

EU's Humanitarian and Civil Protection Aid. Italy's Eccentric and ECHO-consistent Policy

Fulvio Attinà¹

Abstract: *This paper analyses the coherence of the aid to countries in need of humanitarian and civil protection assistance given separately by ECHO and the EU Member States, with an emphasis on Italy that appears as an eccentric case. Section one is about the humanitarian aid burden of the EU and the major European donor countries in the years 1999-2012. The analysis draws attention to the existing coherence at the world level and also to the difference existing in the aid to the countries of the Middle East and North Africa region. Section two analyses and shows the consistency of Italy's aid with the ECHO's. In the Conclusions, the coherence of the EU's and states' aid and the consistency of Italy's aid are shortly discussed in view of the existing shared powers in the humanitarian and civil protection policy area.*

Keywords: *disasters, emergencies, civil protection, European Union, humanitarian aid, ECHO, cooperation policy, Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Mediterranean politics*

Humanitarian and civil protection aid is given by national governments and international organisations to countries in need of funds to save lives, alleviate suffering during and after human-made and natural disasters, and to prevent and temper the impact of such events by promoting preparedness programmes and mechanisms. These goals are met by funding actions like the provision of food, water and sanitation, shelter, health services and other items of assistance to help the affected people and facilitate the return to normal life conditions.

Humanitarian and civil protection actions and programmes are of great concern to the European Union and the object of a policy area which is shared with the Member States (MSs). This study draws the attention of concerned students and practitioners to the existence of highly similar approaches towards this policy area and to some implications of it. In the present paper, the EU's and MSs' official aid is the amount of Euros spent by ECHO and the governments of the EU countries to fund actions and programmes in

¹ Fulvio Attinà is a Professor of Political Science and International Relations, and Jean Monnet Chair Ad Personam at the University of Catania. E-mail: attinaf@unict.it.

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response to humanitarian emergencies caused by natural disasters and human-triggered tragedies in foreign countries. Such official aid is given to foreign state governments, international organizations, private companies and non-governmental organizations to implement, in the aid-receiving countries, one or more of the following responses (a) humanitarian actions and assistance, (b) disaster rescue operations and post-disaster reconstruction programmes, and (c) programmes for natural disaster prevention and for post-conflict peace building and state reconstruction.

The administration officers of the aid recipient country and other implementing actors like international and non-governmental organisations' officers and appointees carry out the humanitarian and protection actions. Though implementing the actions is in the hands of others, it is in the responsibility and concern of the donor country to finance actions in agreement with the shared humanitarian principles. Aid must be given firstly to the most in need, weak and vulnerable human beings (proportionality), by refraining from discriminating any group of people (impartiality), and by supporting any side in a conflict and dispute (neutrality), and leaving out any political, economic, military or other intent (independence).

In the first part of the present paper, the yearly expenditure of ECHO and the EU major donor countries is analysed to test whether they share the same or near the same aid allocation approach. In view of the eccentric position of Italy's aid policy that turns up in the first part of this study, in the second part the analysis of the correspondence of the Italian funds to the ECHO's need assessment measurement, the GVCA and FCA indexes, demonstrates Italy's good compliance to the proportionality principle of humanitarian action and also the good consistency with the EU's policy towards humanitarian and civil protection aid. In the conclusions, the reasons for keeping the humanitarian aid as shared powers area of the EU and the Member States are briefly remarked upon, and the meaning of Italy's eccentric aid is discussed.

Do EU and the MSs share the same approach towards countries in need?

Numerous studies exist about the question of what is the primary reason in determining the international aid of rich and technologically advanced states like the European ones (see, for instance, Holden, 2009; Kevlihan, DeRouen and Biglaiser, 2014; Kono and Montinola, 2012; McKinley and Little, 1979; Merket, 2013; Reynaert, 2011; Rudloff, Scott and Blew, 2013; Schneider and Tobin, 2013). In this chapter, the issue about the determinants of humanitarian and civil protection aid is analysed by responding to two questions. First, *Do the EU Member States share the same approach towards humanitarian needs and civil protection aid?* Second, *Do the Member States' aid matches the need-goal criteria of the ECHO's aid policy?* The meaning of the first question is easy to recognise. Thanks to the integration process, the European states are expected to become similar to one another, and share values and interests. In the integration process, political decisions and institutional mechanisms produce single policies and are expected to also cause the convergence of the policies the member countries prefer to keep as shared competence policies. The foreign aid policy, including the humanitarian and disaster one, is a shared


policy of the European Union system. In the areas of cooperation and humanitarian aid, the EU has power to implement common actions and policies, but this does not prevent the MSs to exercise their own powers in the same policy area. Therefore, the analysis of the MSs' aid policies has to prove the existence of convergence and the nearing of these policies to one another and to the EU's, namely the ECHO's, aid policy. The meaning of the second question, instead, refers to the policy principles and mechanisms the European Commission employs to run, through ECHO, the EU competence in the humanitarian, and today also civil protection, aid policy. On such a ground, the distance of the MSs allocation from, or closeness to, the EU's aid allocation to third countries is a reasonable test of whether the MSs' aid funds are need-oriented as much as the EU funds are.

