THE ENTIRE WORLD’S A STAGE: THE EU’S STRATEGIC PRESENCE IN THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ARENA

Scott Nicholas Romaniuk*

Abstract: In the last ten years, an exceptional and diverse series of impacting events—international terrorism, violent conflict situations, war, environmental and natural crises, coups, assassinations and international disputes and challenges—have unfolded. As higher expectations of international bodies in responding to emerging challenges within the international system continue to surface, the shifting structures of actors that deal with those challenges can be readily observed. With the global conflict map undergoing strident change, the focus of strategic analysts is shifting to the global role of the European Union (EU). The EU is seen, more than ever, as a viable and legitimate player that can appropriately respond to existing and anticipated crises in a coherent and coordinated manner, particularly with the application of military force. This article addresses the shifting power structures of the EU as it becomes oriented toward a more unique role that utilizes a ‘soft-hard’ power duality, and current challenges to EU security. It addresses the emerging role of the EU as an international player and examines several cases of EU intervention in distant theatres of operation.

Keywords: Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), European Security Strategy (ESS), militarization, ‘Normative Power Europe,’ ‘Civilian Power Europe’

Introduction

As new and dynamic methods of arrangement and displays of causation emerge in the geopolitical and geostrategic constellation, the European Union (EU) is establishing itself as a genuine and viable player using both elements of force and diplomacy in a manner that inexorably define it as a strategic actor on a global scale. In the last ten years, EU member states have demonstrated their ability to act with legitimacy comparable to that of the United Nations (UN) and the United States (US), not merely in the EU’s own backyard but in an increasingly international context. While proving that the advanced military capabilities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well as its own security and defence forces are not merely anachronistic, the EU has also proven that a justifiable and concrete political mandate exists beyond its own equivocal, if conceptual, borders.

What is the source of new strategic perspectives of the EU? This question has been the recipient of pervasive attention in recent years. As scholars attempt to provide

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answers to it, many within the analytic community deny the fundamentally unique role that the EU has been playing in the last ten years, particularly in comparison to the position the US has occupied over the previous fifty. Despite what many Americans and Europeans might believe, and even though there is a manifest difference in European strategic culture in the modern world, the characteristics of policy-makers and strategic-planners in the Euro-Atlantic region spring from the obvious practice of the EU during the preceding decade, particularly since 2003.

The contemporary security environment has delivered markedly new security challenges to all nations and international security-oriented organizations all over the world. These new security threats and concerns demand increased attention in such areas as: effective use of force, application of financial resources, management of existing conflict areas, control of and management of anticipated conflict regions, security of civilians and military personnel on the ground, rapid response, crisis response, capacity-building, intelligence and early-detection systems, disarmament, electoral processes, peace process negotiations, and democratization and governance. Although this does not constitute, by any means, an exhaustive list, these fields of policy and practice offer a general sense of the exigency in realizing the need for newer and more complex understandings of the role that the EU has been playing and will continue to fulfill in the years and decades to come.

This article addresses the nature of EU power in international security and politics, and the manner in which the EU exhibits its global strategic ‘actorness.’ The ongoing discourse of the EU as a global power and its role is elaborated by addressing what lies at the core of the issue: policy and performance. It serves as a calling for those in the analytic and policy-making communities to understand the palpable role and responsibilities of the EU in global affairs by addressing specific cases in which the EU has demonstrated its willingness and capacity to undertake programs and operations in and beyond its own backyard in fields that range from interregional peacekeeping to community restoration and state-building.

The preliminary section of this article presents an exploration of the shifting power structures of the EU as it increasingly assumes a trajectory of soft-hard power application in its interregional and global operations. This is followed by an investigation of the burgeoning security challenge and subsequent approaches assumed by those at the highest levels of Europe’s institutions and organizations. Case studies, central to the understanding of the EU as a global strategic actor, are presented in the succeeding pages, addressing four response operations and implementation strategies, including those of: (1) the EU Monitoring Mission to Aceh (Indonesia), (2) ‘Operation Artemis,’ (3) EUFOR/’Operation Althea,’ and (4) ‘Operation Atalanta’ off the Coast of Somalia. The final section offers a brief glance at the EU working in partnership in the fields of security and stabilization in various regions throughout the world.

1. Global Challenges and Principles

Threats

In 2011, the EU carries greater responsibilities than at any other point in its history. It strives to remain an anchor of security and stability in regions far from the edges of Europe and where few might have expected to see the EU act. Afghanistan and Georgia are two such examples that
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represent the dynamic and responsive features of the EU. Two decades after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and an end to global bipolarity, conflicts in the Middle East, regions of Africa and throughout Asia threaten its security interests including its core values. Even within its own borders, there exists a host of forces that can potentially shake the foundations on which the EU was formed.

While drawing on a unique range of mechanisms to address the ongoing security threats that the EU and its twenty-seven member states face, the EU’s Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is the most integral part of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). “The ESS [European Security Strategy],” according to the European Commission, “identified a range of threats and challenges to our security interests. Five years on, these have not gone away: some have become more significant and all more complex”.¹

The challenges that are currently and continuously on the agenda of the EU stem from a variety of sources; however, each presents a unique problem that requires a unique strategic response. These include, in particular: state failure, the illicit flow movement of peoples, piracy, terrorism and extremism, organized crime, the proliferation of conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction, cyber security and security concerns in the energy sector. The widening of the EU’s borders paradoxically present opportunities for peace, cooperation and stability alongside an increased exposure and vulnerability to the threats mentioned above. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was launched in 2004 to create a ring of security around the EU. It was launched, “with the objective of avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and our neighbours and instead strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of all”.²

Between the EU’s “civilian” and “military” missions, the EU recognizes that lasting and sustainable peace within and beyond its neighbourhood will require continued dedication to multilateralism. “At the global level”, according to the European Commission, “Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral order”.³

To this effect, the EU has revealed its commitment and enthusiasm to work closely with its national constituents, the UN, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the US and even the Russian Federation. Since the 1990s, the EU has strengthened its strategic partnerships in order to achieve its objectives as outlined within the ESS. This commitment was further renewed over the initial years of the new millennium in a number of theatres, including Kosovo, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan/Darfur, Chad and Somalia, to name only a few of the regions in which missions were undertaken in an

international context. The evolving breadth and nature of the EU’s role should compel scholars to understand the EU in terms of its application of coercive implements, and that, “what the EU symbolizes,” according to Nick Wright, “is as important as what it does, with its impact as much through the example it sets as the action it takes”.

