A Giant with Feet of Clay? The EU’s Ability to Develop Capabilities for Civilian Crisis Management

Rafal Domisiewicz*

Abstract: Civilian crisis management has long been considered the EU’s forte. Recent research however has questioned the EU’s claim to this specialization. I will interrogate how the EU has fared in building civilian capabilities for CSDP through a case study of the impact of the Europeanization of CCM norms in one of the newer EU member states - Poland. I investigate the domestic reverberations of an EU-level CCM governance – conceptualized as a vertical diffusion of norms - and a horizontal diffusion in the realms of policy setting, institutional adaptation, as well as in recruitment and training. I hypothesize that the European cognitive constructions and policy designs are the more likely to impact upon Polish security policy the more they resonate with the ideas embedded in the national security identity. Another intervening variable affecting the ‘translation’ of EU policy into the domestic context is state capacity. Due to weaknesses in the supply side of CCM and the refracting impact of national security identity and state capacity, I find that Europeanization has had a limited impact on the civilian response capability-building in Poland. Europeanization has been shallow, featuring adjustments on the margins rather than the core of the security policy.

Keywords: Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), civilian crisis management (CCM), Europeanization, capability-building, security governance, Polish security/defence policy

Introduction

In the 2003 European Security Strategy, the member states of the European Union underlined that the EU is “particularly well equipped” for multi-faceted crisis and post-crisis situations, requiring a broad array of capabilities, including civilian expertise (EU Council, Dec. 2003). Since 1999, when the EU agreed to develop its Common Security and Defence Policy, civilian crisis management (CCM) has become its integral part. This reflects the accommodation of the conception of Europe as a “civilian power” with the creeping “militarisation” of the EU (Kirchner, 2006, Lee-Ohlsson, 2008; Smith, 2005). The EU member states have adopted specific targets – called headline goals - and built an institutional framework to support their implementation. All but six out of twenty five crisis management operations undertaken to-date have been civilian or mixed civilian-military. It would appear that the optimistic assessment of the European Security Strategy is justified.

* Rafal Domisiewicz, PhD, is a counsellor in the Polish Foreign Ministry, presently seconded to the European External Action Service HQ in Brussels. The views expressed are author’s own. E-mail: rdomisie@connect.carleton.ca

1 For the sake of consistency, I use this nomenclature and eschew earlier variants, such as the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).
Yet, over a decade since the launch of the CSDP one review after another stresses the limited progress attained in building the capacity for civilian crisis management. In its 2011 Report on the development of the common security and defence policy following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs “regrets the scant results achieved by the Civilian Headline Goal 2010 process regarding civilian capabilities” (EP, A7-0166/2011). The 2012 report by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung notes “a lack of expertise on the part of the member states and a failure to implement existing strategies” (FES, Apr. 2012). Even the Council officials admit that a “coherence and an overall EU approach is still fairly difficult to achieve across pillar boundaries” (2010:7).

In this paper I ask whether such pessimism is warranted by interrogating how the EU has managed building civilian capabilities for CSDP. I will do so through a case-study of CCM application in one of the newer EU member states – Poland. Should the EU have succeeded in stimulating capacity-development in a new member state, this would put the critique in doubt. I shall pursue the analysis at two interlinked levels: the EU level and the member state level. At the EU level of analysis I assess whether there is coherence between the concepts, methodology and an institutionalization of CCM that would facilitate national policy adaptation. The ability to carry out new policy hinges on policy coherence, defined as “the ability to articulate policy goals and align resources to obtain them” (Rynning, 2011). At the national level, I investigate the domestic reverberations of an EU-level CCM governance (a vertical diffusion of norms), and a horizontal diffusion in the realms of policy setting, institutional adaptation, as well as in recruitment and training.

The timeframe encompasses the period of the development of CSDP and concludes with Poland’s EU Presidency in the second half of 2011. Poland’s compliance with the EU guidelines in the form of such policy outputs as the creation of a legal framework as well as means for training and recruitment would attest to an internalization of the norms of civilian crisis management. The choice of Poland as a case study fills a lacuna in the academic studies concerning the adaptation of Polish security and defence to the EU (an exception is Chappell, 2010). This study does not address Poland’s participation in civilian crisis management, but focuses instead on the modalities of capability development. The methodology follows an in-depth literature analysis, participant-observation, process tracing as well as interviews.

The research approach

The promotion of the norms of CCM, envisaging an embedding of civil-military coordination in all the spheres of security policy, is a process unique to the EU. Other institutions, including the UN, OSCE and – lately to some degree also NATO – have undertaken efforts to build civilian capacity and have organized civilian operations, but only the EU has made a concerted effort. Scholars emphasize that civilian crisis management is a novel concept “specific to the EU” having “no equivalent parallels in the lexicons of UN, OSCE or non-European regional organisations” (Kaldor et al., 2007). I therefore analyze the process of the EU member states’ internalization of these norms, conceptualized as Europeanization.