In the present study, the first question has been explored by analysing the data of the EU's and MSs' aid allocation to six regions of the world (see also Attinà, 2014) and to the countries of the MENA region (see also Attinà, 2015). In the second part of this paper, the analysis of the allocation of Italy's aid to individual recipient countries aims to answer to the second question. The analysis employs the data of EDRIS, the European Disaster Response Information System operated by ECHO, the European Commission's Directorate-General of Humanitarian Assistance and Civil Protection. EDRIS contains real-time information on the humanitarian aid ECHO and the EU MSs give to all low-income states, as defined by the World Bank. All information entered in EDRIS is transmitted electronically to FTS, the Financial Tracking System managed by United Nations OCHA (Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Aid) Geneva. FTS contains information reported also by non-EU Members States and the recipients of humanitarian funding².

In the time period of concern to the present study, 1999-2012, the whole humanitarian and civil protection aid of ECHO and the MSs to countries in all the world regions amounted to around € 33 billion. ECHO's aid amounted to 41.5 % of the total while the MSs' aid amounted to 58.5 % of the total, but 11 MSs donated almost 97 % of this portion. The donation of the twelfth country, Luxembourg, was much lower than the donation size of the eleventh large donor country. On such premise, the present analysis is made on the *Top Eleven Direct Donor* EU countries, from here on TEDD countries.

The size of the aid given by each of the eleven states to all low-income states in the 14 years under observation generates a dichotomy within the TEDD group separating the lower-donors, which are Spain, Italy, Ireland, Finland, France, and Belgium, from the upper-donors, namely Denmark, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden (Figure 1). Though the economy of the TEDD countries was not stable in the 14-years, all of them had, and continue to have, large economic resources, and to belong to the class of the most prosperous countries in the world. Large economic resources enable a country to act as a large donor, but economic power is not the only root of foreign aid. Accordingly, the TEDD countries' rank order in total aid does not match the rank order of any country wealth index like the Gross Domestic Product per capita index. Sweden and the Netherlands, for example, are higher on the aid scale than on the GDP per capita scale. Denmark and Ireland are examples of the reverse case.

² See EDRIS website [European Disaster Response Information System](#) and FTS website [Financial Tracking Service](#).


Figure 1 – EU Top Eleven Direct Donor MSs' total aid, 1999-2012

Data source: EDRIS

The direct aid of Sweden, Germany, Belgium and Finland has been growing progressively during the 14-years but the direct aid of the other TEDD States goes up and down from a year to the next. This may be explained by the view of humanitarian and disaster aid as response to events occurring irregularly. But in our times, disaster and emergency events are hardly unexpected and random occurrences as they are tied to structural conditions like the environment degradation that is practically uncontrolled in the Global South, the poverty conditions of large masses of people that are entrenched in the world economic system, and the diffusion of violence that affects many weak states. Consequently, assistance and aid to states in disaster-prone areas and in emergency-state conditions is relentlessly needed and can be provided only by the wealthy states that have advanced capabilities of disaster and crisis management and by international organizations that have appropriate resources and know-how to employ in this area of problems.

In this analysis, the funds given to countries in need are aggregated into region data. The regions are Africa, Asia, Caribbean & Latin America, Central & Southern Asia, Eastern Europe & Balkans, and MENA (Middle East and North Africa). The list of the countries of each region is the EDRIS list (See Appendix). All the TEDD countries and the ECHO allocate similar quotas of aid to the six regions (Figure 2). Hence, the aid distribution preferences of the EU states are close to one another and to the ECHO's aid distribution as well. Only the ECHO's Eastern Europe & Balkans region quota is different from, and significantly larger than, the TEDD's quota. This is easily understood considering the Union's enlargement and neighbourhood policies. On the contrary, the ECHO's Caribbean & Latin America region quota is smaller than the TEDD's quota. This indicates that the EU does not consider those countries of importance to the common interest and that some countries like Italy and Spain prioritize this region's emergency and humanitarian needs.