2. The Shifting Structures of EU Power

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the American homeland, a great deal of attention and emphasis has been placed on the, too few, initiatives that have taken place as major peacemaking and peace-building operations well beyond the confines of the EU’s homefield. They comprise the 2003 American-led military and state-building operations in Iraq and the NATO-coordinated Afghanistan campaign, including the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan).

However, these two cases are too interrelated to be considered defining aspects of EU cooperation and coordination efforts or characteristic of the EU’s international role in general. Although the EU’s overall role in global affairs is the general point of departure here, the aforementioned cases should, in and of themselves, be considered far too generalizing for the purposes of classification. Although caution should be exercised in terms of the types of operations undertaken either independently or jointly by the EU, there persists a need to consider generously the frequency and types of efforts undertaken over the scope of the last ten years in order to offer a more robust and colourful portrait of the EU in terms of its global strategic actorness.

While new debates about the employability of EU external relations continue to emerge, the argument has been made that the various instruments of normative and military force of Europe’s institutions remain relative and restricted to the periphery of the EU itself. In terms of the legitimacy of power, the EU’s ability to project power in its own neighbourhood or sphere of influence is a product of its current internal decision-making structure on conceptualization, formulation and implementation of its foreign and security policies. The function of the EU has served, to some, as the necessary framework for demonstrating, if not proving fully, the EU’s ability and actual function as an interregional actor. Instances in which the EU has used its normative processes and “soft-power” applications within its own borders or just beyond may be seen as symbolically legitimizing institutions and institutional arrangements. The aggregate of these interpretational elements can ultimately blend our understanding of the EU’s operative frameworks into a cohesive institutional order. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann define and explain this process accordingly:

"Legitimation as a process is best described as a ‘second-order’ objectivation of meaning. Legitimation produces new meanings that serve to...

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integrate the meanings already attached to disparate institutional processes. The function of legitimation is to make objectively available and subjectively plausible the ‘first-order’ objectivations that have been institutionalized.6

Nicole Gnesotto posed the argument that, “a significant phase in world history—the West’s political domination of the world—is coming to an end”, while others contend that the EU represents a restoration of trust and support in distant corridors of the world in order to be a force for good.7 Hartmut Mayer recently claimed that the idea of, “Europe in the World” can also provide the legitimacy needed to allow the EU to shape global order as an equal, but not a dominant partner”.8 In this case, the interpretations of the EU and its role are ultimately shaped by cases that legitimize the institutional order of the EU. Indeed, there are reasons to understand the EU’s past and present actions as profound narratives of new and putative power in a new world order. The recognition of such power, however, extends far beyond what scholars have previously recognized as a force operating solely in the European periphery. In a speech delivered to the Bucerius/Die Zeit Summer School, Die Zeit Foundation in Hamburg on 9 August 2005, Olli Rehn stated:

I strongly believe that the EU’s creation of a rules-based framework that is respected worldwide makes Europe a global actor. The success of European integration has stimulated the creation of many other regional projects, such as ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] and Mercosur [economic and political agreement between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay]. The idea at the heart of the European project is a simple one: create institutions and rules within which countries can conduct their business—both political and economic—and other countries will seek to do the same.9

Therefore, the nature of this power represents a new but equally relevant point of departure in this discourse.10 Even though it remains a contested issue, the EU has clearly moved beyond its traditional role as a “normative power” in international security and politics. Just as the EU made strides that took it beyond the confines of “normative” instrumentality, the EU has proven that it can play a central role in transforming the present international system and the multilateralism that defines it. The EU has been eminently successful in its past and in its most recent engagements, according to which the EU was still consensually viewed as a force

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for peace. Such perceptions emerged even in spite of the means that were employed to achieve the EU’s political ends. This has caused particular concern for those standing in opposition to violent means for bringing peace, security and stability. Consider the secessionist conflicts of the Former Yugoslavia during the 1990s whereby peaceful ends were achieved through violent means. Diplomatic efforts and economic pressure came to represent only a moderate estimation of worth, and to some, such measures and restrained arrangements of power were seen as a summons back to the values of “hard-power”, military force, and even an endorsement of the maxim “peace through war”.11 While the success of operations and institutional frameworks—the EU’s comprehensive approach to crisis management, its civil-military dimension of ESDP, deliverance of humanitarian assistance through European Commission Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection (ECHO), and the EU’s cooperation with the OSCE in peace processes—have been a proper demonstrations of the reality of power, the nature and true estimation of which has been called into question, operational progress and officials’ satisfactions concurrently developed a momentous precedent.