By contextualizing the CSDP within the “security governance” framework I approach the impact of “Europe,” in a broader sense than applied in the majority of Europeanization scholar works. I conceptualize governance processually as “creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective action” in the sphere of security and defence policy (Webber et al. 2004). Thus,
integrating governance into my definition of Europeanization I consider it to be a process at the domestic level in which member states’ policies, institutions and ideas are affected by new practices, norms, rules and procedures generated at the above-state level of the EU security governance (Irondelle 2003). This definition allows us to capture policy triggers that do not originate only in Brussels, but also in other EU member states or other European structures.

I argue that the impact of Europeanization is mediated by two intervening variables: security identity and state capacity. Following Rieker I situate the security identity within a dominant security discourse, that is “the general understanding of security shared by the majority of the political elites at a given point in time” (2006). The security identity is a cognitive framework instantiating a national strategic culture, which I take to be “the socially transmitted, identity-derived norms, ideas and patterns of behaviour that are shared among a broad majority of actors and social groups within a given security community, which help to shape a ranked set of options for a community’s pursuit of security and defence goals” (Meyer 2005, 528). I hypothesize that the European cognitive constructions and policy designs are the more likely to impact upon Polish security policy the more they resonate with the ideas embedded in the national security identity (Risse 2001).

The historical memory, the acquis historique, has played a strong part in framing the security identity of Poland, like Germany featuring an acute wartime trauma (Banchoff 1999, Berger 1997; Copsey and Haughton 2009). The lessons of the past have translated into a set of policy axioms of the Third Republic (Longhurst and Zaborowski 2007). First, the central aim of foreign policy has been the maximisation of security. Mindful of Poland’s existential dilemmas, Polish elites respect the military, support the use of force and value “hard” security above “soft security.” Second, Poland is determined to never again become an object of European politics. The country aspires to play the co-decision-making role it considers its due in the European Union and NATO. Third, in a modern vestige of mission civilisatrice, Poland, which in the 15th - 18th century in union with Lithuania had extensive landholdings in Eastern Europe, claims a vocation for drawing Eastern Europe to the Euro-Atlantic community. Fourth, the Poles have taken to heart the principle of solidarity, which translates inter alia into a commitment to preventing the de-coupling of the Western security community. European defence is acceptable provided that a harmonious relationship with NATO and the United States is ensured.

Security identity does not determine neatly state preferences. If a “misfit” occurs between European and domestic ideas the elites may attempt to construct cognitive or institutional compatibilities between the new and the old (Marcussen et al. 1999). Their ability to do so is to a large degree determined by state capacity. It encapsulates both the narrow conception of administrative capacity as well as a broader notion of governance, including the possession of expertise allowing for the “translation” of CSDP into the domestic context, a qualified staff, an effective interdepartmental coordination (a whole-of-government approach), a culture of long-term planning, a sound institutional infrastructure as well as resources.

**The EU conceptual-policy framework**

In line with the post-Cold War security environment, a comprehensive approach has become the norm across international organizations and their members. The European Security Strategy advocates the application of the “full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian,
trade and development activities” (European Council, 2003). The EU thus set out to integrate civilian and military dimensions of CSDP in the planning, capability-development and the conduct of crisis management operations.

Since none of the EU member states, not even the Nordic countries, that influenced most the civilianization of CSDP, had the type of integrated, multifunctional civilian rapid reaction capacities that the EU was calling for, concepts, doctrines and standards had to be developed from scratch (Jakobsen, 2006). Because the comprehensive approach is nowhere defined in the EU (Wendling, 2010) it may mean different things to different actors (Drent, 2011; Nowak, 2006). This pertains to the concepts of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) and the civil-military coordination (CMCO). First brought into NATO, CIMIC entails the use of civilian resources in order to secure local support and thus contribute to the success of the mission (Gebhard, 2008). Limited to the theatre of operations CIMIC is a subset of a broader concept of civil-military coordination (CMCO), hailed as the EU trademark. It refers to “the need for effective co-ordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation of EU’s response to the crisis” (Ibid.). CMCO is a strategic-level approach that addresses the civilian-military interfacing within the EU and – hopefully – the member state’s institutional set-ups (Ibid.). Through an Action Plan for further strengthening of CMCO in EU crisis management, the EU has sought to integrate civilian actors across pillars into planning and implementation of crisis management at political-strategic level (Jankowska, 2007).

The attainment of CMCO has been impaired by the heterogeneity of cultures of civilian-military interaction among EU member states as well as problems in setting up the EU’s own joint civil-military structures in Brussels. The EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) points out that the “fact that CCM potentially comprises multiple stages and multiple actors and that there is no agreement on its definition has resulted in some confusion over the definition of CCM at the EU level.” By 2009, no common definition of what encompasses “civilian” had been developed (Gya, 2009).

**Civilian Headline Goal methodology**

The Civilian Headline Goals are modelled upon the Open Method of Coordination used to develop military capabilities. It encapsulates an establishment of precise, quantitative targets in specific priority areas (police, rule of law, civilian administration, civil protection, monitoring, support to security sector reform), to be met voluntarily initially by 2003 and then by 2008 and 2010 (Civilian Headline Goals). The process entails holding commitment conferences, identifying shortfalls on the basis of the commitment-target gap, and formulating action plans to address deficits (Dwan, 2006).

