructures critiques européennes (ICE), tout comme les actions communes engagées dans ce sens mettent l’accent sur l’irréversibilité de la connexion directe entre les objectifs/stratégies autochtones et celles envisagées par les organismes de l’Union européenne et, en même temps, accélèrent leur marche sur la trajectoire de l’uniformisation et harmonisation, à caractère de nécessité et intérêt commun.

Néanmoins, le principal repère dans la formulation des prochains documents-cadre dans le domaine de la protection des infrastructures critiques, la Directive 114/2008, n’est qu’un premier pas dans le processus d’identification des ICE et d’évaluation de la nécessité d’amélioration de leur sécurité. Par la suite, si on vise les secteurs énergétique et du transport, on admet le fait qu’elle peut être modifiée en vue d’évaluer l’opportunité d’inclure d’autres secteurs dans son domaine d’application – le secteur de la technologie de l’information et des communications, inter alia. En plus, elle prévoit que “la responsabilité principale et finale pour la protection des ICE revient aux États membres de l’Union européenne et, respectivement, aux propriétaires/opérateurs de ces infrastructures.”

De manière similaire, le Programme Européen pour la Protection des Infrastructures Critiques (PEPIC), adopté en décembre 2006, accepte l’idée du développement, par les États membres, de leurs propres mécanismes de sécurisation des infrastructures, en fonction des intérêts et menaces. Pourtant, il met l’accent sur l’importance de l’interconnexion de ces mécanismes par l’intermédiaire de « points de contact ».

Les documents ont plutôt le rôle d’accélérer le développement par les États membres de systèmes propres de protection unitaire des infrastructures critiques, d’une telle façon que, une fois cet objectif accompli, les respectifs systèmes permettent la création d’une autorité centrale européenne.

En ce qui concerne la Roumanie, l’absence d’un modèle actualisé au cadre de l’UE et la persistance de la diversité des intérêts des pays membres conduisent au maintien au même niveau d’importance des objectifs d’intégration en matière de sécurité des infrastructures, respectivement de développement des propres projets dans le domaine. À la fois, le manque d’une formule communautaire unique assure la conservation, à court terme, du format actuel des organismes compétents dans le domaine sur ces composantes:

– prévention des menaces et gestion des risques – les structures de sécurité nationale, membres de la communauté nationale de renseignements, à côté des entités qui composent le Système National de Gestion des Situations d’Urgence ou SNGSU (conformément à l’Ordonnance d’Urgence du Gouvernement 21/2004);

– intervention et gestion des situations de crise – le Ministère de l’Administration interne, par l’intermédiaire de l’Inspectorat pour les Situations d’Urgence, ensemble avec les organismes spécialisés, en fonction de la nature de l’événement;

– assurance de la capacité de résilience et reconstruction suite aux événements/crises – structures subordonnées/coordonnées par les ministères qui ont les infrastructures critiques en compétence.

À présent, la responsabilité de la gestion des problèmes de sécurité des deux catégories d’infrastructures critiques (le fonctionnement en bons termes et la prévention des menaces, gestion des risques, respectivement de la capacité de résilience), revient, en grande

Le Service Roumain de Renseignements fait partie des autorités publiques avec des attributions en ce qui concerne la protection des infrastructures critiques:

• la technologie de l’information et des communications (avec les sous-domaines communications et transmissions de données interconnectées au niveau national), le Service ayant des responsabilités dérivant de ses qualités d’autorité nationale dans le domaine:
  • CYBERINT (conformément à la décision du Conseil Suprême de Défense du Pays), avec des attributions dans l’implémentation du projet CYBERINT, destiné à assurer l’accroissement du potentiel de défense de la Roumanie contre les menaces venues de l’espace cybémétique, en assurant les capacités de prévention, protection, réaction et gestion des conséquences en cas de cyber attaques;
  • de l’implémentation du Système Informatique Intégré;
    • la lutte contre le terrorisme;
    • la protection des informations classifiées.