Europe has demonstrated its ambition to play a greater role in the world system for some time now. This is strongly demonstrated in the EU “first pillar” zone, which includes interregional networks, trade, social policy, economic and monetary issues, and community integration practices, among other domains. The Lisbon Treaty has been a fundamental step that not only significantly enhanced the EU’s global aspirations but was vital in allowing the EU to realize those aspirations. As Van Langenhove explained in 2010:

Jean-Luc Dehaene, former Vice-President of the European Convention and one of the defenders of the idea of a European Constitution, recently described the Lisbon Treaty as ‘a new European quantum leap’ that allows Europe to operate as a global actor.12

The EU has leapt in this manner a number of times since the world departed from its bipolar trajectory during the Cold War era and was launched into a new multipolar age at the turn of the 1990s. The conflict of that decade acted as an important vehicle for the process of “Europeanization” whereby the EU has played a greater role in the world in such a way as to influence other states and international actors to play an active role as well. From the late 1990s, the EU’s new and emerging role was reinforced through the nomination of European Union Special Representatives (EUSR).13 Representatives of the EU were sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Kosovo and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).14 During this time, the EU has also deployed “civilian” and “military” crisis management missions for the first time in its history. This was

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14 Ibid., 5.
done under the codename “Operation Concordia”, which took place in FYROM.\textsuperscript{15} The European Union Police Mission, “Proxima” tested what has been referred to as the “European” approach to peace-building in 2003, assuming its responsibilities from NATO approximately two years later through “Althea”—the EU’s largest ever military operation.\textsuperscript{16} This new and beguiling task for the EU nearly coincided with a second demand in southern Serbia, where the EU found itself playing the role of political “midwife” in a state-building process that saw the creation of sovereign Kosovo.

The EU’s expression of “soft-power” in Bosnia and elsewhere in the Balkans, during this critical period in conflict prevention and peace-building, was clearly of little effect without the credible backing of military force. The international community received the message from the action that was taking place in South Eastern Europe that highly-sophisticated military capabilities were important for the supplementation of diplomatic pressure and “normative” practices, which were also employed as foreign policy instruments in order to realize a pivotal modification in political, social and economic realities of the region. Even as the incredible and understandable importance of “soft-power” and moral appeals for change became apparent or were revealed on these levels, the utility of force cannot be gainsaid. Of the change that was eventually seen in South East Europe, military force was the catalyst of change.

As the EU sweeps its way increasingly towards a role of international actorness and assumes a position of effective and not just “normative” change in its periphery and further, force has become the cornerstone of the EU’s capacity in crisis response, conflict management and building sustainable peace in distant regions of the globe. The inclusion of a marked security component in EU foreign policy—in a manner that would suggest that peace and stability could legitimately be achieved through military means—places the discussion of the EU as a global strategic actor in the middle of a fractious and polemic debate.

Despite the controversy that stems from addressing the proliferation of peace beyond “normative” means, or by institutional and organizational frameworks that comprise the EU, a broad range of cases have solidified the notion that military means remain a sharp precondition for security, stability and cooperation. More importantly, recent and ongoing operations provide a representation of the nature and potential character of the EU’s power as a strategic actor. Unfortunately, as with Iraq and Afghanistan, altercations in the Balkans have come to symbolize something other than the true potential of the EU’s strategic power. Conflict there has shadowed considerably the benefits that have been demonstrated in the humanitarian, peace-building and relief-type activities that provide the basis of other various interventions undertaken by the EU.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
3. EU Security: Challenges and Approaches

3.1 The EU and Europe’s Strategic Dimension

Since the early 1990s, scholars have been gripped by their interest and fascination with the priorities of the EU and its member states. The preoccupation with its moral principles in addition to its real and perceived commitments across the European continent and elsewhere in the world have become critical to the relevance of the EU’s strategic future. Both the prosperity and stability of the EU’s evolving role will continue to be determined by both internal forces plus a host of externalities. Accordingly, there are two predominant challenges for the EU:

1. To ensure that the EU can successfully act as “one of the poles in the emerging multipolar order”;
2. To play a role in the shaping of the emerging multipolarity of the new world, forming it “into one that strengthens global governance”.

The dialogue that has taken place has been productive insomuch as it has produced a positive framework on which to build further understanding and expectation. However, there has also been a negative dimension due to the creation and promulgation of unrealistic and counter-productive expectations. One such obstacle is the need to know where to draw the line for the conception and establishment of a concrete and workable EU foreign policy regarding security. Will the current arrangement of EU pillars satisfy future demands placed on supranational and intergovernmental principles? Will the changing role of the EU in general demand a radical restructuring of the three pillars so as to increase the role of the European Commission in terms of creating and executing its foreign and security policies?

Hartmut Mayer considers the EU’s success in this field as intrinsically connected to matching foreign policy “abstract obligations (derived from general principles of morality) with external expectations (as a result of a conceptual switch from a Euro-centric to a non-European world view).”18 The slippery slope is the avoidance of what he refers to as “inflated views within and external to Europe.”19 As both internal and external forces challenge the EU’s evolution, it is necessary to realize that internal mechanisms of the EU might require reshuffling to adequately meet the demands of its own internal and external challenges.

Volumes of work within atypical EU journals, such as Survival, European Security, International Affairs or International Peacekeeping, are dedicated to the study of the EU as an international actor. Informed scholarship on the militarization of the EU and its use of power beyond “civilian” or “normative” means is a welcomed event, although concerns for democratic legitimacy and the potential impact on the EU’s “civilian power” have been largely conspicuous in their

19 Ibid.
absence. Works that reflexively analyze the implications of discussing EU security without considering the consequences of inserting or writing security into the EU narrative need to be considered as part of the securitization problem, rather than a (“normative”) solution. However, the problem extends beyond the narrow confines of security. Mayer recently expressed the difficulty in clear terms:

> Scholars and policy makers who work on Europe’s external relations have broadly failed to integrate themselves sufficiently with thinkers on globalization, global order and on non-Western approaches to international affairs. Research on EU foreign policy has been, on the whole, a bit too narrow and specialized.\(^\text{20}\)

Its stabilization and security processes identify the increasing strategic dimension of the EU as a global actor. The role that the EU will play in both the “civilian” and “military” halls of the international arena is rooted in issues beyond the nascent multipolarity of a new international order. One of the major challenges that Europe (including the EU) struggles to overcome is the misconception that the EU not only possesses an undeniable \textit{bête-noir} to the use of military force, but that it is generally powerless when pressured to act militarily beyond its borders. The EU and its national constituent states habitually shared in the responsibility for regional and global security and stabilization, especially since the early 1990s. As the majority of EU Member States share a broad scope of geostrategic interests at home and abroad, an overarching ability to defend not just their own interests as they relate to regions abroad but also the interests of others is a growing requirement for all of them, even if they only obliquely relate to those of the EU.