Although a new Civilian Capability Management Tool powered by a software called Goalkeeper was launched, lists of non-human resources, such as equipment, compiled, and since 2008 National Action Plans brought in to help the EU members meet CHG commitments, a significant gap remains between commitments on paper and concrete contributions to the CCM activities (Angelet and Vrailas, 2008; Korski and Gowan, 2009; Grevi and Keohane, 2009). Out of 11,000 civilian experts available, only 3,000 have been deployed in theatre (ISIS, 2010). In 2009, the shortfall were at least 1,500 personnel across 12 CSDP missions then running (Korski and Gowan, 2009:44).
In the absence of communautarisation, in a policy field open to contestation by states upholding different security identities, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) may deliver only modest results, if at all. Lacking coercive mechanisms, voluntary mimetic and normative processes may not be effective enough to bring about policy change and action plans turn out to be merely summary reports for Brussels’ consumption (Borrás and Jacobsson, 2004: 195; Korsi and Gowan, 2009; Dwan, 2006). Resources committed on paper neither reflect the reality of what civilian capabilities the EU can actually bring to bear in a mission nor help identify specific civilian expertise (Dwan, 2006: 9-10). Korski and Gowan quote one diplomat saying that the CHG remains a “number exercise,” and another, from a new EU member state, describing it as nothing but a “declaration” (2009:44).

The civilian personnel, such as judges and lawyers, correctional officers or civilian administrators, are rooted in the domestic contexts of training and employment. In contrast to the military who are pre-trained, pre-equipped and pre-formed for service abroad rather than at home, the civilians are called primarily for home duty (Dwan, 2006; Jakobsen, 2006; Khol, 2010). They must be provided with sufficient incentives to leave their domestic duties and go on a foreign mission (Gourlay, 2004). Regulations are necessary to ensure that civilians retain their jobs at home while on deployment, remain eligible for promotion and/or pay raise, and are not penalized in terms of vacation and leave. This set of issues has not been taken into account in the majority of the EU member state legislation on the civil service or such sectoral services as the correctional service or the prosecutor’s office – save for the police.

Poland, like many other EU member states, has not shied away from making impressive commitments unmatched by the level of domestic capacity-building. As soon as it entered the EU in 2004, Poland pledged 345 experts towards the CHG 2008. It was the sixth largest contribution after Italy, Germany, France, Spain and the United Kingdom. At the time Poland also spearheaded discussion within the EU on how to unify the regulations and principles underlying the training and deployment of civilians in crisis management operations (Kupiecki, 2005). In 2004, it even organized a seminar in Warsaw to this end. Poland’s generous commitment and its initial spur of activity had been motivated by a desire to make “the first impression”. The creation of coordination mechanisms for participation and training of Polish representatives in the EU’s CCM had actually been mandated during the accession negotiations on the CFSP chapter and recognized as one of the priority tasks in the 2001 National Programme of Preparation for Membership in the European Union, approved by the Polish Council of Ministers (Council of Ministers, 2001). Because CSDP is an intergovernmental domain the EU could not, however, enforce compliance, so this promise of establishing coordination mechanisms (save for tasking an expert at the CSDP section of the foreign ministry’s security policy department with overseeing the process) has by and large remained but a declaration.

**Institutionalization**

The EU has not set up a coherent civil-military coordination framework able to facilitate the diffusion of norms related to civilian crisis management, and foster policy convergence. The institutionalization of CCM has been an on-going process of trial-by-error, inhibited by a scattering of organizations across the intergovernmental and community pillars as well as clashing administrative cultures (Gourlay, 2006).
Within the second pillar alone several institutions have been involved in planning, coordination, supervision and evaluation of CCM. As envisaged at the 2000 Helsinki Council, the Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) has been established to advise the Political and Security Committee (PSC) on running and planning civilian missions, steering the development of civilian capabilities and helping disseminate common standards and best practices (EU Council, 10898/08). It is staffed by Brussels-based national representatives, in most cases non-specialist junior diplomats or lower-level officials from interior or justice ministries. Poland has been represented at CIVCOM by an interior ministry expert seconded to its permanent representation to the EU.

Due to the heterogeneity of membership, limited informal contacts and other means of socialisation, CIVCOM representatives tend to be more attuned to the national positions (Serrano, 2011). While CIVCOM mainly assists the PSC, an important role in preparing and implementing decisions related to civilian missions was assumed by the Council directorate IX (Civilian Crisis Management) of Directorate General E (External and Political-Military Affairs).

At a minilateral summit of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg in April 2003, France proposed setting up a command and control HQ independent of NATO. Because of British objections, as a compromise, a Civil-Military Cell (CivMil Cell) was created within the EU Military Staff (EUMS) to bridge both the gap between civilian and military cultures as well as intra- and inter-pillar organizations and instruments (Gebhard, 2009; Korski and Gowan, 2009). The Cell was supposed to have the capacity to set up an Operations Centre (OpCen) for an EU mission (Quille et al., 2006). When conducting operations, rather than activating the OpCen the EU goes through pre-selected national HQs multi-nationalised upon call.