L’échec de l’initiative de constitution de l’Autorité Nationale pour la Protection des Infrastructures Critiques (ANPIC)


Conformément à cet acte normatif, l’Autorité aurait eu un rôle de coordination, monitorisation et contrôle des activités de protection des infrastructures critiques, qui inclut l’élaboration des procédures d’identification, évaluation et gestion adéquate des vulnérabilités et risques à leur sécurité, pendant que les attributions auraient été les suivantes:

• la réglementation et coordination, au niveau national, de la protection des infrastructures critiques;
• l’élaboration de la « Stratégie Nationale de Protection des Infrastructures Critiques » (un document destiné à la définition du programme stratégique visant l’identification des infrastructures critiques, l’analyse des vulnérabilités et des risques, des dépendances et interdépendances, la définition des mesures qui améliorent leur protection);
• la création du « Plan National de Protection des Infrastructures Critiques », partie composante de la Stratégie Nationale de Protection des Infrastructures Critiques, document classifié, qui aurait inclus les plans individuels pour chaque infrastructure critique et aurait compris ses éléments descriptifs et les mesures de protection revenant aux propriétaires/ opérateurs/ administrateurs d’infrastructures critiques;
• la constitution du « Système National Informatique de Protection des Infrastructures Critiques » - le système informatique de gestion

⁹ http://webapp.senat.ro/pdf/09L125PV.pdf
et traitement de données et informations, monitorisation, direction et contrôle du complexe de mesures et mécanismes associés à la protection des infrastructures critiques contenues dans la Stratégie Nationale de Protection des Infrastructures Critiques. Le système aurait dû être connecté à la structure d’alerte précoce du Système National de Gestion des Situations d’Urgence et au réseau similaire qui existe au niveau de l’UE;

• l’élaboration de la stratégie d’identification/ gestion des risques et planification de la protection à travers une approche unitaire capable d’encourager l’implication responsable des secteurs public et privé;
  • la représentation dans les relations avec les tiers;
  • la promotion, l’implémentation et le suivi des décisions de l’UE et de l’OTAN dans ce domaine;
  • l’implémentation des réglementations nationales et internationales et l’adaptation du cadre légal dans ce sens;

• de solliciter et d’obtenir de la part des institutions publiques ou privées les informations dans le domaine de compétence.

La décision du Conseil Législatif du Parlement a été motivée par le manque de constitutionnalité de l’initiative, car le projet d’acte normatif n’a pas été formulé par le Gouvernement (mais par un membre de la Chambre des Députés), la seule autorité capable de proposer la création d’une structure dans sa subordination. Les autres arguments présentés par le Conseil (qui peuvent être interprétés comme recommandations pour la prochaine démarche similaire), ont invoqué:

• le caractère trop général de la proposition, avec l’observation qu’elle pourrait être analysée à travers la compatibilité de ses dispositions avec l’acquis communautaire général;

• l’absence des dispositions spécifiques qui établissent le rapport entre l’Autorité Nationale pour la Protection des Infrastructures Critiques et les autres composantes du Système National de Gestion des Situations d’Urgence (sachant que l’Autorité devrait être partie du Système), conformément aux réglementations de l’OUG nr.21/2004 visant la composition et les attributions du SNGSU;

• le manque de relevance de la proposition législative de point de vue de la transposition d’une directive ou d’une décision communautaire (même si elle traite « un domaine sensible dans tout l’espace européen »);

• le fait que l’initiative n’a pas comme fin la création du cadre nécessaire à l’application d’un règlement communautaire.

Exemples de bonnes pratiques au niveau national

Le rejet de la démarche de création de l’ANPIC n’a pas empêché la continuation des programmes existants, l’évolution du cadre conceptuel et normatif ou l’apparition de nouvelles initiatives dans l’aire des infrastructures critiques, mais a contribué à la limitation de la capacité d’interconnexion, respectivement au développement d’un niveau supérieur de réglementation de la problématique de la protection et sécurisation.

