Populism and Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic: Meeting Friends or Passing By?

Petr Kaniok, Vlastimil Havlík

Abstract: Euroscepticism and populism, however defined, are often taken as two sides of the same coin, both in public discourse and academic debates. This paper challenges this common wisdom by analysing the case of the Czech Republic. Reviewing the EU related press releases produced by either Eurosceptic or Populist Czech parties, covering a six months period in 2014, the paper reveals to what extent there is a match between ‘Euroscepticism’ and ‘Populism’. As for the main results, the paper identifies that a) there is not a positive correlation between these two phenomena in the Czech Republic, and b) Euroscepticism seems to be inspired by Populism more than Populism draws from Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic.

Keywords: Populism, Euroscepticism, Czech Republic, political parties, press release

Introduction

Euroscepticism and populism, however defined, are often taken as two sides of the same coin both in public discourse and in academic debates. Be it because of the normative perception of the two terms or for some other reasons, Eurosceptic political parties are very often seen (or rather accused of) being populist. And vice versa, populist political parties are almost automatically perceived as Eurosceptic. As expressed by Nick Sitter, the „central role of dissent in Eurosceptic politics indicates a strong potential link with the populist anti-elite protest“ (Sitter 2002: 11, see also Taggart 2004). Nevertheless, this general hypothesis about the „friendship“ between populism and Euroscepticism has been taken for granted and very little empirical research testing the hypothesis has been done so far. Our paper aims at filling this gap through a close examination of the Czech Republic’s case.

The party system in the Czech Republic is extremely suitable for a closer investigation of the relationship between populism and Euroscepticism for several reasons. Firstly, the Czech
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Republic is traditionally seen as being one of the most Eurosceptic EU member states (Boros, Vasali 2013). Secondly, there is a long tradition of relevant Eurosceptic political parties both on the right (the Civic Democratic Party, ODS) and on the left side of the spectrum (the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, KSČM). Moreover, a new Eurosceptic party – the Party of Free Citizens (SSO) – was able to join the European Parliament, in the wake of the 2014 elections. Thirdly, the last general election in 2013 witnessed the unprecedented rise of populist political parties, including the Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (ANO 2011) and Tomio Okamura’s Dawn of Direct Democracy (Úsvit). Consequently, because of the presence of several Eurosceptic and populist parties, the party system belonging to the Czech Republic provides us with an exceptional laboratory for researching the link between populism and Euroscepticism. In order to assess the relationship between the two phenomena, we formulate the following question: is the European rhetoric of Eurosceptic parties characterized by populism? And vice versa: are the populist parties Eurosceptic? And if yes, do they use populist appeals in their European discourse? Is populism more typical for hard Eurosceptic parties in comparison to soft Euroscepticism?

How do we proceed in our analysis? First, we conceptualize the two phenomena that are of interest and operationalize them into indicators that will be used in a directed content analysis of both Czech Eurosceptic and populist parties – such parties we identified on the basis of relevant literature. After that, we are briefly introducing parties that are relevant for our analysis. In regards to the analysis, we are working with press releases dealing with the European integration topic. We believe that press releases are a better source of data than, for example, electoral manifestos or programme documents as parties can respond through them immediately and comment on topical events. Their analysis therefore enables us to capture both phenomena in their variety and complexity. In more practical terms, we are looking at the content of press releases in order to find if indicators of Euroscepticism (hard or soft) or populism are present. As a next step, we are trying to find if there is a match between the presence of Euroscepticism and the presence of populism – that means, is there a positive mutual relation between them as expected in the literature?

1. Concepts: Populism and Euroscepticism

No analysis of populism can begin without pointing out the vagueness of the term and the difficulties in defining it (e.g. Mény and Surel, 2002; Taggart, 2000). There are a number of reasons for this. One of the reasons is a long-standing (and never ending) academic debate over whether the concept should be understood as a (thin-centred) ideology, a strategy, a communication style, or a discourse. A second reason is the varied use (and misuse) of the term by the media and in political competition as a means of discrediting rivals. Populism in this context (compared to the academic debate) has almost entirely negative connotations.