In August 2007 the EU member states decided to create within the Council Secretariat the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), a nucleus civilian operational HQ, headed by a Civilian Operations Commander (CivOpsCdr), who since Lisbon Treaty came into force reports to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. In December 2008, the European Council agreed to yet another innovation – the creation, alongside the CPCC, of the Crisis Management and Planning Department (CMPD). Integrated into the European External Action Service, the CMPD has merged skeletal DG E directorates IX and VIII (defence aspects), thus integrating civilian and military planning (Ibid.). Because the Crisis Management and Planning Department is brand new, it is difficult to assess its performance. Nor, for that matter, is it easy to appraise now effectively the European External Action Service (EEAS) has integrated all the tools for capability development. Three months into his appointment, in 2011, the CMPD’s head assessed the EEAS as being “not really up to speed yet” (Schaaf, 2011). The European Parliament advocates a single Directorate General for peace building and crisis management within the EEAS that would marry the Council structures and the Commission financial instruments in line with the High Representative’s Lisbon mandate to “ensure coordination of the civilian and military aspects” of “crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation” (TEU, art. 43(2)). Due to the sensitivities of the member states, the power tussle between the President of the Commission and the High Representative and the preferences of the HR/VP, such an amalgamation has not happened.

Just as the EU has found it difficult to tie together all the actors needed for a multi-faceted civilian crisis management, so have a majority of the EU member states. In contrast to military crisis management, the EU member states have had to develop concepts and doctrines ad novum (Wtorek, 2008; Jakobsen, 2006). While military missions call upon chiefly defence
ministries/general staffs to handle planning, execution and funding, civilian missions require tight-knit interministerial cooperation as well as a single, effective coordination (Wtorek, 2008).

Sweden, Germany and Finland have devised national strategies for civilian crisis management rooted in a whole-of-government approach. In 2000, the German government produced a Comprehensive Concept on Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building, followed by an Action Plan (German Federal Government, 2004). In 2008, Finland adopted the National Strategy for Civilian Crisis Management, which tasks the foreign ministry with responsibility for political coordination and decision-making with regard to participation in missions, and the interior ministry with capacity-building, which it exercises through the new Crisis Management Centre (Finnish Ministry of Interior, 2008:4; Behrendt and Nutt, 2008). The Council and the European Parliament have recommended that other EU members adopt similar strategies (EP, 2009/2198).

Lacking the resources to match its West European counterparts, and in the early 2000s lacking in strong central executive coordination, the Polish state has found mobilizing the whole-of-government approach more difficult. The need for a comprehensive approach has only recently been articulated in Polish strategic documents. In the national strategies of 2000, 2003 and 2007 Poland’s support for the EU’s military and civilian capacities is mentioned albeit briefly. The ministry of defence in the 2008 Vision of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland – 2030 and the 2009 Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland inserted paragraph-length statements addressing the comprehensive approach. The first document envisages that to attain desired political, social and economic objectives, the future military operations would have to be integrated and synchronized with the activities of other government and nongovernmental organizations. The future planning process has to address military and civilian synergies (MoD, 2008; Smith-Windsor, 2008). The defence strategy states that “planning and conduct of international operations, including the preparation of an adequate civil-military component is the responsibility of the entire state [emphasis added – RD] and requires the cooperation of many entities” (MoD, 2009). Although these documents appear path-breaking in terms of their cross-sectoral approach to crisis management, a closer analysis suggests a narrower, CIMIC-type attitude to crisis management rather than the EU’s CMCO.

The 2009 Strategy of the Republic of Poland’s Armed Forces’ participation in international operations, drafted by the defence ministry in cooperation with the foreign ministry, is the first document to express a state commitment to raising civilian capabilities. Although it comes in a single paragraph in the 6-page document, its wording is rather strong:

“The engagement of Poland in international operations is a national effort. Hence, there is a need to develop, in addition to already functioning procedures for the preparation and deployment of the armed forces of the Republic of Poland abroad, also procedures regulating the participation of state administration institutions other than the ministry of national defence in international operations. Therefore, appropriate legal, organizational and financial arrangements will be adopted in order to ensure a broad participation of civilian specialists (inter alia from the ministry of foreign affairs, ministry of internal affairs and administration, nongovernmental organizations) in international operations. This concerns both the phase of state preparation for participating in an operation, the period of an engagement within an area of its responsibility in a given mission, as well as the phases of rebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction” (MoD, 2009).
The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration (MIAA) officials admit that the lack of legal-institutional arrangements reflected the “weakness of administration”. They also opine that this newfound interest in addressing the civilian deficit owes to the choice of CSDP as one of the priorities of Poland’s 2011 EU presidency (MIAA Interview, 2009; Goetz, 2001; Zubek, 2006). Poland’s ISAF experience, particularly the difficulty it has had in leading its own PRT, also prompted the MoD to tackle this issue. Perhaps this experience rather than the EU influence per se has been a greater stimulus.