A partir du mois d’avril 2009, on peut remarquer, au plan interne, sur les deux paliers majeurs établis par la Directive CE 114/2008:

– Energie

• La dotation des stations de distribution de l’énergie électrique (au cours de l’année 2009 et au début de 2010) avec des systèmes SCADA, avec support de communication par fibre optique, qui permet la monitorisation de l’état technique des installations en
temps réel et l’intervention rapide en cas de problèmes. En parallèle, ont continué les programmes de renouvellement des stations de transformation au niveau national;


- L’inclusion (04.03.2010) dans le programme de financement de la Commission Européenne pour les initiatives dans les domaines du gaz et de l’énergie électrique de trois projets de développement et sécurisation où est impliquée la compagnie « Transgaz »;
  o des équipements qui permettent le changement de la direction du flux de livraison au cas d’une interruption à court terme (1,56 millions €);
  o l’interconnexion des réseaux de gaz entre la Roumanie et l’Hongrie (16,6 millions €);
  o l’interconnexion des réseaux de gaz entre la Roumanie et la Bulgarie (8,9 millions €);

- L’octroi de garanties d’Etat (OUG nr.9 du 17.02.2010) pour le cofinancement des projets déroulés en Roumanie, au niveau local, à travers des fonds européens, dans le domaine de l’infrastructure énergétique;


– Transports

- La loi nr. 94 du 08.04.2009 sur l’audit de sécurité dans le domaine de l’aviation civile, qui assure le cadre pour adapter et appliquer efficacement le Programme national de sécurité de l’aviation civile, pour prévenir les actes d’intervention illicite et assurer la sécurité des infrastructures afférentes;

- L’Autorité Navale Roumaine a démarré, en mai 2009, l’implémentation de la 2e phase du projet «Système de gestion du trafic sur le Danube et information sur le transport sur les eaux internes – RORIS 2».

C’est un système complexe de monitoring et gestion du trafic de navires sur tout le secteur roumain du Danube, en conformité avec la Directive 2005/44/CE;
- les administrateur/s d’infrastructure ferroviaire;
- les gestionnaires d’infrastructure ferroviaire non-intéropérable;
- les opérateurs de transport ferroviaire;
- l’opérateur économique qui assure le transport avec le métro;
- les opérateurs économiques qui détiennent, en propriété, en leasing ou avec loyer, des chemins de fer industriels raccordés à l’infrastructure ferroviaire publique et/ou l’infrastructure ferroviaire privée ouverte à la circulation publique;
- les opérateurs économiques qui détiennent, en propriété ou avec loyer, des véhicules ferroviaires qui circulent sur l’infrastructure ferroviaire;
- les opérateurs économiques qui mènent des activités connexes et adjacentes au transport ferroviaire.

Selon le Règlement, AFER est désigné l’agence spécialisée d’intervention, qui a l’obligation d’agir au cas des appels d’urgence, d’accident ou incident ferroviaire;

• la signature, le même jour, du Mémorandum d’entente entre les Ministères des Transports de Roumanie et Bulgarie sur la création du Bloc Aérien Fonctionnel „Danube” (Danube Functional Airspace Block – Danube FAB), dans le cadre du programme Single European Sky;

Les facilités portuaires disposent d’un officier de sécurité, qui gère l’implémentation et le maintien d’un Système de gestion de la sécurité, destiné à la conservation d’un climat de pleine sûreté sur les plateformes portuaires. Annuellement, chaque facilité portuaire prépare une Évaluation de sécurité qui est analysée et approuvée par l’Autorité Portuaire, et qui est suivie par un audit externe de sécurité du Système;