Nevertheless, in recent years, scholars have come to a general agreement on the so-called “analytical core of populism”, which this chapter adopts. Based on Cas Mudde’s definition of populism as “a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated onto two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will)
of the people” (Mudde, 2004,p. 543), three fundamental, closely connected characteristics of the analytical core of populism can be distinguished: 1) a perception of people and elites as homogeneous groups, 2) a focus on the antagonistic nature of the relations between the two groups and 3) a view of the people as morally sovereign (see also Hawkins et al, 2012; Rooduijn, 2013; Stanley, 2008).

The key component in populism is “the people”, conceived as a monolithic or homogeneous group with collective interests (Canovan, 2002; Taggart, 2002). To describe the people as a monolithic entity in whose interests a populist party or its leader act is to refuse to divide society into groups, for instance, by social status, political attitudes or religious beliefs. As Margaret Canovan (1999) points out, populism is best described as “an appeal to ‘the people’ against both the established structure of power and dominant ideas and values of the society” (p. 3). The anti-establishment appeal employed by populist parties highlights an antagonistic relationship between the people and the political elites. Populists highlight that the people – however defined – are not represented by the elites who are in power. As Schedler put it, the established parties “forming an exclusionary cartel [are seen as] unresponsive and unaccountable, a homogeneous class of lazy, incompetent, self-enriching and power-driven villains” (Schedler, 1996, p. 291). Populist political parties thus present themselves as defenders of “pure” politics, as fighters taking on corruption, who are able to renew the “distorted” relationship between the elites and the people (this is discussed in more detail below). The proclaimed aspiration of populists is therefore to return power “to the people”, often by implementing elements of direct democracy.

Euroscepticism represents another challenged and ambiguous concept. Basically, there can be two general research traditions found in it: (1) that is rooted in party-based research and (2) dealing with Euroscepticism expressed by the public. Starting with the latter, in the case of public Euroscepticism research tradition, there are two dominant approaches. The former understands Euroscepticism as a phenomenon that is one-dimensional and can be reduced - in terms of operationalization - to one specific problem. So to say, the evaluation of membership of a specific country in the EU can describe such issues (Carey 2002, Eichenberg - Dalton 2007, Kuhn 2011, Hakverdian et al 2013) or an opinion on deepening the European integration (Boomgaard - Freire 2009). Conversely, the second approach sees Euroscepticism as a phenomenon that cannot be reduced to a single issue. In this context, there is a distinction between political Euroscepticism, which focuses on consent to the transfer of competences from the national state to the EU’s institutions, and instrumental Euroscepticism, which is based on calculating the benefits of membership (Lubbers, Scheepers, 2005, 2010). Krouwel and Absts (2007) distinguish - according to the objective of the criticism and its depth - four types of Euroscepticism or critical attitudes. Finally, Boomgarten et al (2011) point out that the support for European integration and its criticism represent an even more complex and multidimensional phenomenon, consisting of a number of factors – the emotional dimension of the relation towards the EU, the question of European identity, the utilitarian dimension, attitude regarding the functioning of EU institutions and attitude concerning the future consolidation of the EU. Their importance can change over time. In this case, conceptualization of the support / criticism of European integration involve both its specific and diffuse part.
The Party based debate has been much more intensive than the public one and led so far to the creation of various typologies and definitions of Euroscepticism. As such, Euroscepticism was in party tradition firstly divided by appeal to the typology developed by Taggart and Szczerbiak, splitting it between its soft and hard versions. According to this, the two dimensional approach (dealing with opposition towards the EU and opposition towards the EU membership) can be described as: “hard Euroscepticism is where there is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived” (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2003: 6). Soft Euroscepticism was defined as follows: “where there is not a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas leads to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that ‘national interest’ is currently at odds with the EU trajectory” (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2003: 6).

Taggart and Szczerbiak’s typology provoked several reactions and can be seen as the very take-off for intensive theoretical debate. The most influential contribution was that of Kopecký and Mudde (2002), raising two principal objections. The first contested the category of soft Euroscepticism as being too inclusive. Kopecký and Mudde’s second objection concerned the issue of EU membership. Instead of emphasising the support for EU membership of the given country (or lack thereof), they suggested taking two different factors into consideration: (1) the principle of delegating sovereignty of the nation state towards the supranational structures and (2) support for/opposition against further enlargement of EU sovereignty (as a contemporary trajectory of European integration). As a result of combining these two dimensions a new typology consisting of four categories was advanced – Euroenthusiasts, Europragmatists, Eurosceptics and Eurorejects (Kopecký, Mudde 2002: 303).