### 3.2 The EU Security Strategy

As a result of increasing demands placed on the EU, the compass of its contemporary strategic environment continues to spin. The Member States’ account for expansion in geostrategic interests is readily apparent in the ESS. This is a comprehensive approach to the EU involving itself in much more than security operations. The ESS represents a combination of “civilian” and “military” power instruments in a unique formula. The formula can be used to address an increasing and changing threat matrix. The ESS is designed to meet the challenges of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction, regional conflicts, failed- and failing-states and organized crime to name a few. A major feature of the ESS lies in the fact that the Strategy is not region-specific, nor was it formulated with the intention of it guiding operations in any particular strategic theatre. Broadly speaking, the EU has established three primary aims as the foundation of the ESS.

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The imperatives on which the primary aim of the EU is based in the context of the outlined strategy objectives should dispel strong notions on which a great deal of scholarly research has concentrated. The data provided in the Strategy offer sufficient reason to conclude that the second pillar of the EU was designed to respond to continual change on an international level and with it to change the fundamental nature of EU power in the world. The EU is no longer a singular model in a specific theatre of operations, nor an example of older modes of power and security arrangements, such as an exclusively “normative” player.

Rather than being considered a creator or agent of “norms” on a regional scale, the EU is a driving force in terms of “norms”, promotion and implementation, though relative to the changes taking place far beyond Europe. Therefore, “normative” power Europe has become the smaller brother of its military sibling in the second pillar. The EU and its role should be seen according to the relationship between globalization and “Europeanization”. Considering this relationship, we should be able to understand that the EU is able to make an even greater contribution to global order and security. The case studies in the following section illustrate, through an assessment of real and practical engagement on various levels, the incongruity that exists between the EU’s speech-act and its actions.

### 3.3 European Security and Defence Policy

The EU has increasingly oriented itself toward a structure for peace and security, and as such, has made a valuable contribution to a more stable international framework. ESDP is a central pillar in this framework. It represents the EU trajectory in moving beyond its traditional roles as a trading and economic power. There has been a test-period for ESDP and the structures of this policy continue to be tried and applied to new and unfamiliar contexts. One of the main criticisms of the EU in tackling issues on a level that goes beyond its traditional stride is its lack of military capabilities. As such, the types of missions that the EU has assumed should stand as sharp representation of its capability to incorporate that necessary military feature in its arsenal. ESDP seeks to address the noticeable gap that was obvious during the EU’s handling of the Balkan crisis as does the ongoing missions beyond South East Europe.

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<th>Table 1: Primary Objectives of the European Security Strategy</th>
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Source: European Commission
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Three challenges persist in the face of an embryonic ESDP framework. First, the EU continues to tackle the need of establishing necessary political structures in Brussels in a manner that could effectively and singularly inform the procedures and processes of ESDP. Second, the EU, unlike its American counterpart, continues to struggle with developing the necessary military and technological capabilities. Third, the need exists to establish a coherent and unified approach to the command of military operations and the conduct of missions undertaken on the continent and further.

Three additional challenges, in particular, exist in developing ESDP and establishing it as a potent instrument of Europe’s responsibility and role as a global actor in strategic terms. EU officials are plagued with difficulty in convincing all EU Member States of the value of thinking beyond the strategic importance of the continent. Finally, policy-makers in Brussels are forced to address the perception, not only of its own citizens, but the opinion of those abroad, about the ability of willingness of the EU to address security and stability on an international plane. One potential rebuttal to this stated challenge is the notion that Brussels need not spend time attempting to market itself or convince others of its willingness and capacity to address global issues so long as it continues to exemplify its assumed obligations and responsibilities through action. Of no less importance is the different threat perceptions between EU Member States at a micro-level and between the EU and the United States at a macro-level. In part, these matters are strongly associated with psychology, but are also rooted in a pragmatic sense of security concerns as they relate to trade, economics and politics. In the first place, the EU and the US do not share the same enemies, nor are they confronted by identical threats; in the second place, the US’ understanding of security and its security and stability standards remain strongly incongruent with those of the EU.

Notwithstanding the deep-seated challenges facing the EU in further developing and establishing ESDP as a critical tool for global strategic “actomess”, the track record of the EU serves as convincing evidence that the EU is entrenched in a greater role. Since 2003, no less than fourteen ESDP operations have been initiated, which tells of the function of the EU.

No doubt there are those who hiss at the idea that the EU can grow into a solid institution with the ability to deal with important implications for how the EU should fight, when it should fight and how it should conduct its strategic-military relations in order to ensure peace, security and stability. The recognition needs to be made that embedded within the ESDP engine are highly causative mechanisms such as the Policy and Security Committee (PSC), which endows the policy with political and strategic direction for all ESDP activities. The EU Military Committee (EUMC) also offers essential military advice to the PSC and assumes command of all military action. Additionally, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) offers counsels to the PSC on a civilian level.

These committees are ultimately supported by the General Secretariat of the Council—the Joint Situation Centre—which supplies vital intelligence on various strategic developments and areas that are classified as conflict or crisis zones. The General Directorate External Affairs (DGE) serves as an umbrella group, offering support to the PSC, CIVCOM,
the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) and works directly with EUMC. The DGE simultaneously provides military knowledge and experience to the Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR).