• la signature, le 06.04.2010, du contrat d’acquisition, par l’Administration des Canaux Navigables (ACN) Constanța, du système électronique River Information Services – RIS de gestion du trafique de navires sur le Canal Danube – Mer Noire et d’information sur le transport sur les eaux internes. Le contrat a une validité de deux ans et il est financé des fonds européens, par le Programme Opérationnel Sectoriel de Transport (71,12%) et du budget d’État (28,88%). Le système mettra à la disposition de l’utilisateur la carte électronique des

canaux navigables, des informations sur le trafic, pour les commandants, sur les conditions hydrométéorologiques de la zone de navigation, la gestion des écluses et la surveillance vidéo sur le déroulement du trafic. Il est déjà implémenté en Allemagne, Hongrie, Slovaquie et Autriche, et il sera fonctionnel en Croatie, Serbie, Bulgarie, Roumanie et Ukraine, couvrant, ainsi, tout le cours du Danube, respectivement le Corridor VII Pan-Européen19.

Défis actuels


Dans le contexte actuel, interne et externe, le nécessaire de sécurité des infrastructures critiques, dans ses aspects relevant (sécurité des ressources et des voies d’accès, avec des implications géopolitiques prononcées, respectivement la sécurité des infrastructures critiques associées), impose le rapport du cadre d’action de Roumanie à:

- l’impératif de l’amélioration, dans les conditions de la crise économique, de la gestion de la qualité, qui découle du vieillissement et la détérioration des infrastructures sur le fond de l’intensification de leur utilisation; les investissements insuffisants pour le renouvellement; la gestion sous les paramètres optimaux du partenariat public-privé dans le développement des infrastructures; la diminution du nombre des employés. En dépit des efforts pour surmonter ces défis, la crise économique et financière continue d’influencer l’ampleur et l’efficacité des actions;
- la nécessité d’améliorer l’adaptabilité des infrastructures et du potentiel d’interconnexion – conditions de la hausse de l’efficacité de la gestion de risque. Les perspectives de développement des réseaux de transport des hydrocarbures – les gazoducs Constanța-Soci et AGRI Interconnector20, objectifs d’intérêt majeur également pour d’autres États de l’UE – tracent simultanément le cadre et la nécessité de l’intensification de la coopération pour assurer leur sécurité physique. À ce point, on peut mentionner la montée du niveau de risque, engendrée par l’association avec des partenaires provenant de zones d’instabilité accrue et les menaces considérables envers les infrastructures (similaire aux problèmes de l’oléoduc Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pendant les luttes entre la Russie et la Géorgie, de l’été de 2008);
- l’accroissement de la capacité de résilience comme moyen d’agir contre/ minimaliser la menace terroriste. Ensemble avec la composante de prévention, assurée par des politiques spécifiques et des actions des structures de sécurité nationale, le potentiel d’absorption de l’impact, d’adaptation/ intervention dans des conditions extrêmes, de réduction de la durée et de l’intensité de l’agression, la capacité de reconstruction suite à une attaque constituent les principaux

19 http://www.rna.ro/Noutati/prezentare%20Sistem%20RIS%20II.pdf
LA PROTECTION DES INFRASTRUCTURES CRITIQUES – DÉFIS ACTUELS