Polish experts agree that the foundation of a systemic framework for civilian capacity-building requires a major legislative and administrative overhaul (Polish Institute of International Affairs interview, 2009; European Centre Natolin interview, 2009). Failure to adapt would leave Poland as a relatively weak player, not only in CCM, but in CSDP generally (Polish EU mission interview, 2009). After the 1999 Helsinki summit, the EU department in the ministry of interior drafted an internal concept paper on ways and means of developing Polish civilian capabilities. It failed to solicit a willing response by the decision-makers (MIAA interview, 2009). The ministry officials took comfort in the fact that the 1990 Police Act already provided for the secondment of police officers for deployment as part of police contingents in peacekeeping missions (Journal of Laws, 2007). The administration has therefore stove-piped CCM commitments, limiting it to police. It is easier for decision-makers to tick off the deployment of military police as a contribution to civilian missions rather than to undertake the complex work of adapting the state institutions to the demands of CCM (European Centre Natolin interview, 2009).

A strong impulse to examining legal and procedural questions related to deployment of civilians in operations came with Poland’s socialization in NATO, and in particular its exposure to the CIMIC concept during the US-led mission in Iraq. The Polish Land Forces Command had already in 2001 taken on the task of translating and inscribing CIMIC into Polish law, but with little results. Three years later, this job was handed over to the Office of the Civil Service, overseeing the whole bureaucracy. The Office debated whether to draft a new law, such as the Finnish Act on the Participation of Civilian Personnel, or address this problem through legislative patches (Majcherekiewicz, 2009). The work on drafting a law or otherwise administrative procedures on the deployment of civilians ended up in the security policy department of the foreign ministry. The department had already in 2003 started to conceptualize a law on a secondment of civilian officials, which has yet to become reality. It assumed a role of a coordinator of CCM among the Polish institutions. While the Finnish MFA has an entire administrative unit dedicated to civilian crisis management, one person within the security department’s CSDP section of 4 is responsible for it.

Change is coming, albeit slowly. The Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 19 June 2006 on the service of officers of the Border Guard in the Border Guard contingent addresses the issue of foreign deployments for border guard officers. The new Act of 27 August 2009 on the Customs Service also contains procedures related to the secondment of personnel to the EU (Journal of Laws, 2009a). The draft 2009 law on the correctional service elaborates at greater length regulations on the secondment of correctional service officers to international organizations. However, policy adaptation takes place within sectors rather than across-the-board throughout the administration.
Recruitment

The EU neither promotes generic recruitment nor maintains an in-house roster of deployable experts. Relevant norms have been diffused by means of the EU Council’s 2006 Draft recommendations and guidelines on the raising of personnel for EU civilian crisis management and a horizontal sharing of information on the recruitment, exchanges of know-how, best practices and lessons learned (EU Council, 16696/06). The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability recruits national experts through Calls for Contributions to the member states (Behrendt and Nutt, 2009), and it is up to the member states to supply the candidates.

Nineteen EU member states have either integrated rosters, which include the police officers and other civilian personnel, or police databases; 3 are in the process of developing rosters; and 5 have none (Korski and Gowan, 2009). Finland, through its Crisis Management Centre, Germany, a quasi-governmental Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF) and the United Kingdom, through the Stabilization Unit, have pioneered civilian rosters of individuals hailing from both the government and the non-government sector (Behrendt and Nutt, 2009; Korski and Gowan, 2009; Gourlay, 2006). The British model has inspired the Netherlands and Denmark to set up similar outfits (Behrendt and Nutt, 2009; Gourlay, 2006). Belgium has also established a database of civilian personnel for CSDP operations (Korski and Gowan, 2009).

In Poland ad hoc-ism prevails. Only the police is said to maintain an embryonic database of police staff for EU, UN and OSCE missions, which it is said to be considering expanding into a fully-fledged roster to include also experienced police officers, retired staff and veterans of police deployments. However, police bosses are wary of standardizing recruitment procedures and centralizing rosters as this would take away their discretionary power to dangle the carrot of financially lucrative foreign deployments to their subordinates. Austria, Cyprus, Portugal and Slovakia have only police rosters (Ibid.).

The Polish police have developed some planning and recruitment mechanisms for deploying police contingents. This is a responsibility of a division in charge of police contingents and liaison officers within the international police cooperation bureau at the National Police Headquarters (NP HQ). The bureau screens and interviews the candidates as well as coordinates pre-deployment training.

As part of the 2009 switch from a conscript army to an all-volunteer force a 20,000 strong National Reserve Forces within the 120,000-strong Polish military was to be created. This would provide the defence ministry a pool of deployable civilian specialists. It already supervises the so-called Military Police Specialized Units, founded in 2004-2005 as rapidly deployable units of the Military Gendarmerie for duty abroad. In 2006 the Polish Military Gendarmerie acceded as a partner to the then five-nation European Gendarmerie Force (France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, and since 2008 Romania), of which the EU may avail. Warsaw expects that the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) would in the near future evolve from a multilateral initiative and become a common EU project (Polish Council of Ministers, 2005:72).