4. Europe’s Military and International Field Experience

The most significant expressions of EU’s interaction and the expansion of its power are apparent in its recent global activity and influence in both “civilian” and “military” capacities. The actions of the “regulatory superpower” as Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler have referred to the EU, have been successful in fulfilling an international security agenda and the EU has not operated in theatres in its nearly twenty-year history. The cases presented in this section illustrate the arguments presented previously by drawing on aspects of the EU’s regulatory and security policy.

Even though the various levels of the EU member states’ individual military strengths appear to stand in opposition to the idea of the EU as a “military power”, or even to the EU’s attempt to establish itself as a coherent military player, there are clear signs of the EU’s “hard-power” identity. First, the EU’s Defence expenditure is of great significance. According to the European Defence Agency (EDA), and as outlined in the European-United States Defence Expenditure in 2009, the US spent €498 billion on Defence in 2009 whereas the EU spent €194 billion. In 2009, the US employed 1,418,142 military personnel and 738,872 civilian personnel while the EU employed 1,688,537 military personnel and only 426,335 civilian personnel. The 2009 defence expenditure not only indicates that the US employed only 85% of the EU’s military personnel base, it shows that the US military personnel level exceeds its level of civilian personnel by twice as much whereas the EU employed nearly four times the number of civilian personnel in the military sector. Even given the obvious disparity in these figures, the EU manages to nearly match the US’ personnel expenditure—the EU spent €98.4 billion and the US spent €104.3 billion.

Detractors of Europe’s budding military potential might argue that its total Defence expenditure has fallen significantly between 2006 and 2009. Such an approach would likely underscore the fact that the EU’s Defence expenditure of 3.78% in 2006 has shrunk to 3.31% by 2009. The same data show that the EU’s Defence expenditure as a percent of the EU’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has remained relatively stable between 2006 and 2009, surviving even the global economic crisis that hit

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23 The EDA defines “military personnel” as authorized strengths of all active military personnel on 31 December of each year; includes all personnel in uniform who can operate under military command and can be deployed outside national territory.
24 The EDA defines “civilian personnel” as authorized strength of all civilian personnel on 31 December of each year employed by all military establishments and the armed forces.
25 Ibid., 6.
in 2008. The EU’s collaborative Defence equipment procurement reached a high-point in 2009, indicating a 2% increase from the previous year. In 2006, EU Defence spend per soldier was recorded by the EDA at €103,602 with a moderate rise noted for 2007.\(^{28}\) After a brief period of stagnation in spending from 2007 to 2008, Defence spend per soldier revealed a considerable increase of €12,662 or 11% in 2009 from its original position in 2006. The similar trend can be seen in the EU’s investment per soldier, which has risen steadily over the latter half of the decade, with a 5.36% increase between 2008 and 2009. It must surely be acknowledged that the quality of troops means a great deal. In contrast to its 2006 figures, the EU currently retains a military force that receives considerably more funding, its operation and maintenance as well as infrastructure funding has been increased drastically, and its outsourcing has increased.

One of the most critical indicators of the EU’s ability to fulfil its evolving global and strategic role rests in its force deployability. Whereas the EU could field approximately 426,700 troops in 2006, it was capable of deploying well over 443,000 trained troops in overseas operations in 2009.\(^{31}\) This number gradually rose since 2006, peaking in 2008 and ebbing only marginally twelve months later. A significant rise has also been recorded in the EU’s total number of sustainable land forces, which rose by nearly 6,000 in only three years. Understanding the importance of the Defence expenditure underscores the EU’s deployability as of 2009. Though the EU’s deployment of troops has actually declined between 2006 and 2009, there are more deployable troops in 2009 than there did five years before that time. Even the reduction in the average number of troops deployed through select years by all EDA Participating member states, from 2006

Table 2: Deployability of EU Military Forces

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<th>Years</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Number of Troops Deployed</td>
<td>83,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployable (Land) Forces</td>
<td>426,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainable (Land) Forces</td>
<td>100,900</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average Number of Troops Deployed out of pMS Military Personnel</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Source: European Defence Agency (EDA)

\(^{27}\) Ibid., 4.
\(^{28}\) Ibid., 5.
\(^{29}\) Ibid.
\(^{30}\) Ibid.
to 2009, cannot go unchallenged. While infrastructure has received a consistent level of funding since 2006, procurement has shown a consistent increase in funding over the past four years.

Since 2006, the EU’s equipment procurement expenditure has climbed nearly 5%, signifying nearly €3 billion in additional funding for all major equipment categories of military forces. Even taking into consideration the range of investment that EU military sectors currently receive and understanding that EU Defence expenditure figures for 2006, 2007 and 2008 are inflated to 2009 economic conditions, EU military strength is now more robust than ever. As training per soldier has increased steadily, force sustainability has strengthened. Overall, the EU’s military forces are able to boast a much higher degree of deployability within and beyond the borders of the EU.