Figure 2 – Distribution of the TEDD and ECHO aid to six regions (percent quotas), 1999-2012



Data source: EDRIS

In general, the countries that are members of the total-aid upper-donor group (Denmark, United Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands, and Sweden), and the countries of the lower-donor group (Spain, Italy, Ireland, Finland, France, and Belgium) are also in the upper and lower echelons of the aggregate aid scale of each region. But there are exceptions to this. Denmark and the Netherlands, two members of the total-aid upper-donor group, are lower donors to the Caribbean & Latin America and the Asia region. Sweden, the total-aid highest donor, is a lower donor to the Eastern Europe & Balkans region. On the opposite, Italy and Spain, two members of the total-aid lower-donor group, are in the upper-donor group of the Caribbean & Latin America and Asia regions; Italy also in the Eastern Europe & Balkans region; Spain also in the MENA region.

As the sum of the aid to the first and second recipient region is used as indicator of the individual country's aid concentration, Italy shows up as the country with the lowest aid concentration and the fairest allocation to regions (Table 1). Italy amasses

aid funds on the first two regions much less than the other countries do. The aid ratio to MENA, the second region in the row, is also a remarkable feature of Italy's policy. This supports the declarations of attention to this region frequently released to the public by the Italian policy-makers. France, a reputed great power of the Mediterranean area and a regular player of the Middle East politics, allocates to the MENA countries a quota of humanitarian aid smaller than the Italian one. Spain, however, is the country prioritizing MENA in the distribution of state aid for humanitarian and civil protection needs.


Table 1 – TEDD countries' aid concentration

	Aid to the 1 st region (%)	Aid to the 2 nd region (%)	Aid to the 1 st and 2 nd regions (%)
Italy	31 (Africa)	24 (MENA)	55
Germany	44 (Africa)	19 (Cen- & South. Asia)	63
France	47 (Africa)	18 (MENA)	65
Denmark	49 (Africa)	18 (MENA)	67
Finland	53 (Africa)	16 (Cen- & South. Asia)	69
Spain	53 (MENA)	17 (Caribbean & Latin America)	70
Sweden	55 (Africa)	15 (MENA)	70
UK	59 (Africa)	14 (MENA, Cen- & South. Asia)	73
Netherlands	60 (Africa)	13 (Cen- & South. Asia)	73
Belgium	61 (Africa)	14 (MENA)	75
Ireland	70 (Africa)	11 (Cen- & South. Asia)	81

Data source: EDRIS

In the following, it is tested how much near to, or distant from one another are the humanitarian and civil protection funds allocated by ECHO and the TEDDs to individual countries of the MENA region, which is of great interest to all the European states in these years. In this case, differently from the rank order of the total aid (see Figure 1 above), the TEDD countries set in straight decreasing order (Figure no.3).


Figure no.3 – TEDD countries’ aid to the MENA region, 1999-2012




Data source: EDRIS

But the important feature of this set of aid funds concerns the aid-receiving countries. Three groups are distinguished on the base of the size of the donation allocated by the TEDD countries and ECHO. Eight out of the 14 MENA states have been small receivers, namely Israel, Jordan, Turkey, Iran, and Libya, and very small receivers, namely Morocco, Egypt, and Tunisia. Four of them are mid-level receivers, i.e. Algeria, Yemen, Lebanon, and Syria. The great receivers of the whole European aid are Iraq and the Palestine Territories. Separating ECHO’s from TEDDs’ aid, another important feature is worth noting. The Palestine Territories are the only great receiver of the ECHO’s aid while Yemen, Lebanon, Algeria, Iraq and Syria are mid-level receivers and the remaining eight MENA countries are small and very small receivers of ECHO’s aid (Figure no. 4). In the series of the aid given by the 11 major European donor countries, instead, Iraq jumps to the top position, a bit ahead of the Palestinian Territories, while Algeria falls back to the small-recipient group (Figure no. 5).

Figure no. 4: ECHO’s aid to individual MENA countries, 1999-2012



Data source: EDRIS

Figure no. 5: TEDD countries' aid to individual MENA countries, 1999-2012

Data source: EDRIS

In conclusion, the EDRIS data make apparent few but important differences in the country allocation priorities the Commission attaches to the ECHO aid approach and the TEDD countries' policy-makers attach to their own humanitarian aid approach. In particular, Algeria is seen as an important target by ECHO rather than by the TEDDs. On the opposite, aid to Iraq gets the highest score from the TEDDs but not from all of them. Knowledge about the different position of the EU countries towards the 2003 American-led invasion of Iraq helps us recognize that the TEDD countries divided themselves into two aid-donor groups to that country as they did in responding to the war on Saddam Hussein declared by the American ally. In such a perspective, it has been remarked that there are different types of aid allocation to MENA countries and a four-type sorting of the major European countries' approach to emergency aid allocation to MENA countries has been presented (see Attinà, 2015). 'Type One' countries prioritize Iraq and the Palestine Territories as large recipients. This is the biggest group including four North European countries, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Sweden. The "Type Two" group comprises Germany, Finland, and Spain. They give large aid to the Palestine Territories and Iraq and also significant funds to other countries like Syria and Yemen. "Type Three" countries are Belgium and France. They give about half the total aid to one country, the Palestine Territories. Lastly, Italy and the UK are the "Type Four", residual group allocating aid in a disparate way. The United Kingdom concentrates aid on Iraq and to a lower extent to Syria and Yemen. Italy is the only country concentrating aid on Lebanon, where Italy contributed significantly to the UNIFIL peace operations up to 2008, and in a lower amount to the Palestinians and Iraq.