The EU has urged “Member states to consider, in accordance with their national legislation, expertise from the NGO and CSO [civil society organizations] sector, when establishing or developing rosters for deployment in civilian crisis management missions” (EU Council, 15741/06). Poland has taken little heed. Polish nongovernmental experts criticize the inability of the foreign ministry to utilize the strength of the Polish NGOs active abroad (European Centre Natolin interview, 2009). The unwillingness to solicit expertise from outside reflects a still conservative bureaucratic culture in Poland.
Training

At the 2000 Feira European Council the EU member states committed to “consider ways to train” judges, prosecutors and penal experts within the rule of law capabilities, and likewise “consider improving the… training” of civil administration experts and police officers for civilian crisis management (European Council, 2000). Although one detects an incremental trend towards strengthening EU-level efforts, European civilian training policy “remains in its infancy” as member states guard their prerogatives (Jakobsen, 2006). However, the record of member states’ provision of training remains at best mixed and at worst severely deficient.

In 2003-2004, the member states endorsed the EU Training Policy in CSDP and the EU Training Concept in ESDP (Council 14176/2/03). This policy has been underlain by a socializing motif - to “develop throughout the Union a common CSDP culture,” as well as enhance the efficiency of CCM and interoperability at the operational level (Ibid.). In 2001, the Commission started a pilot project on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. This program, known as the European Group on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (EGT) links 13 training institutes and NGO training providers from as many member states (Jakobsen, 2006; Lieb, 2010). Even though, in 2002-2009, the EGT offered 68 courses for a total of 1,399 civilian experts, few of them have ever been deployed. The design of the program may bear a large share of the blame (Gauthier, 2011; Gourlay, 2004). Notwithstanding the Lisbon Treaty’s elimination of the pillar structure of the EU, CSDP remains intergovernmental, while training has stayed under the funding and contracting authority of the Commission, with the member states unable to provide meaningful input (Gauthier, 2011). Renamed since 2010 Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (ENTRi), coordinated now by Berlin-based ZIF, it has shifted focus to harmonizing and standardizing course curricula (Gauthier, 2011).

The EU Training Concept for CSDP launched the European Security and Defence College (ESDC). It has a mandate to conduct strategic-level CSDP training, to develop and promote a common understanding of the policy among civilian and military personnel, and to identify and disseminate best practices (EU Council, 2005/575/CFSP, 2008/550/CFSP). Although the ESDC has run a number of courses relevant to CCM, a lion’s share of its offer addresses the military dimension of CSDP (Lieb, 2010). Based on a networked-architecture, with no central budget, and only a small secretariat, the College is incapable of facilitating a strong cooperation (Gauthier, 2011). The relations between the EGT/ENTRi and ESDC have been strained by competition, overlaps in courses and functions, as well as fear on the part of the former that training for civilian crisis management could be “taken over” by the “military ESDC” (Lieb, 2010).

Two other innovations, also network-based, have not provided strong EU solutions to CCM training. In 2000, the EU Council provided for setting up the European Police College (CEPOL) tasked inter alia with developing and training police forces of the member states for CCM (Council, 2005/681/JHA). The Commission too entered the fray since 2007 funding the European Police Force Training (EUPFT), which until 2011 has provided operational-level training for 1,800 police experts for participation in international policing missions (Gauthier, 2011; Tóthi, 2011).

A stocktaking of CCM training capacities in the 27 member states, performed by the Hungarian Presidency, revealed that 25% of mission staff receives no pre-deployment training.
at all. This training is compulsory for seconded civilian experts in 18 member states, though it applies usually to police and gendarmerie, and only recommended in 9 member states. Nineteen member states provide training covering all the categories of personnel executing CCM. The majority of these operate year-round, 8 centres are operational during the training periods. Five countries outsource training to the private sector. Only “a few member states” have integrated training centers, handling also recruitment and deployment, while the majority have sectoral training centres, catering to the police. Although 14 countries have agreements on international cooperation, only about 10-20 experts are trained abroad and at a cost to the sending authority. Seventeen member states organise generic core courses, 19 mission-specific pre-deployment courses and 15 member states organise thematic courses. Only 3 member states have dedicated budgets to cover these expenses, while the rest finance these activities through their ministry or departmental budgets.

Like a majority of EU member states, Poland has not devised a systemic approach to training. It has stayed on the sidelines of the fledgling EU training policy for CCM, and made no serious effort to revamp domestic arrangements. A reason cited for Poland’s non-participation in the European Group of Training is a paucity of its own training institutions, a debatable argument in view of the strengths some of the Polish police schools have acquired in recent years (Polish EU Mission interview, 2009). Although several Polish interior ministry staffers have attended EGT courses none has deployed (MIA interview, 2009). The “costs lie where they fall” principle underlying the ESDC’s funding for training has discouraged deeper involvement (MFA interview, 2009).