Taggart and Szczerbiak reacted to this new typology by redefining their initial concept. Soft & hard Euroscepticism “version 2.0” abandoned the issue of EU membership and replaced this criterion by another one which looks into support for (or opposition to) the transfer of political power from the states to the supranational centre. In their revised conception, hard Euroscepticism is the “principled opposition to the project of European integration as embodied in the EU, in other words, based on the ceding or transfer of powers to [a] supranational institution such as the EU.” (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2003: 12) Soft Euroscepticism is then an attitude where “there is not a principled objection to the European integration project of transferring powers to a supranational body such as the EU, but there is opposition to the EU’s current or future planned trajectory based on the further extension of competencies that the EU is planning to make.” (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2003: 12)

With Taggart and Szczerbiak’s refinement, developments in the conceptualisation of party based Euroscepticism was essentially complete and their revised typology is now the most used, notwithstanding the fact that the political science has attempted to articulate other, more or less sophisticated typologies (for overview see Crespy and Verschuuren 2009). However, their influence can be considered as marginal given the fact that we are speaking
about attempts to introduce a new terminology, by replacing the term Euroscepticism (Crespy and Verschuren, 2009: 382).

2. Operationalization and method

In order to identify and analyse the level of populism in each of the press releases included in the dataset, we employed a quantitative content analysis using a hand-coding procedure. All press releases which were identified as EU related (see above) were included in the analysis. Based on a qualitative interpretative assessment, three elements of populism (people centrisms, anti-establishment appeal and calls for the strengthening of popular sovereignty – see Table 1 for a detailed description of the elements of populism used in the coding procedure) were observed in the press releases and their presence coded as “1.” Therefore, each article could reach a maximum value of “3” if all three elements were identified in the text, and a value of “0” in case the article was “populism-free.” It allows us to assess the average level of populism in Eurosceptic press releases in general and to compare the level of populism of Eurosceptic press releases between political parties. Moreover, we will be able to identify which of the three elements of populism is the most common “fellow” of Euroscepticism in the case of the Czech political parties.

Table 1: Operationalization of populism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element of populism</th>
<th>Description</th>
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| People centrisms          | The people are presented as a homogeneous entity but just an occurrence of the term „people“ is not sufficient to code a press release as „people centrist“.
   | The code „1“ applies if a party talks about homogeneous representation of the people (terms such as population, citizens or voters are considered as synonym to the „people“; on the other class-based expressions such as workers, businessmen, self-employed people are not considered as synonym for the „people“ as a homogeneous entity. Moreover, press releases referring to the absolute supremacy of the people are taken as the second indicator of people centrisms. In other words, the people are described in a fundamentally positive way (e.g. „the people know what is best for them“). |
| Anti-establishment appeal | The core of an anti-establishment statement is a negative portrayal of the elites in their entirety. For example, terms like the „old political parties“, the „established parties“, „all politicians“, „political elites “or „political class“ represent elites as a homogeneous entity. On the other hand, a criticism of a particular political party or just a part of political spectrum (e.g. the „left“) is not considered as anti-establishment appeal. In order to code a release with the code „1“, the elites need to be depicted in a negative way. Referring to their incompetence, corruption or negative personal traits are the most typical examples of these detractive statements. Another type of anti-establishment statement refers to the alleged clash of interest between the elites and the people (e.g. „politicians take care only of themselves and not of the people’s interests)". |
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When it comes to the analysis of Euroscepticism, we adopt a very similar approach as in the case of populism. All analysed press releases were coded according operationalization of both versions of Euroscepticism described in Table 2. On this basis, we identify non-Eurosceptic press releases (value 0), soft Eurosceptic press releases (value 1) and hard Eurosceptic press releases (value 2). When we find both versions of Euroscepticism in a particular press release, such item is coded as hard Eurosceptic press releases as it contains “stronger” argument.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of Euroscepticism</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hard Euroscepticism</td>
<td>Critique of the Euro based upon a general rejection of the EU and the European integration. There is an absence of sophisticated or theory-based argumentation (since general opposition to the EU is the main argument). There is a clear preference for nation-state discourse, ultimately challenging EU general discourse. Press releases use negative and critical language tools (metaphors, parables) concerning the EU, whereas there can be an absence of linguistic tools offering and discussing alternative solutions within the EU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soft Euroscepticism</td>
<td>Press releases generally accept the process of European integration and criticize only its current development or various key EU policies (the EMU, constitutional development, CFSP). Such critique is thus well targeted and backed up by topical arguments. Press releases try to offer alternative solutions while respecting the presence of the EU as a polity. Increase of EU competencies is opposed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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3. Data and analysed parties