Italy's approach

The policy-makers of contemporary Italy have always pledged strong commitment to humanitarian values as guiding principles of the country's foreign policy, and to humanitarian assistance as an undertaking ever missing from Italy's international

responsibilities. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA, is in charge of Italy's humanitarian policy. In the MOFA, humanitarian affairs are assigned to the Directorate-General for Development Cooperation (Italian acronym, DGCS), and are the care of the Office VI, known as the Office of humanitarian and emergency intervention.

In the period of time taken into account, Italy's humanitarian aid has been ruled as required by Law no. 49, titled *New provisions governing Italian cooperation with developing countries*, which was approved by the Italian Parliament in February 1987. The competence of the MOFA and its DGCS to manage Italy's humanitarian and emergency affairs in foreign relations is stated soon in the Law no. 49 as Art. 1.4 recalls the management of 'special initiatives' as a MOFA competence. Such initiatives are humanitarian and civil protection actions as Art. 11.1 specifies³. Official documents of interest to the analyst are also (a) the Annual Report to the Parliament on the *Implementation of the development cooperation*; (b) the Annual Forecast and Programme Report on the *Development cooperation activities*, both prepared by the DGCS; (c) the two documents titled *Guidelines and strategic programme of Italy's development cooperation* that have been published in 2012 and 2014 to state the priorities and lines of action of the next three years on the legacy of the past experience; and (d) the paper prepared by the Workgroup DGCS-ONG, titled *Guidelines for Humanitarian Aid. Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative. Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship (2012-2015)*. The *Annual report on the Italian contribution to the activities of banks and development funds in the multilateral sector*, prepared by the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance, is also of interest to the study of the Italian involvement in the multilateral aid programs and actions⁴.

It is worth noting that the Guidelines 2012 document, on page 20, asserts the convenience of containing the number of Italy's aid recipient countries in order to get the strongest impact from the aid, and the Guidelines 2014 Document supports the impact goal in the recipient countries by arguing for conforming Italy's approach towards foreign aid to this practice as common practice of the EU countries. The document proposes to choose the countries worth receiving aid by employing seven *principal criteria* including poverty, serious humanitarian emergencies, closeness to Italy (geographical as well as defined on the basis of historical, economic and migration ties), ongoing conflict and/or fragile democratization conditions, critical minority presence, and existing relations

³ The extraordinary initiatives referred to in Article 1.4 shall consist of:


- a) sending emergency assistance missions; transferring goods, equipment and food supplies purchased, preferably, in situ or in the region; granting funding at the bilateral level;
- b) launching initiatives revolving primarily around health and installing basic infrastructure, especially in the agricultural and health and sanitation fields, which is vital to the immediate satisfaction of basic human needs in areas hit by disasters, hunger or famine and characterised by high mortality rates;
- c) the creation, in situ, of systems to collect, store, transport and distribute goods, equipment and food supplies;
- d) the use, in agreement with all the Ministries concerned and of local authorities and public bodies, of the resources and personnel required for the timely achievement of the objectives referred to at letters a), b) and c);
- e) the use of non-governmental organisations recognised as eligible in accordance with this law, both directly and through by financing programmes drawn up by such organisations and agreed with the Directorate General for Development Cooperation.

⁴ All these documents are available on the MOFA-DGCS website.

involving duties and attachments on Italy's side. Immediately after this, the Guidelines list the 24 priority countries for Italy's aid including Senegal, Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Guinea in Sub-Saharan Africa; Egypt, Tunisia, Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq in the MENA; Albania in Eastern Europe/Balkans; Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Cuba in Caribbean and Latin America; Afghanistan and Pakistan in Central and Southern Asia; Myanmar and Vietnam in Asia. In agreement with the so-called exit strategy approved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Guidelines 2014 Document cut the number of the priority countries to 20 for the years 2014-2016. The countries deleted from the 2012 list are Ecuador, Guinea, Iraq, and Vietnam. The Guidelines 2014 Document also asserts that Italy's humanitarian actions will be consistent with, and complementary to, the strategy lines of the country's aid to development policy. Accordingly, the humanitarian aid will prioritize intervention in the Mediterranean, Sahel and Horn of Africa areas. Lastly, in agreement with the European Commission's policy, the DGCS Office VI will focus Italy's humanitarian actions on natural disaster risk reduction and on strengthening the resilience capability of the countries hurt by external shocks.