Aside from the military, only the police has good training infrastructure. However, its origin bears no direct relation to EU expectations, and it only offers training to national personnel from within its ranks. Pre-deployment training is provided at the Police School in Słupsk and the Police Training Centre in Legionowo near Warsaw, both experienced in UN missions training. The Higher Police School in Szczytno, the main educational institution of the Polish police, has had its legal mandate changed to respond to the extension of the Bologne process of harmonizing educational standards – the creation of a European Higher Education Area – to police education. In 2009, the European Commission awarded the School the Erasmus Mundus Charter to facilitate an expansion of international collaboration.

The strength of police capabilities in training is mirrored in a majority of EU member states (Khol, 2008). The fact that the lion’s share of EU CCM has been police missions owes to the once-preponderant focus on stabilizing the Balkans and on the promotion of the rule of law and norms in democratic security sector governance (Chivvis, 2010; Menon, 2009).

**Poland’s EU Presidency**

There is an argument that the more an EU member is determined to make an impact on EU policy the greater its will to strengthen administrative capacity (Kaminska, 2010). Prior to and during its first EU Presidency in the second half of 2011 Poland was determined to stake out a position as a credible agenda-setter for the CSDP, and move closer to the Franco-German motor of integration. A number of factors underlay the flurry of Polish activity with regards to CSDP. First, in line with its national identity imperative of ensuring a strong security net, Poland, hitherto lukewarm on the CSDP, began to regard it a useful reinforcement of NATO. This change in perspective has come about through a test of CSDP in the field, in particular the
dispatch of CSDP missions to Eastern Europe, including, since 2005, the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine, and, since 2008, the EU Monitoring Mission to Georgia. Thanks to, on the one hand, the successful launch of the Polish-Swedish Eastern Partnership in 2009, and on the other hand both a strengthening, since 2007, of executive authority under the Tusk government and a robust economic growth, Poland felt confident its enhanced state capacity would support its foreign policy ventures. Warsaw has also been eager to play up civilian-capacity building in the EU, and, thereby, arrest NATO’s foray into this area, which it wanted to concentrate on the military strength. The country also seized a widow of opportunity offered by the timing and the composition of its troika presidency. Although, under Lisbon, the CFSP/CSDP would fall into the remit of HR/VP, the Polish presidency would come after the end of the first transitional troika (Spain, Belgium and Hungary) and it would be composed also of Denmark, which had a CSDP opt-out, and Cyprus, a problematic player in security policy.

In July 2009, Polish foreign minister Sikorski handed his French counterpart Kouchner a non-paper listing dozens of proposals to strengthen CSDP. These ideas formed the gist of the joint French-Polish declaration adopted at the bilateral summit on security and defence in November of that year (Wojciechowski, 2009). Among them were inter alia the establishment of a deputy to the High Representative who would be solely responsible for CSDP; the creation of an integrated civil and military EU headquarters; setting up ‘European stabilisation forces’ (civil-military forces that would be made up of elements of armed forces, national police and border guards); and increasing the number of common exercises (Liberti, 2011). When the Poles, eager to punch above weight, saw the French forge a military alliance with the UK a year later, they tried a different tack. They turned to the Weimar Triangle, a trilateral forum of Franco-German-Polish cooperation dating back to the early 1990s. By launching the “Weimar package” for revitalizing the CSDP, Poland sought to win over Germany, and, thus draw closer to the European integration core (Adebahr, 2011). At the end of April 2010, in Bonn, the three foreign ministers presented a set of proposals, which included, among others, a joint European operational headquarters (OHQ) and a modification of the battlegroups composition to include strong civilian elements (“battlegroups plus”).

The Weimar countries then “uploaded” their agenda into the EU by conveying the Weimar proposals in a letter to Catherine Ashton in mid-December of 2010. This initiative won many supporters among the member states, except Britain which opposed activating the OHQ. It is difficult to say whether the December 2011 Foreign Affairs Council conclusions reflect an influence of Poland’s CSDP agenda since many of the proposals had long been recommended by the Council Secretariat or other actors. However, if it weren’t for Poland’s push, these ideas would not have found EU-wide acceptance. In civilian crisis management, the Council reiterated support for strengthening ties between CSDP and the area of Freedom, Security and Justice; agreed to establish a CSDP permanent warehouse for civilian assets (equipment); “encouraged” enhancing the possibilities for Battlegroup interaction with civilian actors; and, as a compromise between the British and the rest of the EU, agreed to activate on an ad hoc basis the Operations Centre for the Horn of Africa operations (Council, 1 Dec. 2011).