In order to build up a dataset that can be used for our analysis, we sorted all press releases that had been issued by relevant parties in the first six months of the year 2014. This period was chosen deliberately – the parties were preparing for 2014 European Parliament election and we can thus expect more press releases dealing with the EU issues. All press releases can be found on the parties’ websites where there are stored at a special section, usually called “Press releases” or “Statements for Mass media”. Our aim was to analyse
five political parties that can be characterized as either Eurosceptic (ODS, KSČM, SSO) or populist (ANO 2011, Úsvit). Nevertheless, already in the beginning or our analysis we were force to exclude KSČM due to lack of relevant data. The Communists have recently built a new website removing all press releases issued before 2015. Even though we contacted the press office of the Communist party and asked for their press releases, they were not able to provide them. Thus, we could have worked only with press releases issued by ODS, SSO, Úsvit and ANO. Altogether we managed to find 84 press releases addressing EU related topics.

Table 3: Distribution of the press releases across parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of press releases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ODS</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANO</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSO</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Úsvit</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: authors own calculation

After the fall of the Nečas government in 2013, ODS substantially declined and its leading position in the right wing of the party system (and leading position in the party system as a whole) disappeared. It was not only due to the scandals of the last ODS led cabinet, when its image and reputation were for a long time affected by corruption scandals of its local politicians, weak leadership and internal quarrels – Klíma argues that ODS degenerated into a new type of political party, that he identifies as “clientelistic party” (Klíma 2013). In terms of ideology, ODS is usually described as moderate conservative (Cabada, Hloušek, Jurek 2014: 93) or conservative-liberal subject (Havlík 2011: 134). Before the 2009 European elections, ODS was a member of the European People’s Party – European Democrats (EPP-ED) political group, and in 2009 it started to participate in the new group of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), which emphasizes a soft Eurosceptic stance towards the European integration.

ODS has been traditionally labelled in relation to European integration as a Eurosceptic or soft Eurosceptic party (Haughton 2009: 1371-1392, Hanley 2008, Just 2015). This evaluation was particularly caused by opinions of former party chairman and former Czech Prime Minister Václav Klaus. Even after Mr Klaus’ resignation as party leader in 2002 and his subsequent election as the second Czech president in 2003, Václav Klaus was still influential within ODS and served as an ideal for many party politicians and members. Klaus’ Euroscepticism has been confirmed several times (Kaniok, Hloušek 2014; Hloušek, Kaniok 2014), but he was not the only source of ODS Euroscepticism. The majority of the MEPs representing ODS (including their leader Jan Zahradil) and a substantial amount of ODS Senators profiled themselves as Eurosceptics. Concerning concrete arguments, ODS
Euroscepticism was always inspired by the British tradition – ODS emphasized economic arguments, criticized further transfer of competencies from nation states towards the EU etc. On the other hand, the party never contested the general principles of the European integration and has never seriously considered the possible withdrawal of the Czech Republic from the EU.

The second analysed Eurosceptic party is Free Citizens’ Party. So far, the party has failed to win seats on the national level. In the 2010 elections, it obtained 0.74% of the vote; in 2013, the year of the most recent parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic, it obtained 2.46% of the vote. The Free Citizens’ Party was successful at the European level in the most recent EP elections, obtaining 5.24% of the vote, with party chairman Petr Mach taking a seat as MEP.

Although the Free Citizens’ Party was not established until 2009, media reports had anticipated the establishment of such a party several years earlier, stemming from tensions within Civic Democratic Party (ODS). After Václav Klaus left the helm of ODS, Mirek Topolánek became the party leader, and his attitude regarding European integration was more conciliatory than the one of his predecessor. But a Eurosceptic platform was in existence within ODS at the same time. It drafted the Czech Eurorealism Manifesto, and in fact had done so by 2001. The moderate stance of ODS was reinforced with the party’s election to government in 2006. Countervailing tendencies were emphasized with the party’s 19th Congress in 2008, when it adopted a resolution leaving the decision on ratification of the Lisbon Treaty to its parliamentary and senatorial clubs. In other words, the Lisbon Treaty was neither approved nor resolutely rejected. Before the Congress, Mach, who had been a long-time ODS member and a former advisor to Václav Klaus and headed the party’s dissident wing, stated that the establishment of a new party hinged solely on the outcome of the Congress. His party, the Free Citizens’ Party, came into being in February 2009, with the organization of its constitutive assembly.