**Figure 1: EU Military Force Deployability, 2006-2008**

![EU Military Force Deployability, 2006-2008](image)

Source: European Defence Agency (EDA)

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Figure 2: Troop Composition of EU Civilian, Military and Joint Mission Since 2003

![Number of Soldiers Involved in EU Civilian, Military, and Joint Missions Since 2003](image)

Source: London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)

Table 3: EU Civilian and Military Missions Since 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Country/Region</th>
<th>Type of Mission</th>
<th>Mission Objectives</th>
<th>Force Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missions in Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-ongoing</td>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>EU Police Mission (EUPM)</td>
<td>Establish a sustainable, professional and multiethnic police service</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[civilian]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March-December 2003</td>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>“Operation Concordia” replaced NATO operation to support peace efforts [military]</td>
<td>Contribute to a secure environment and allow implementation of the Ohrid Agreement</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date (Start-End)</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Duration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2004-July 2005</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>EUJUST Themis rule of law mission [civilian]</td>
<td>Support reform of criminal justice system.</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2004-ongoing</td>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>EUFOR/“Operation Althea” replaced NATO peacekeeping force [military]</td>
<td>Help BiH make progress in the context of the SAP; ensure compliance with peace agreement; contribute to secure environment</td>
<td>7,000 (reduced to 2,500 in 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2005-ongoing</td>
<td>Moldova/Ukraine</td>
<td>EU BAM border assistance mission (action under the Rapid Reaction Mechanism and TACIS) [civilian]</td>
<td>Prevent smuggling, trafficking and customs fraud by providing advice and training to border and customs services</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2005-June 2006</td>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>EU Policy Advisory Team (EUPAT) [civilian]</td>
<td>Monitor and mentor police on priority issues: border police, public peace and order, fight against corruption and organized crime</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2008-ongoing</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>EU monitoring mission (EUMM) [civilian]</td>
<td>Monitor ceasefire</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2008-ongoing</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>EU rule of law mission (EULEX) [civilian]</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>1,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Missions in Africa**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date (Start-End)</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June-September 2003</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)</td>
<td>“Operation Artemis” to stabilize the Bunia region before UN troops arrival [military]</td>
<td>Contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions and improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia.</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## THE ENTIRE WORLD’S A STAGE: THE EU’S STRATEGIC PRESENCE IN THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ARENA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Mission Description</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 2005-ongoing</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>EUSEC DRC: mission to assist security sector reform</td>
<td>Provide advice and assistance to the authorities in charge of security</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2005-December 2007</td>
<td>Darfur, Sudan</td>
<td>EU assistance to African Union mission</td>
<td>Support AU political, military and police efforts to address the crisis in Darfur.</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April-December 2006</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>EUFOR DRC: assist UN to supervise elections</td>
<td>Help the UN peacekeeping force secure the region during elections</td>
<td>2,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2007-ongoing</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>EUPOL DRC Police mission: assist reform of Congolese national police</td>
<td>Assist police authorities in field of security sector reform</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2008-March 2009</td>
<td>Chad, Central African Republic</td>
<td>EUFOR Chad/RCA: Civilian policing mission and military security mission to protect Darfur refugees</td>
<td>Protect civilians in danger and UN personnel, facilitate delivery of aid</td>
<td>3,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2008-ongoing</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>EU SSR Security Sector Reform mission</td>
<td>Advise and assist security sector reform</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2008-ongoing</td>
<td>Off the coast of Somalia</td>
<td>“Operation Atalanta”: EU naval force against piracy [military]</td>
<td>Protect merchant and vessels of the World Food Program; deter, prevent and bring to an end acts of piracy</td>
<td>1,800 (over 20 vessels)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2010-ongoing</td>
<td>Somalia/Uganda</td>
<td>EUTM Somalia: mission to train security forces [military]</td>
<td>Train Somali security forces</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Missions in the Middle East

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Mission Description</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 2005-ongoing</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>EUJUST Lex: rule of law [civilian]</td>
<td>Train high and mid-level officials in senior management and criminal investigation.</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2006-ongoing</td>
<td>Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>EUPOL COPPS: police mission [civilian]</td>
<td>Provide support for sustainable and effective policing arrangements</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As the previous table shows, the EU has been responsible for initiating twenty-four “civilian” and “military” missions since 2003, which took place in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Asia. Of these, no less than one-third were military in nature or were comprised of a military component. They include: “Operation Concordia” EUFOR/Operation Althea, “Operation Artemis”, EU assistance to the African Union (AU) in Darfur, Sudan, EUFOR DRC to assist the UN to supervise elections, EUFOR Chad/RCA, “Operation Atalanta” and EUTM Somalia. However, many of the other “civilian missions” involved security sector reform such as EU SSR in Guinea-Bissau and EUSEC DRC.

### 4.1 EU Monitoring Mission to Aceh (Indonesia)

Although the EU Monitoring Mission to Aceh (Indonesia) is formally considered a “civilian” mission, operations have consisted of a “civilian” and “military” blend. Preparations for the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) began in 2005 with an initial Technical Assessment Mission that included “civilian” and “military” personnel and a headquarters establishment in the provincial capital Banda Aceh. Subsequent to the deployment of both Missions, the creation of an Interim Monitoring Presence (IMP) took place. The primary objective of the AMM was to provide assistance to the Free Aceh Movement or Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), which was struggling for an independent Acehnese state. The AMM was also tasked with assisting Indonesian authorities with implementing the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which was facilitated by the Finnish Crisis Management Initiative with help from the EU. Specifically, the AMM was responsible for:

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34 Ibid.
(1) Monitoring the demobilization of GAM and the decommissioning of its weapons
(2) Monitoring the redeployment of centrally deployed Tentara Negara Indonesia (TNI) and police
(3) Monitoring the reintegration of GAM and the human rights situation as well as the legislative change
(4) Ruling on disputed amnesty cases
(5) Investigating violations of the MoU

In specific terms, the EU played a critical role, “ensuring that the parties have begun to deliver on the commission they made in the MoU”\(^{36}\). More broadly, the success of the EU and the AMM created a positive impression that the EU had the means and the capacity to manage crisis on an international level. The mission was a critical step in establishing the EU’s presence as an international player in the Asian region—an area where it had not previously ventured. This mission serves as an example of the EU’s far-reaching powers in “civilian” terms, complementing the EU’s growing list of military missions in distant locales as well.