Poland’s efforts to upload its preferences at the EU level have been accompanied by few domestic steps to strengthen capacity. Poland invested in strengthening the civil-military capacities of the Weimar battlegroup and in a symbolic move underscoring Poland’s attempt to strengthen its credibility, in December 2011 the Polish defence minister filed an application for the Polish Military Gendarmerie to join the European Gendarmerie Force as full member.
Conclusion

Due to weaknesses in the ‘supply side’ of CCM and the refracting impact of national security identity and state capacity, Europeanization has had a relatively limited impact on the civilian crisis management capacity-building in Poland. This domain of Polish security policy has been Europeanized in patches. The level of participation of Polish civilians in EU missions has surpassed domestic policy and institutional adaptation, which remains geared towards police deployments. One observes a “shallow Europeanization” of Polish security policy in this domain, characterized by adjustments on the margins rather than the core of the security policy.

CCM requires effective interdepartmental cooperation at the domestic level to enact changes in the legislative framework, appropriate modalities for decision-making as well as allocation of budgetary resources, provision of training and recruitment procedures – in short a whole-of-government mobilization. It takes a strong political will to see it through.

The soft governance of capacity-building does not help matters. Prior to the 2004 adoption of the Civilian Headline Goal (CHG), the EU member states had few if any concrete targets to fulfill. Only later did the EU start to offer more guidance, though leaving a very wide margin of discretion to the member states. A notorious mismatch between commitments and contributions ensued.

Heterogeneity (‘patchwork’) in national CCM architectures reflects complex demands put on state administrations and different degrees of congruence of member state security identities. Only a few countries, those with colonial legacies (for example, Britain), or traditions of either neutrality (Sweden) or internationalism (Norway), or having strong development assistance programs and a thriving civil society (Germany), or a mixture of both (Finland), have made strides in implementing the kind of multi-faceted CCM paradigm envisaged in the EU doctrinal documents. In the context of divergent national approaches, horizontal diffusion has not facilitated the optimization of outputs.

While the “supply” side of CCM has been weak, Europeanization has also been curtailed on Poland’s “demand” side. This is due to a dissonance between the norm of engaging civilians in a broad spectrum of crisis management activities and the military-first Polish security identity as well as capacity constraints. Before joining the EU, Poland deployed its police officers for the UN, OSCE and WEU missions. This experience helped make the police the only civilian capability in Poland to have adapted reasonably well to CCM. Stove-piping their CSDP commitments, the Polish authorities have been content to let the police do the job of CCM, while under-investing in the non-uniformed civilian capabilities.

The Polish security identity remains fixated on hard security. Unlike France, in particular, Poland has no former colonies in the developing world that might sustain interventionist impulses; its civil society is fairly weak and its development assistance program is relatively new and still modestly endowed.

The Europeanization paradigm assumes that misfitting European policies inflict high implementation costs. Polish elites have not shown much willingness to pay the price for internalizing CCM norms. A few legislative changes enacted to date have been vertical rather than horizontal, more suitable for cross-sectoral CCM. They have also been confined mostly to the police, including the MoD-subordinated military police. Since many other EU member states have also put a lot more resources into police rather than other civilian capabilities, there
have been few tutors. Apart from the police, the recruitment of civilians in Poland has been ad hoc. Due to an opaque bureaucratic culture, the administration has only in the recent few years expressed a genuine inclination to seek outside expertise. This contrasts with well-developed public-private cooperation in some of the EU-15 states. Outside of the police and the military, few opportunities exist to train civilians.

As the 2011 Polish EU presidency approached, an ambition grew to close the gap between the military and civilian tracks of Polish involvement in CSDP. The 2009 MoD strategy on the participation of Polish armed forces in international operations expressed a commitment to build civilian capacities. Instead of putting this declaration to work, however, the authorities strove to strengthen collective EU civil-military capacities. This has been exemplified by Polish-led minilateral and EU-level efforts to strengthen the civilian capabilities of the battle groups or to set up the EU operational headquarters. Perhaps this approach gives substance to the EU predilection for “pooling and sharing” capabilities. Or it may appear a useful credibility- and prestige-building exercise at the EU level diverting the attention of policymakers from less glamorous, though arduous domestic reforms to enable capacity-building.

References

A Giant with Feet of Clay? The EU’s Ability to Develop Capabilities for Civilian Crisis Management

- Chivvis, Christopher. *EU Civilian Crisis Management: The Record So Far*. Santa Monica: RAND, 2010
- Council of the European Union (Council).
  - Doc. 14176/2/03. Draft EU Training Policy in CSDP.
  - Doc. 15741/06. Recommendations for Enhancing Co-operation with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in the Framework of EU Civilian Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention. Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management.
  - Joint Action 2005/575/CFSP of July 2005 establishing a European Security and Defence College (ESDC)
  - Joint Action 2008/550/CFSP of 23 June 2008 establishing a European Security and Defence College (ESDC) and repealing Joint Action 2005/575/CFSP.
- European Centre Natolin interview, 2009.
A Giant with Feet of Clay? The EU’s Ability to Develop Capabilities for Civilian Crisis Management

- MIAA Interview, 2009.
- Polish Institute of International Affairs interview, 2009.
- Polish EU mission interview, 2009.


• Serrano, Omar. The impact of domestic factors in the secondment of personnel in civilian and mixed civil-military operations, Paper presented at the EUSA Twelfth Biennial International Conference, Boston, 3-5 March 2011.