Kaniok (2014) classified the Free Citizens’ Party as a hard Eurosceptic party, noting that it may not be labelled a monothematic party since, apart from its emphasis on the European issue and bolstered by an equally strong accent on the theme of freedom, the party fails to fulfil a single criterion of Mudde’s (1999) monothematic party concept. Instead, the Free Citizens’ Party gradually expanded its thematic agenda, in particular its party program. It may be classified as a niche party, at least from the standpoint of European issues, because of the attention it pays to European integration versus other Czech parties.

The next party, analysed in our paper, is ANO 2011. In November 2011, a billionaire of Slovak origin and the owner of the biggest agro-chemical company in the Czech Republic, Andrej Babiš, released a document entitled the “Action of Dissatisfied Citizens,” in which he criticized the existing situation in Czech politics and the politicians, calling on the citizens to take part in an initiative towards “a more just society, and a functional state with the rule of law.” (ANO 2011). Populist claims effectively substituted a clearer profile of the party (established shortly before the 2013 election) in terms of party families or left-right division. This corresponds to the high proportion of valence issues (as opposed to positional issues) in ANO’s election platform, which exceeded all other parties’ space in their respective platforms (Eibl 2014). The initiative became the basis for the ANO 2011 party, which rolled
out a very intensive election campaign before the 2013 election and finished with 18.65 per cent of the vote (47 out of 200 seats) and eventually became part of the new government alongside ČSSD and KDU-ČSL.

The ideologically vague profile of the party also applied for its attitudes towards the European integration. The EU-related statements in the 2013 election manifesto of the party was limited either to the general need of representation of the interests of the Czech Republic at the European level or to a goal of an effective use of European funds (ANO 2013; Havlík, Havlík 2014). Nevertheless, ANO applied for membership in the Alliance of Liberal and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) and eventually became a member of one of the most pro-European political parties. The Europeanization of ANO and pro-European candidates of the party for the 2014 EP elections moved the party to the camp of parties having generally positive (or at least not negative) attitude to the European Union.

Dawn of Direct Democracy (henceforth as Dawn) was founded by Czech-Japanese businessman Tomio Okamura, owner of a travel agency as well as a company that imported Japanese food. In 2012, Okamura was elected to the Senate and wanted to run in the historic first direct presidential elections in January 2013, but the Interior Ministry barred his candidacy for having an insufficient number of valid petition signatures. Despite the fact that his Dawn movement was registered just a few months before the 2013 general election, it was able to gain 6.9 per cent of votes and 14 seats out of 200. Strong anti-establishment rhetoric and Okamura’s adamant refusal to participate in any governing coalition left the movement in opposition.

The key element of Dawn’s discourse was an unending emphasis on direct democracy as the most important element of any proposed reform of the political system. The current setup of the political system of the Czech Republic – a representative parliamentary democracy with a proportional voting system – was understood by Okamura as the main culprit of the political crisis. Direct democracy would be further supplemented by a reform of the voting system, the option of recalling politicians in office, material responsibility, and the introduction of a presidential system. Only a model of direct democracy was understood as “actual” democracy, in contrast to what Okamura characterized as “demo-democracy ruled by godfather-like party mafias” (Úsvit 2013). The European integration was not a topic of prominent importance for the party. Dawn preferred an economic form of European integration and refused a Europe of “non-systemic subsidies, allowances and bureaucrats” (Úsvit 2013), which moved the party to the camp of soft-Eurosceptic political parties.

4. Analysis

When it comes to the analysis, the quality and quantity of data excludes any reasonable statistical analysis both at the aggregate and at the individual level. Regarding the former, overall dataset is biased by a simple fact that majority of the press releases were produced by ODS (64%). This kind of disproportion among analysed parties inevitably influences the results of such analysis which could be hardly interpreted. Concerning the latter, as half

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3 The Senate is the upper house of the Czech parliament.
of the analysed parties produced less than 10 press releases, any reasonable quantitative method cannot be used per se. Nevertheless, despite this pessimistic note regarding robust quantitative analysis, our dataset can be well analysed in a qualitative interpretative way.