4.2 “Operation Artemis” in the DRC, June-September 2003

The EU’s deployment to the DRC in 2003 under the designation “Operation Artemis” represents the very first mission that has been undertaken beyond the assistance of NATO.\(^{37}\) Even though “Operation Artemis” has been referred to as a short-term military mission EU troops engaged in combat shortly after arriving in the DRC. They did so as a result of extensive reports about extreme violence and human rights violations having taken place. To many, the willingness of France to act as a leader during the situation has been seen as the cornerstone to EU effectiveness. “Operation Artemis” demonstrated the EU’s capacity to fulfil and strengthen its own common foreign and security policy. So palpable was the success of the EU’s endeavour that EU High Representative Javier Solana referred to the overall operation as “EU military progress”\(^{38}\).

One of the most remarkable events, which highlights the EU’s efficiency in coordinating its external priorities, was the formal approval for the mission that took on 12 June 2003. Initial approval for the

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mission took place on 5 June vis-à-vis joint action by the European Council. “This mission,” according to Ryan C. Henderson, Jonathan R. Strand and Kyle L. Raney, “was the EU’s first in which EU peacekeepers operated independently from NATO and its military assets”. 39 France was the first country to agree to assume the mission. Agreement was made by France to lead the mission two weeks before the UN Security Council Resolution 1484 and almost four weeks prior to the EU’s decision to sanction the overseas mission. 40 Those observing the events as they unfolded were also able to witness the remarkable cooperation between the UN, the EU and other nations contributing with military forces to ensure the positive outcome and stabilization of the situation in Bunia as well as enforcing the UN presence in the DRC. Those nations, on the EU side, included: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Sweden, United Kingdom (UK) and Croatia. 1,800 troops acting together enabled the EU to assume an executive role on the ground with support from aircraft operating from airbases located at N’Djamena in Chad and at Entebbe in Uganda.

A number of variables contributed to the overall success of “Operation Artemis”, including the influence of American foreign policy, the various contributions made by EU member states and Javier Solana as an exemplification of EU diplomatic leadership. These elements cannot be underestimated and, as the EU’s CFSP continues to face difficult challenges, as the first autonomous EU military mission to take place beyond the borders of Europe, “Operation Artemis” should be seen as a pivotal point in the establishment and strengthening of the European Security and Defence Policy. More specifically, the coordinated actions of the various EU member states burn a flare of confidence that the EU can play a decisive role in African security.

4.3 EUFOR/“Operation Althea” in BiH, December 2004-ongoing

Military deployment by the EU on 2 December 2004 represented the first step in the EU replacing NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) and Implementation Force (IFOR). 41 The primary objective of this operation was overseeing the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement—the result of a series of accords that sought to conclude a nearly four-year long war in Bosnia. 42 The majority of forces on the ground came from various Member States of the EU. The coordinated efforts of the EU should be praised for including further forces from Albania, Chile, FYROM, Switzerland and Turkey. 43 One could reasonably argue that the inclusion of external forces constituted a basis for an integrationist strategy regarding the EU’s external policy. That is, the inclusion of foreign military forces offers the EU an opportunity to leverage its international character, exaggerating both its military potential and its interregional reach.

40 Ibid.
43 “EUFOR Fact Sheet”, Available at: http://www.euforbih.org.
EUFOR adopted all the missions of the SFOR, with the exception of apprehending individuals responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The EU retained under its command 2,173 troops by 2008. As of February 2011, the cadre of Troop-Contributing Nations (TCNS) included: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK.\textsuperscript{44}

EUFOR revealed the EU’s crisis response capacity in its own backyard. It is far from certain whether any other international actor could have demonstrated the same speed, coordination and legitimacy in addressing security and humanitarian concerns. The European Commission demonstrated that it was a body capable of responding to security threats and of efficiently implementing effective foreign policy towards a region of pernicious challenge. The EU’s conflict management and prevention activities in BiH are linked to, \textit{in primis}, strengthening all three pillars in addition to blurring the lines between these pillars.

\textbf{4.4 “Operation Atalanta” off the Coast of Somalia, December 2008-ongoing}

In the wake of growing acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia over recent years, the EU launched “Operation Atalanta” in an effort to “protect humanitarian aid and reduce the disruption to the shipping routes and the destabilizing of the maritime environment in the region”.\textsuperscript{45} It involves a diverse range of operations in a manner that characterizes the mission as one reaching far beyond the realm of piracy. Whereas France led the charge in EU action in the DRC, Germany took the lead in securing Africa’s contiguous waters, which includes the most important trade route between Europe and Africa. Having assumed a comprehensive range of responsibilities, Germany currently:

[Participates in the EU Somalia Training Mission, a programme to train a total of 2,000 security officers of the Somali transitional government, which is being carried out in Uganda within the framework of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy. Beyond this, Germany has earmarked substantial sums to finance and equip the AMISOM mission as well as to train African police officers who are to serve AMISOM as trainers, advisors and mentors to Somali police officers. Germany also supports the constitutional process in Somalia through legal advising provided by the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law. The activities of various UN agencies (UNDP, UNPOS, UNODC) helping develop the judicial system in Somalia are also funded in large part by German and European contributions.\textsuperscript{46}

Manoeuvring the morass of international law, Germany deployed forces after procuring a UN Security

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{46} “Atalanta: Successful Operation Against Pirates off the Somali Coast”, Federal Foreign Office, December 27, 2010. Available at: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Europa/Aussenpolitik/GSVP/ATALANTA-UEBERSICHT_node.html
Council mandate, including approval by the Council of the European Union and the constitutive consent of the German Bundestag. The German government gave its approval for Germany’s participation in “Operation Atalanta” on 19 December 2008. On 18 June 2009, the Parliament allowed the extension of the operation to include the Seychelles and gave further approval to expand the operation area to encompass a section of the Indian Ocean off the coast of Somalia and other states on 30 July 2009. As piracy became active in other parts of the Indian Ocean, the EU responded by extending its areas of operation to combat the growing threat. A final extension of “Operation Atalanta” was made on 2 December 2009, for two more years, with the operation set to expire on 18 December 2011.