Italy's total aid, which is the second lowest of all the TEDDs' in the time period of concern here, has gone up and down but loosely growing in size from 1999 on (Figure no. 6). The goal of this last section is to check, with the data of the aid to individual countries, whether and, in the positive case, how much the somewhat peculiar aid of Italy adjusts to the need-oriented method of ECHO's aid allocation.

Figure no. 6 - Italy's total aid, 1999-2012



Data source: EDRIS

The European Commission ECHO Directorate-General identifies the people and countries receiving the EU humanitarian and civil protection funds by assessing the size and urgency of the needs. ECHO's assessment is the workout of a series of tools including the evaluation made by field's experts and desks, the country's score in the WFP's (World Food Programme) food insecurity needs assessment, and two instruments of need assessment and measurement that have been produced by the European Commission

Joint Research Centre scientists, namely the Global Vulnerability and Crisis Assessment (GVCA) and the Forgotten Crisis Assessment (FCA). GVCA exploits the grades of two multifactorial indexes, the *vulnerability* and the *crisis index*, to classify all the low-income countries on a 12-score scale. The degree of *vulnerability* of the country in the event of a disaster at a definite time (or year) is calculated from data about the socio-economic and health conditions of the population like under-5 children weight and mortality, inequality in income, and the number of internally displaced people. The existing *crisis* conditions are calculated from data about current and recent violent conflicts and natural disasters, and the presence of a large number of refugees. The higher the country's score, the more the country is in need of humanitarian assistance. The FCA index, instead, is an instrument to recognize severe protracted humanitarian crisis situations, namely those where there is no political commitment by domestic and external actors to solve the crisis, and the affected populations receive no or insufficient international aid. Such forgotten crises may concern minorities and specific groups of people within a country, which is not necessarily itself considered as being in crisis. Also FCA classifies countries on a 12-score scale.

In the remaining part of this paper, the consistency of Italy's humanitarian aid to the ECHO's Global Needs and Forgotten Crisis assessment is used to assess the need-orientation of the allocation of Italy's aid. Consistency is inferred from the analysis of the data about the recipient countries and how much money they get from Italy and from ECHO.

In 1999-2012, Italy funded humanitarian actions and civil protection programmes worth € 775 and half million in 108 low-income states. 10 % of the amount was given to international organisations like the World Health Organisation, the World Food Program, and the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and to Italian ministries like the Health Ministry and MOFA, for actions and programs to implement, in most of the cases, in more than one country. In EDRIS, these organisations are labelled as Implementing Agency. The country of implementation of such actions and programmes is labelled as Country Not Specified.

The total aid to a recipient country varies from € 100 million to Afghanistan down to € 22 thousand to Costa Rica. The 108 Italian-aid-recipient countries are grouped into 5 Log-10 classes. From the highest to the lowest, the classes gather the countries that received funds over € 100 million (class 5), € 10 million to € 100 million (class 4), € 1 million to € 10 million (class 3), € 100 thousand to € 1 million (class 2), and up to € 100 thousand (class 1). Italy supplies different lumps of aid to a large number of countries (Table no. 2.) but allocates the largest portion of the aid, namely 60 % of the total, to 15 % of the countries, i.e. the 16 countries of the classes 4 and 5. Briefly, the policy-makers and officers of Italy's humanitarian assistance take care of a large number of countries in humanitarian need conditions but concentrate large donations on a small quota of countries in need.

Table 2 – Log-10 Classes of Italy's aid recipient countries, 1999-2012

Classes	Class aid size	Total aid amount of the class €	Recipient countries: number	Recipient countries: examples
5	> € 100 million	100.306.781	1	Afghanistan (alone)
4	€ 10 million to € 100 million	362.449.941	15	Lebanon, Albania, Palestine T., Somalia, Sudan, Pakistan, Iraq, Angola, Uganda, Ethiopia,
3	€ 1 million to € 10 million	223.925.444	52	Iran, Nigeria, Thailand, Armenia, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Colombia, India, Honduras, Libya, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone
2	€ 100 thousand to € 1 million	12.355.783	34	Madagascar, Tonga, Chile, Tajikistan, Morocco, East Timor, Congo, Namibia, Cuba, Nepal, Senegal, Ecuador, Djibouti
1	< € 100 thousand	222.821	6	Malawi, Uruguay, Cambodia
<i>IGOs, NGOs, Italian Ministries</i>		76.323.387	<i>Countries not specified</i>	
<i>Total aid</i>		775.654.157		

Data source: EDRIS

The last question of the present analysis is *Do the policy-makers and officers of Italy's humanitarian assistance programmes apportion aid chiefly to countries in severe need conditions?* To answer this question, the strategy of this analysis is to check whether the Italian allocation policy fits to the global needs assessment that ECHO employs to implement the EU's policy, i.e. to the GVCA and FCA indexes.