As a first step, we computed mean values for both variables (Euroscepticism and Populism) for each analysed party. These values are reported in Table 4 as unstandardized numbers showing both the degree of Euroscepticism and Populism in press releases.

### Table 4: Mean values of Euroscepticism and Populism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Mean Euroscepticism (0-2)</th>
<th>Mean Populism (0-3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ODS</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSO</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANO</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Úsvit</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: authors own calculation

When looking at the Table 4, it is noticeable that there are two clearly Eurosceptic parties – ODS and particularly SSO. On the other hand, for ANO Euroscepticism does not seem to be a source of inspiration as there is not one Eurosceptic message in the analysed press releases. According to our coding, only SSO repeatedly expressed hard Eurosceptic stance while both ODS and Úsvit – if using Euroscepticism – worked only with its soft version.

When it comes to Populism, there is less variety among parties, particularly in the cases of SSO, ODS and Úsvit. All three parties reached very similar values while ANO seems to be – quite surprisingly – the least Populist party. When analysing dimensions of populism, there seems to be a clear dominance of people-centrism (particularly in the case of ODS where 22 such remarks were found) above other dimensions (anti-establishment scoring only 7 times and popular sovereignty only 3 times). Generally speaking, the Euro-populism of Czech political parties seems to be very moderate as we found only two press releases where at least two dimensions of Populism were identified.

As next step, we re-calculated absolute mean values for Euroscepticism and Populism into a standardized numbers expressing percentage share of both variables for each party. This enabled us to place all analysed parties at two dimensional chart expressing relation between Euroscepticism and Populism.
What does Chart 1 tell us? First, there is no strong and straightforward relation between Euroscepticism and Populism in the Czech Republic. It is true that political parties that are Eurosceptic express a remarkable degree of Populism, but there is no positive correlation in sense that the higher the degree of Euroscepticism is, the higher the degree of Populism is – the most Eurosceptic party (SSO) is less Populist than ODS which seems to be the most populist party from all the analysed ones. Quite surprisingly, ANO which is usually reported as the typical Czech populist party (Havlík 2015), scored less than SSO, Úsvit and ODS in Populism. The answer explaining this finding may be in the nature of the electoral campaign (which was covered by a lot of analysed press releases). While ODS strongly focused on the referendum concerning the EU common currency (which inevitably means using some sort of populist arguments), the ANO campaign was run by EU specialists and former career diplomats⁴ whose presence could have softened and polished party rhetoric. Last but not least, one has to take into account that the Czech 2014 EP elections were held in a specific context. Major political parties were exhausted after early parliamentary elections which took place in October 2013, for example concerning funds available for the campaign. Therefore the general profile of the EP elections campaign was very low. Impact of the second order characteristics of the EP election was also limited as the new coalition government took power only a couple of weeks before the campaign started.

⁴ The party list was led by Pavel Telička, former Member of the European Commission. Other places on the list were occupied by career diplomats or EU specialists.
For the second, when it comes to the relation between Populism and Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic, Populism seems to be a substantially weaker partner – all values recorded for Populism were two or three times lower than the values found for Euroscepticism. This means that Euroscepticism – in the Czech Republic – inspires itself in Populism while the opposite relation does not exist – ANO as the least Populist party scored value 0 for Euroscepticism. This dominance of Euroscepticism above Populism can be explained by several reasons. The first of them can be identified in the specific characters of the EU political system which is far from being a standard liberal and a representative democracy. As there are no salient issues (e.g. taxes, social security) at stake, populist parties do not have much opportunity to express the same degree of Populism as in the case of domestic competition. The definition of Populism we used focuses on criticism of the establishment and the people. Both issues are problematic in the context of the EU political system. There is no clear and identifiable EU establishment which can be contested in the elections. The same applies regarding “the EU people”. Moreover, neither elite criticism nor people-centrism can be in the context of low profile EP elections considered as important topics for the voters. Additionally, EU political competition is very specific. As the EP elections have only indirect impact on the composition of the European Commission – which can be seen as an institution close to “EU government” – their attractiveness for Populist parties is also limited.