One should also take into account the tremendous range of partnership initiatives undertaken by the EU beyond the realm of formal “civilian” and “military” operations in its various theatres of operation. Accordingly, the partnership agreements that the EU has forged with other states suggest that the EU is perhaps the foremost proponent of peace-building in the contemporary global arena. Its programs have been able to make significant progress in regions that the US has not necessarily been able to do. To be sure, the diverse range of regions that the EU has added to its operational repertoire exemplifies the EU’s capacity to coordinate regional organizations in issues of conflict prevention, education of representatives on strategies in preventing conflict and building a basis of peace-building expertise in countries that might not be able to manage the complexity of conflict situations otherwise.

The following table depicts the various peace-building projects supported by the EU and its member states.

Table 4: Peace-building Projects Supported by EC Development Assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region and Source of Funding</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Activities Supported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Regions (ACP) Funded from the European Development Fund (EDF)</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Demobilization and reintegration; Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Institution building and support for the peace process; Support for: transitional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>institutions; the electoral process; security sector reform; the restoration of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>legal system in Bunia; small arms collection and destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(DRC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
### Conclusion: Europe’s Global Role

The implication, while wide-ranging in IR as well as in a practical domain, is an inextricably comprehensive concept. Theories of a “soft-hard” power duality have spawned a debate that centres on the idea of tackling such objectives as they relate to political, economic, social, development-related issues as well as “civilian” and classical military issues within the EU and far beyond Europe’s expanding borders. As such, there should be little room for pessimism regarding the role of a global strategic EU, as a politically and militarily legitimate, conceptually cohesive and politically-united player in a changing geopolitical environment. Even though previous years have exemplified the deeply-rooted difficulty in coordinating foreign policy measures within a European regional context, the same period has been highly demonstrative of the success of the execution of EU policy actions. This is true not only in Europe’s own backyard but also in distant regions of the world where Europe and European states have not engaged in since the days of colonialism and empire-building. The EU has demonstrated its readiness to move beyond traditional, “soft-power” foreign policy methods, from “norm”-diffusion to a geopolitical arena that includes the readiness to employ “hard-power”, such as military coercion and the deployment of effective and technologically advanced

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Country(s)</th>
<th>Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia and Latin America</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Cambodia, East Timor, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Guatemala</td>
<td>Establish law and order; Promote reconciliation; Monitor peace agreements; Build zones of peaceful cohabitation; Demobilize and rehabilitate troops; Strengthen the police and judicial system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Palestinian Authority, Iraq</td>
<td>People-to-people projects to promote societal confidence building; Support of political constitutional processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe and Central Asia</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Support the democratic transition process; Support for strengthening the rule of law and criminal justice reform; Capacity-building of police and border management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Balkans</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
<td>Strengthen the police and the legal system to advance reconciliation; High-level advice on equitable representation of minorities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
military force capabilities. Thus, the current debate regarding the identity of the EU at this level should not centre on whether or not the EU is a global actor; rather it should more appropriately address the question: to what extent has the EU fulfilled its role as a global strategic actor? In other words, recent experience only serves as an indicant of external governance success and future potential in newer and more strategically-oriented fields.

The EU recognizes the value in using military power as means of realizing its political, social and economic objectives, the actualization of which has otherwise been sought through “civilian” means. Military action in Kosovo is a clear prognosis that the EU is willing to defend the “norms” that it attempts to spread regionally and interregionally. Greater still, is the message that the coupling of military power and “normative” influence produces a balance-positive result that works in favour of and in the best interests of international peace and security, not to mention the ultimate fulfilment of the EU interests as outlined in the EU’s three pillars.

The historical narrative of European peace operations drives the idea that the EU’s conduct is likely to remain subject to contradiction and negative repose. The EU’s recent endeavours have proven the liquidity of its external policy boundaries, not to mention its propensity to move from the “normative” side of the ledger to the “military” side upon its own choosing. Oscillation of this nature represents the very crux of the debate on which the EU’s actions rest. One interesting point of supposition that lies beyond the scope of this article is the issue of whether the EU has sought to employ an increasingly military tone in its external policy when it is certain to achieve its desired results. In other words, does the EU choose to apply military force only to targets considered weaker than itself?

More than ever, new and dynamic perspectives on the nature of European foreign policy, including the CFSP and the ESDP, are being witnessed. They are simply a natural expression of the evolutionary nature of any institution, organization or polity in the international system, which in this case has recharacterized the EU as an indisputable global player. Would-be detractors of this new reality have and may continue to underestimate orsummary write-off the potential of the EU operating in the global commons. Scholars and practitioners who are strong proponents of the EU’s growing and self-imposed mandate currently face such questions as:

1) How should the EU best represent its power in internal and external models?
2) How might regional, interregional and global audiences perceive and respond to the Union’s articulation of military power?
3) Will the EU be forced to choose either a definitively “civilian” or military status at any point in the future, or will it be pressured to fill both roles?
4) Could a global EU plausibly develop a cogent global strategy?

While there are not any easy answers, the conceptualization of the EU’s CFSP should be seen as a positive step in understanding one aspect of a growing EU in an evolving Europe.

Preventing conflict, stabilizing conflict zones and situations, and deleveraging the capabilities of external and internal threats should be and can be seen as efforts innately political in nature. Changing the EU’s external policy orientation in addition to the ways in which the EU’s efforts in external policy are viewed represents an
essential new basis of confidence-building among communities and the ab hinc development of friendly collaboration, which is essential not only for the evolving nature of EU power but also for an evolving EU that fulfils a global role.

References