The first test of the Italy and ECHO need assessment agreement consists in checking whether the countries high on the GVCA Index scale are also in Italy's highest aid class. The analysis gives back a broadly positive result as all but 4 of the 15 ECHO 12-score countries receive high donation funds from Italy. Afghanistan is the largest recipient of Italy's aid, followed by 10 countries receiving a class-4 money amount. Liberia, Pakistan, and Russian Federation-Chechnya, in class-3, are the 'out-layer' of Italy's high aid classes along with Congo, in class-2. They get from Italy less than they are entitled to get in agreement with the ECHO GVCA Index.

Table 3 – Countries with the highest score on the GCVA Index scale (2012) and their position in Italy’s aid class (aggregate data 1999-2012)

Country	GNA Final Index (a)	Italy’s aid class (b)
Afghanistan	12	5
Central African Republic	12	4
Chad	12	4
Congo DR	12	4
Congo	12	2
Haiti	12	4
Liberia	12	3
Mali	12	4
Myanmar	12	4
Pakistan	12	3
Russian Fed.-Chechnya	12	3
Somalia	12	4
South Sudan	12	4
Sudan	12	4
Yemen	12	4

Source: (a) 2012 - v.1 (June) - *Global Vulnerability and Crisis Assessment*, <http://echo-global-vulnerability-and-crisis.jrc.ec.europa.eu/PublicVisualization.aspx> (accessed on 01.11.2014). (b) Author’s elaboration of EDRIS data.

The mismatch of the countries low in the ECHO’s need assessment and the countries low in Italy’s aid classes is also small, and gives back a positive signal about the correspondence of the Italian need assessment to the ECHO’s (Table 4). There are three out-layers here, Albania, Argentina, and Brazil. They received aid in a small number of years. In 1999, Albania received a donation amounting to around \square 57 million for the Kosovo crisis. This country also received large donations from Italy in the preceding years. The socio-economic and political problems in this Italy-neighbour country were good reasons for such a large humanitarian donation, which has been stopped later on with the exception of a small aid in 2010. The severe economic conditions of Argentina explain the 2002 large donation of around € 5 million for the country’s humanitarian crisis that has been implemented mainly by means of programmes run by the World Health Organisation. Also the large aid to Brazil in 2005 and 2006 was given for programmes against the deterioration of the socio-economic conditions and were implemented by the Italian Foreign Affairs Ministry.

Table 4 – Countries with the lowest score on the GVCA Index scale (2012) and their position in Italy's aid class (aggregate data 1999-2012)

Country	GNA Final Index (a)	Italy's aid class (b)
Albania	1	4
Argentina	1	3
Brazil	1	3
Cuba	1	2
Kazakhstan	1	2
Korea DPR	1	3
Mongolia	1	2
Samoa	1	2
Tonga	1	2
Turkmenistan	1	1
Uruguay	1	1
Uzbekistan	1	2

Source: (a) 2012 - v.1 (June) - *Global Vulnerability and Crisis Assessment*, <http://echo-global-vulnerability-and-crisis.jrc.ec.europa.eu/PublicVisualization.aspx> (accessed on 01.11.2014). (b) Author's elaboration of EDRIS data.

Notable cases of missing agreement between the remaining classes of Italy's aid and the ECHO's need assessment scale exist to a limited extent. Many African states like Angola, Eritrea, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone are on the excess-side aid, i.e. Italy assigns to these countries funds larger than to other countries that have the same score in the GNA index. Out of Africa, this is the case of Armenia and Democratic People's Republic of Korea. On the shortage-side aid, i.e. the countries receiving from Italy less than it is expected in consistency with the ECHO need assessment, states outside of Africa are, instead, more numerous than those of the rest of the world like Cambodia, Ecuador, Kyrgyzstan, and Paraguay.

Such disagreement of the ECHO's global need assessment and Italy's funding of the humanitarian and disaster policy, however, does not upset the existing large correspondence between the two that has been highlighted by the fairly good fit at the top and bottom of the two scales. Statistically, the agreement between the GVCA Index and the Italian aid class index is confirmed by a fairly strong coefficient of positive correlation, $r = 0,501$. In other words, the higher the GVCA Index of a country is, the higher the Italian aid to the country is, and the reverse too.