5. Conclusion

As already mentioned in the introduction, Euroscepticism and Populism, however defined, are often regarded as two sides of the same coin, both in public discourse and in academic debates. Be it because of the normative perception of the two terms or for some other reasons, the Eurosceptic political parties are very often seen (are rather accused of) being populist. And vice versa, populist political parties are almost automatically perceived as Eurosceptic. Our paper tried to challenge this “common wisdom” by in depth analysis of one suitable party system – in this case the Czech Republic - which represents a party system where mix of Eurosceptic and Populist parties has recently emerged.

Our analysis has revealed that there is no clear and straightforward mutual relation between Euroscepticism and Populism in the Czech Republic. Looking at the behaviour of either Eurosceptic or Populist parties in the times when the EU issues were particularly salient, we have found out that these two phenomena do not go hand in hand. While the Eurosceptic parties did not dare to use Populist tools, Populist parties did not do the same with Euroscepticism. Euroscepticism thus appears to be a stronger factor in the mutual relation between Euroscepticism and Populism. In other words; it is more likely that Eurosceptics will tend to be Populists while Populists do not need to be Eurosceptics. Such Eurosceptic strategy seems to be logical. EU topics that are important for Eurosceptics (for example, the Euro, distribution of competencies between EU and Member States etc.) voters usually consider as unattractive. However, for Eurosceptics the EU issues are often key parts of their program and identity. They therefore can try to increase the attractiveness of these

5 Composition of the European Commission still remains in the hand of EU member states. Concerning the European Parliament elections, the Lisbon Treaty only refers by article 18(7) to the President of the Commission. He/she should be chosen with regard to the account of the elections to the European Parliament.
low profile topics by using Populist tools. On the contrary, the EU topics do not necessarily mean important issues for Populists. As we have demonstrated by the analysis of ANO 2011 attitudes, Populist formations can adopt a pro-European attitude without losing its voters as they simply do not care about the European Integration.

We are aware that our research has a lot of shortcomings and produces perhaps more questions than conclusions. We took into account relatively short period of six months. One could argue that if we had covered a longer time span, for example the whole electoral cycle, the results could have been more reliable and representative. This could be true as we would have data not biased by the European Parliament elections. However, due to lasting and repeating changes in the Czech party landscape, such approach is impossible. Both ANO 2011 and Úsvit became relevant parties only since October 2013. Before early parliamentary elections, the party scene and its composition were different. It, inter alia, consisted of parties which during 2010-2013 electoral term became relevant but before the early election their existence came practically to an end.

Another potential problem concerns the type of data we used. It is very difficult to find data of the same quality and quantity for each party – particularly when one deals with low profile issues as the EU politics for the Czech political parties represents. Replacing press releases with for example Twitter or Facebook entries is not a solution in the case of the Czech Republic as almost each party use these social networks as reminders for their statements and press releases. The analysis of party manifestos is not suitable as an alternative choice because they are rigid documents that cannot sensitively react to current events. Hence, there is the apparent question of how to do research on Populism expressed not as a general approach but related to one specific arena.

The third problem deals with the exclusion of the Czech Communists who are strong and long-time lasting representative of Czech Euroscepticism (Riishøj 2007: 526-527, Esparza 2012). Having them included into the analysis, the findings could be different or perhaps more robust. Due to the lack of data, this was impossible. However, we admit that without KSČM the picture of the Czech Euroscepticism and Populism is incomplete.

Last but not least, we are aware that case study as a way of approach towards the relation between Euroscepticism and Populism has its own limits. Research based upon comparative design could produce more convincing and interesting results. Such an effort would have to inevitably face and solve at least two problems. The first of them concerns the availability of the comparable data across EU countries. The second one regards decreasing stability in party systems of the EU Member States. Accelerating tempo of changes which are inter alia affecting position and relevance of political parties makes it very difficult to grasp party systems. On the other hand, events such as the refugee crisis, which are visibly involving both the EU and its Member States, add importance and attractiveness to the further researching of the relation between Populism and approaches towards the European Integration.

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6 A typical example of such party represents Věci Veřejné (Public Affairs, VV). VV participated between 2010 and 2012 in a coalition government consisting of ODS, VV and Tradition-Responsibility-Prosperity 09 (TOP 09). In April 2012 several Members of House of Deputies elected for VV left the party and established a new political movement Liberal Democracy (LIDEM). However, both “old” VV and LIDEM quickly became only marginal players in the Czech party landscape. For details on VV see Havlík-Hloušek 2014.
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