moyens de lutter contre les menaces représentées par le phénomène terroriste;
• les nouvelles menaces cyberrécurrentes. Dans les conditions de l’évolution rapide de la complexité/ perfectionnement des attaques cyberrécurrentes et des vulnérabilités créées par les technologies novatrices, les prévisions concernant la sécurité des infrastructures critiques ont indiqué, pour 2010, la montée des menaces envers les réseaux informatiques. Le projet de Loi concernant la défense cyberrécurrente, prévue au cadre du Programme législatif du Parlement roumain pour la période 2009-2012, vise explicitement la protection des infrastructures critiques de point de vue de la technologie de l’information;
• les situations imprévues entraînées par des épidémies, des phénomènes naturels et des changements climatiques – inondations, tremblements de terre, éruptions volcaniques etc. – ont testé constamment la capacité d’interopérabilité des infrastructures critiques, conduisant à l’élargissement et la consolidation des connexions entre elles. Le but consiste dans la prise, par un certain secteur, des mesures destinées à atténuer les effets d’une situation de crise sur un autre secteur (dans les conditions de la paralysis du trafic aérien européen, les communications, respectivement l’infrastructure routière, navale et ferroviaire ont été essentielles pour la stabilisation de la situation);
• la culture de sécurité. La prise de conscience sur l’utilité d’une coopération approfondie et efficace entre tous les acteurs impliqués dans l’opération/ sécurisation des infrastructures critiques est devenue décisive sur toutes les coordonnées d’action dans le domaine de la sécurisation des infrastructures critiques, en spécial en ce qui concerne la synchronisation et la complémentarité des services assurés par le secteur privé, autorités étatiques, institutions du milieu académique ou de recherche. D’autre part, la communication, l’information et l’instruction de la population, combiné avec la transparence des relations entre les institutions responsables (Ministères de la Défense, de l’Administration Interne, Service Roumain de Renseignements, Service de Renseignements Étrangers, Service de Télécommunications Spéciales, Service de Protection et Garde, l’Office du Registre National des Informations Secrètes d’État, l’Office de Surveillance du Secret d’État et d’autres structures dont l’activité est partiellement classifiée) et la contribution du milieu académique/ de recherche (Fondation EURISC) contribuent à la réception positive des efforts en vue de sécuriser les infrastructures critiques et une meilleure mobilisation des citoyens au soutien des autorités.

L’importance de la problématique associée au processus de protection des infrastructures critiques a monté en importance dans le contexte de la croissance des cas de dommages au niveau des infrastructures, l’apparition des phénomènes météo extrêmes et la hausse des actions d’entrée non-autorisée. Dans la transpositions des lignes directrices destinées à la gestion efficace des dysfonctions et/ ou vulnérabilités qui peuvent surgir, on peut utiliser le schéma présenté en annexe (particularisé en fonction du domaine auquel appartennent les infrastructures).

Conclusions

L’état actuel d’alignement de notre pays aux standards communautaires et internationaux permet le développement et l’implémentation de mesures spécifiques, qui, pour le moment, représentent des étapes d’un plan unitaire, national, en cours de configuration, de protection des infrastructures critiques. Ce processus est de durée, fait souligné aussi par la distance temporelle entre les premières approches européennes...

Au niveau communautaire, on n’a pas identifié une solution pour dépasser les différences législatives inter-étatiques (provenant de priorités et intérêts qui diffèrent). La Roumanie continue le programme d’alignement en ce qui concerne les standards propres et l’interconnexion des infrastructures propres et l’interconnexion des infrastructures critiques autochtones à celles européennes et régionales.

Les actions de Bucarest visent à positionner l’État roumain à un niveau de développement correspondant à l’intégration dans un espace unique européen des infrastructures critiques et de remplir un rôle important dans l’énonciation des futures stratégies de l’Union européenne.

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Annexe : La protection des infrastructures critiques

**RISQUES**
- Exploitation intensive des installations et équipements spécifiques
- État de dégradation, sur le fonds du manque de ressources d'entretien/modernisation
- Opération déficitaire des installations et équipements
- Protection et garde inadéquates

**CRITICITÉ**
- Influence sur l’activité économique et sociale
- Génération de déséquilibres au niveau des entités avec connexion horizontale et/ou verticale
- Ampleur des effets destructifs (dégâts et victimes), en cas d’accident

**INFRASTRUCTURES CRITIQUES**

**EXPOSITION**

**Nécessité de protection**

**EFFETS**

**Partenariat public-privé**

**Institutions responsables avec l’assurance**
- de la législation
- des contrôles.

**Propriétaires ou administrateurs responsables avec l’assurance des**
- fonds
- maintenance
- garde

**Flux informationnel**

**Système d’intervention opportune**

**Système d’avertissement précoce**

**Initiative**

**Demande**

**Autorités compétentes**
- lutte contre le terrorisme
- intervention en situations d’urgence

**PROTECTION physique technologique**
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