The positive relation existing between Italy's aid and the vulnerability of people and countries to disaster events disappears concerning the people and countries suffering from protracted violent conflicts as measured by the ECHO's Forgotten Crisis Assessment

Index. The FCA index is intended to measure the severity of protracted violent conflicts that are hidden to the world public and neglected by the international diplomacy. The index is built like a risk analysis instrument. It employs four indicators, namely the vulnerability index, media coverage, public aid per capita, and the qualitative assessment of DG ECHO geographical units and experts. As such, it is a tool apposite to spotlight the areas of the world where humanitarian crises, as defined by the four indicators, are in place. It is less of use for rank ordering all the low-income countries, as the conditions for prolonged, unknown and neglected crises are not a feature of all the countries. In fact, the correlation coefficient of the GVCA and FCA indexes is very low, $r = 0,153$, and that of Italy's aid size and FCA index is nearly missing, $r = 0,025$. However, looking only at the countries with the FCA Index highest scores, it is notable that Italy's aid to the 10 countries which are high in the FCA Index is not small and never below the class-3 level (Table no.5) but we can't say whether it is employed to help the people of the forgotten crisis or to fund other programmes in the recipient country.

Table 5 – Countries with the highest FCA Index (2012) and their position on the GNA Index scale (2012) and Italy's aid class list (aggregate data 1999-2012)

Country	FCA Index (a)	GNA Final Index (b)	Italy's aid class (c)
Central African Republic	11	12	3
Myanmar	11	12	3
Algeria	10	8	3
Bangladesh	9	8	3
Colombia	9	11	3
India	9	11	3
Pakistan	9	12	4
Sri Lanka	9	8	3
Yemen	9	12	3
Angola	8	6	4
Mozambique	8	5	4

Source: (a) *Forgotten Crisis Assessment 2012*, <http://echo-global-vulnerability-and-crisis.jrc.ec.europa.eu/PublicVisualization.aspx?system=FCA> (accessed on 01.11.2014). (b) *2012 - v.1 (June) - Global Vulnerability and Crisis Assessment*, <http://echo-global-vulnerability-and-crisis.jrc.ec.europa.eu/PublicVisualization.aspx> (accessed on 01.11.2014). (c) Author's elaboration of EDRIS data.

The concentration of aid in few countries is plain also at the regional level with two exceptions, Asia and the Caribbean and Latin America regions (Table no. 6). In Asia, DPR of Korea, not an important GCVA country, received around the 30 % of the total aid to the region. Another 30 % was given to six countries with rather high GVCA scores but Indonesia. The remaining 30 % was divided among six countries low in GVCA scores but Cambodia. In the Caribbean and Latin America, a small sum of money has been distributed among a large number of countries but a group of six, namely Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, and Peru, received the largest quota even though only Bolivia and Haiti are high in the GVCA index. In Sub-Saharan Africa, instead, the concentration of aid to high GVCA countries is high but there are also important disagreements between high GVCA-score countries like Chad, Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Madagascar, and the Central African Republic, and the level of Italy's aid. Central and Southern Asia is the region with the highest concentration of aid to a few countries, namely Afghanistan and Pakistan, and a fair agreement of GVCA scores and Italy's aid levels, with the only exception of Kyrgyzstan, a highly vulnerable country that received a small aid from Italy. Lastly, the aid of Italy to the countries of Eastern Europe and the Balkans and the MENA regions is highly concentrated in the Balkan states, regarding Europe, and three Middle East countries, namely Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine.

Table 6 – Italy's aid by region, 1999-2012

Class	Africa		Asia		Caribbean & Latin America		Central & Southern Asia		Eastern Europe & Balkans		MENA	
	Recipient countries: No.	Total amount	Recipient countries: No.	Class total amount	Recipient countries: No.	Class total amount	Recipient countries: No.	Class total amount	Recipient countries: No.	Class total amount	Recipient countries: No.	Class total amount
5	0	-	0	-	0	-	1	100.306.781	0	-	0	-
4	8	139.427.858	0	-	0	-	1	20.850.769	3	80.309.076	3	121.862.238
3	20	72.005.273	7	22.402.879	10	65.603.339	5	18.682.077	3	8.560.020	8	36.671.857
2	13	6.355.521	5	1.794.995	7	1.685.403	5	1.415.508	2	730.352	1	410.304
1	1	70.000	1	36.300	3	136.521	1	50.000	0	-	0	-
Total	42	217.858.652	13	24.234,174	20	67.425.263	12	141.305.827	8	89.599.448	12	158.944.399

Data source: EDRIS

Conclusions

The present analysis sheds light on important aspects of the humanitarian and civil protection aid policy of the EU and the major aid-donor MSs. In particular, the analysis wants to enlarge existing knowledge about how close to one another are the MSs' and European Commission's choices of aid allocation to different areas and countries in need, and also how consistent with the ECHO's need assessment criteria is the aid of a member country like Italy. Such questions are of importance since the Commission united in a single Directorate-General the humanitarian and civil protection policy areas that were separate areas of the EU administration in the past. Such an institutional change may have impact on the Member States even though the two areas continue to be shared competence areas in the European Union system.

Regarding the EU's and MSs' aid policy, this analysis demonstrates that the EU and the MSs share the same aid allocation approach at the world level, i.e. towards six international regions. Such finding suggests the convergence effect of the integration process on the values and interests that drive the humanitarian and civil protection policy of the MSs. But the research reveals also that the EU countries dispense funds to direct humanitarian assistance and civil protection aid to a size larger than the EU's fund size. This condition is not typical of the humanitarian and civil protection aid policy but common to other external policies of common power in the EU system. As foreign aid is an important instrument of the external action of the contemporary states, the EU governments are careful not to pass such an instrument entirely to the power of the EU policy-makers. Foreign aid, including the humanitarian one, is an instrument to play for gaining political influence on the domestic and foreign affairs of the recipient countries. Direct foreign aid is also an instrument for giving to the donor's domestic groups access to the market of foreign countries. This is obtained by financing the national companies investing abroad and also the non-governmental organizations acting in the recipient countries. Lastly, giving aid has symbolic return as the country earns the reputation of being a good fellow. Such a reputation is larger when the aid is given directly to foreign countries rather than through a common office like the ECHO. On such premises, this study invites to further research about these and other possible reasons, and to assess how much such different interests impinge on the efficacy of European aid in humanitarian and civil protection matters.

The second part of this analysis focused on the aid policy of an individual country, Italy, to stress the existing difference among the MSs as this country appears as eccentric in important respects. In particular, Italy's aid has been the least region-concentrated policy of all the TEDD countries' policies, and did not look like the other TEDD countries' aid in the MENA region. The present analysis demonstrates also that Italy's aid policy shows up as consistent with the ECHO's need assessment criteria that have been devised to abide by humanitarian action principles. However, this is a provisional finding as the ECHO-consistency of the aid policy of the other EU countries is not known and remains to be analysed by research experts.

There are other topics of interest to research on in this field of study. One of these is the magnitude of the humanitarian and civil protection aid to Africa. All the TEDD

countries give the most to Africa but Spain. Apparently, this is no surprise when one considers the large number of states and the severe and numerous emergency problems of the African continent. But the analysis of Italy's aid consistency with the ECHO's GVCA index, demonstrates that Italy's aid to African countries is 'in excess' of the GVCA index score of those countries, in other terms countries in other regions are more in need than the African ones. On such knowledge, one has to investigate about the reasons for such European preference, or bias, towards delivering aid to an African country rather than to a country in more severe conditions of need in another part of the world. Whether such excess aid (relative to GVCA) is wanted by some or all the actors of the national humanitarian and disaster aid policy circle, and whether it is a matter of culture (European feelings towards Africans are deep and strong), communication (the media attention to Africa is higher, and consequently has amplifying impact on the policy-making), technical (Europe's resources and capabilities fit better to the African needs) or political (the national interest is best served supporting political cooperation and economic ventures in Africa), are conditions to investigate in order to better know the causes of such a deviant preference.

Deepening knowledge in the recently united area of humanitarian assistance and civil protection cooperation is of great concern today. Existing knowledge about humanitarian action is wide and good but the present condition of the world has broadened the problems and issues at stake and fused the study of humanitarian action with the study of natural and human-made disasters and emergencies. Accordingly, the responsibility of the EU scientist community has to meet with such a new condition.

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Appendix

Regions and member states

AFRICA – 39 member states: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Congo Dr, Cote D'Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan Republic, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

ASIA – 19 member states: Cambodia, China, East Timor, Fiji, Indonesia, DPR of Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Taiwan, Thailand, Tonga, Vanuatu, Viet Nam.

CARIBBEAN & LATIN AMERICA – 18 member states: Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru.

CENTRAL & SOUTHERN ASIA – 16 member states: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Comoros, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, Mongolia, Pakistan, Seychelles, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan.

EASTERN EUROPE & BALKANS – 19 member states: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, FYROM Macedonia, Serbia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine.

MENA (Middle East and North Africa) – 14 member states: Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Terr., Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen.